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ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 18 Jan

LD1801090295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0600 GMT 18 Jan 95

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 18 ITAR-TASS—The ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI newspaper comments on the tv address by Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin to the Russian people on ways of a political settlement of the chechen crisis. "As the president's previous address, the speech by Viktor Chernomyrdin is a move towards establishing a long-awaited dialogue between authorities and society on the most burning problem of our days—the Chechen crisis," the newspaper writes.

"Viktor Chernomyrdin, may be, is not a very brilliant speaker, however (the address again confirmed this), he listens very attentively to what he is told by others and is able to use reasonable proposals in work," ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI notes.

"Groznyy residents learnt about Viktor Chernomyrdin's proposals, expressed in his tv speech on Monday, from radio reports and are waiting at least for a short respite," the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA newspaper writes. The proposals by the Russian premier are also known to Chechen volunteers whose positions are close to the city's central thoroughfares.

However, some field commanders "do not find anything new in the position of the Russian premier", since, as they claim, "the Chechen side also repeatedly proposed to sit at the negotiating table," the newspaper notes.

In an interview with ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA on prospects for a political settlement of the Chechen crisis, the Russian president's first assistant Viktor Ilyushin notes that "foundations for a way out of the crisis are being laid down even now, during ongoing hostilities.

"Bodies of local self-rule are being set up. Projects of the social sphere resume their operations, and all-round assistance to population is being rendered."

Under the headline "If War Is Raging, This Means That Somebody Profits By It", the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper runs an interview with Ingushetia President Ruslan Aushev.

"I believe that when the so-called opposition (eds: opposition to President Dudayev inside Chechnya) which planned to capture Groznyy, failed to do this, somebody wanted to conceal the traces of shame and to drown them in blood," Aushev claims.

In his opinion, there is only one way out of the crisis: "It is necessary to stop the war and not to believe that a victory over Chechnya is a great achievement for Russian armed forces. Hostilities must be stopped by both sides.

"Then, troops should be disengaged, and talks started on a broad range of issues. Above all, on the status of the Chechen Republic, on restoration of its economy, etc."

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA also prints results of a public opinion poll of Muscovites on the Chechen events. According to data of the newspaper's sociological service, half of Muscovites are afraid of a civil war as a direct consequence of the Chechen events.

"Over half of respondents (54 per cent) would favour an immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, not regarding this as a sign of weakness or a defeat of Russia."

The IZVESTIYA newspaper front-pages an article headlined "Way Out Of Crisis Was Close Yesterday. Economy Again At Crossroads Today". Commenting on information from the state statistics committee on Russia's social and economic situation in 1994, the newspaper notes that "the policy of stabilisation has not been hit by a disaster, but the horizon is again being covered with clouds.

"Will it be possible to reverse things for the better this year? Not only material well-being of Russians depends on a reply to this question. The political future of the present national leaders will depend on this reply as never before," the article concludes.

Speaking about the future of the Russian economy, the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA newspaper expresses an idea that "the Russian economy is acquiring traits of the so-called colonial-type economy in which semi-processed raw materials are exported in exchange for consumer goods and investment equipment.

Under the present conditions, the newspaper notes, when scientific and technical progress is the chief factor of economic growth, the structure of the national economy, shaping up in Russia, dooms the country to a protracted depression, outflow of capital and high stagnant unemployment."

U.S. Spy Plane Said Forced To Land in Kamchatka

MK1801083295 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 18 Jan 95 p 1

[POSTFACTUM report: "Air Defense Services Force-Land American Reconnaissance Plane"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Services of the Far East Air Defense District have forced an American spy plane that violated the Russian Federation border to land at the Yelizovo airfield in Kamchatka. The air defense district command declined to reveal the details of the incident, referring to the fact that the main air defense command or the supreme commander-in-chief alone have the right to give the press information about such actions. It did not, however, refute this information.

Foreign Ministry Receives No Response to Summit Invitation

LD1701131695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1208 GMT 17 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Serov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 17 TASS—Moscow has not so far received an official consent or refusal of U.S. President Bill Clinton to visit Russia in May, ITAR-TASS was told by Aleksey Kvasov, a first deputy director of the Foreign Ministry's North America department. The Russian Foreign Ministry thinks there is enough time ahead to thoroughly prepare the likely visit, Kvasov said, commenting on statements of unnamed U.S. Administration officials in THE WASHINGTON POST that serious problems had to be discussed before a visit date is set.

The Russian diplomat said those statements might be underlied [as received] by interior political considerations of the officials. According to Kvasov, the Russian Foreign Ministry is not so far alarmed by a lack of an official response to the invitation. The American side has shown neither refusal nor any sign of it, Kvasov added. There is enough time to prepare the visit and set a specific date, the Foreign Ministry official said.

Clinton Said Considering Summit

LD1701233395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2323 GMT 17 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington, 18 Jan—"The Clinton Administration is considering the question of holding a summit meeting between the presidents of the United States and Russia in Moscow; however, no decision has yet been taken." The ITAR-TASS correspondent was told this in a telephone conversation by a member of the White House staff, who asked not to be named. "During his official visit to Washington, President Boris Yeltsin invited Bill Clinton to make an official visit to Russia. This question, including the dates for holding this meeting, is currently under consideration," he said.

Date of Clinton Visit To Be Discussed

LD1701171095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1434 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 17 (INTERFAX)—The date and format of U.S. President Bill Clinton's visit to Moscow, scheduled for May, figures among the issues to be discussed by Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Geneva on January 17 and 18.

First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, in charge of organizing celebrations of the 50th Anniversary of the Victory over Nazi Germany, told Interfax on Tuesday that Moscow would expect the arrival of many state leaders on May 9, including the U.S. president.

"During summit talks in September 1994, President Yeltsin extended a verbal invitation to President Clinton to come to Moscow on May 9 to attend the celebrations of the 50th Anniversary of the Victory over Nazi Germany. The same invitation was extended to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and other leaders," said Ivanov.

He also said that the arrival of the U.S. president and the leaders of other countries must not be viewed as bilateral visits. "The celebrations for Victory Day are of special significance," he said.

It is not ruled out, however, that Clinton's visit will be timed to coincide with the celebrations of Victory Day. "In other words, it may take place on the eve or directly after this date," he continued. "This question will be discussed among other issues by Kozyrev and Christopher in Geneva," he added.

Ivanov is convinced that the recent events in Chechnya will not affect the decision of the state leaders to come to Moscow on May 9. "There is no link between the events in Chechnya and the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of Victory Day," he said.

Yeltsin Telegram To Japanese Prime Minister on Earthquake

LD1701145895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1435 GMT 17 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Solntsev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 17 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent a telegram to Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama to extend profound condolences in relation to the tragic consequences of the earthquake which tolled 1,300 lives and caused massive destructions, ITAR-TASS was told in the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Russia remembers and values the fact that Japan was first to give a hand of help to Russia after the recent earthquake on Kuriles, the telegram says. The telegram offers Russia's assistance in the management of the earthquake's sequelae [as received].

Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets sent their telegrams to Japanese Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Yohei Kono today.

Japan Declines Offer for Help

LD1701164695 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1500 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Japanese authorities declined Russia's offer of help in clearing up the aftermath of the serious earthquake today in the central part of Japan's largest island, Honshu Island, an ITAR-TASS correspondent was told at Russia's Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Natural Disasters. In reply to the offer from Russia, Japan said today that it intends to use its own resources for this.

Kozyrev, Christopher Begin Talks in Geneva

LD1801095395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0922 GMT 18 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Dmitriy Gorokhov and Konstantin Pribytkov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva January 18 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher started the main round of two-day talks in Geneva on Wednesday [18 January], which they are conducting on instructions from the Russian and U.S. presidents.

If the sides achieve mutual understanding on key issues of partnership, they will make headway in preparing for a Yeltsin- Clinton summit scheduled for May.

The ministers will discuss a broad range of issues: European security, Bosnian settlement as well as military and political topics.

Special attention is given to the Geneva dialogue, since the ministers are holding it for the first time after the December forums of the OSCE and NATO, which showed substantial differences in approaches of some Western countries and Russia to an expansion of the North Atlantic alliance to the East. It is expected that the sides will also appraise the latest developments in Chechnya.

The meeting started at the U.S. Permanent Mission to the U.N. European Branch this morning, will continued at the Russian Mission. The sides will hold a news conference also at the Russian Mission in the evening, which will sum up the results of six-hour discussions.

Kozyrev Rules Out 'Cold Peace' With U.S.

LD1801105395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1016 GMT 18 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Dmitriy Gorokhov and Konstantin Pribytkov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva January 18 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev promised no "cold peace" in relations with the United States and said his Tuesday meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher "inspired additional optimism regarding the stability of our partnership".

"A cold peace in international relations will not come, the Russian-U.S. partnership works and overcomes difficulties", Kozyrev told reporters on Wednesday before a new meeting with Christopher.

The minister said he was convinced that talks with Christopher would not focus only on the Chechen crisis. "The Chechen problem is a part of the discussion on how things go within each state. We exchanged opinions about that yesterday. We have a big agenda and we do not avoid any issues, including Chechnya", Kozyrev said adding that his talks with Christopher were "frank and friendly".

Says Partnership With U.S. 'Working'

AU1801092595 Paris AFP in English 0848 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Jan 18 (AFP)—Russian Foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev said Russian-US relations were on a firm footing, ahead of new talks in Geneva on Wednesday with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

"There will be no cold peace," he told reporters as he arrived at the U.S. mission in this Swiss city.

Kozyrev said his working dinner with Christopher late Tuesday had given him "additional hopes and optimism concerning the stability of our partnership." The discussions, he said, were "friendly, businesslike. It is possible to say that now our partnership is working."

The Russian foreign minister added: "We didn't try to avoid any issue, including Chechnya." But Russia's five-week long campaign to crush Chechen independence was disussed as an internal Russian affair, he stressed.

Christopher made no comment as he arrived for the talks.

Christopher and Kozyrev are to give a press conference at the end of the day.

Kozyrev on Russian Proposals for Chechen Settlement

LD1701202795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2007 GMT 17 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Dmitry Gorokhov and Konstantin Pribytkov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva January 17 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev informed the

U.N. high commissioner for human rights and the president of the International Red Cross Committee of the proposal of the Russian leadership for settlement in Chechnya.

Kozyrev told Cornelio Sommaruga and Jose Ayala Lasso about the work done by the federal bodies and public organizations to ease the tragedy's burden for civilians at tonight's meeting in the Russian geneva mission.

Sommaruga told correspondents that the International Red Cross Committee calls on all participants in combat operations to abide by norms of the humanitarian law, show humane treatment of POW and wounded and do not harm civilians. The Red Cross would like to have a free access to all POW.

The Russian minister told the U.N. high commissioner that Russia is adherent to principles of democracy and freedom and is ready for a constructive dialogue on human rights. The interlocutors discussed ways to consolidate international cooperation in protection of minorities' rights and overcome aggressive nationalism and xenophobia.

Official representative of the U.N. European office Tom Netter told ITAR-TASS that the U.N. high commissioner for human rights suggested to send a mission to Moscow and Chechnya for meetings with all interested sides. Contacts to the effect will be continued.

Minister, Duma Member Call FCS Report on Soros Fund Slander

MK1801085095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Oleg Rubnikovich under "Scandal" rubric: "George Soros' Indignation. His Feelings Shared by Russian Minister and Duma Deputy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] George Soros, the well-known American financier and philanthropist, held a news conference in Moscow yesterday in connection with his fund's intention to provide aid for the suffering civilian population of Chechnya and for refugees. Briefly remarking that the present visit was not planned and was prompted only by the desire to help the victims of the Chechen war as soon as possible, Mr. Soros turned to the main issue which, to all appearances, caused the meeting—a Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS] report that appeared in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 10 January in which the Independent Science Fund is accused of intelligence-subversive activity. The report says in particular that according to information available to the Russian counterintelligence service, the true objective of science centers in Russia is "helping the realization of the U.S. foreign political course aimed at containing Russia as a state potentially capable of competing with 'the only superpower.'" Mr. Soros sees these attacks as nothing but a provocation by some circles who are "trying to restore the isolation of Russian science in the world and the totalitarian control over the intellectual life of Russian society."

Standing up ardently for the American financier and the fund he heads were Boris Saltykov, Russian Federation minister for science and technical policy; and Academician Nikolay Vorontsov, State Duma deputy. They accused the compilers of the report of incompetence and an attempt to slander the respected organization. In Mr. Saltykov's words, the fundamental science supported by the Soros Fund contains no secrets, and each scientist is trying to spread his research findings throughout the world as quickly as possible.

Mr. Saltykov claims that in the government they do not doubt the American fund's good intentions because, back in the summer of 1994, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin agreed to the joint financing of Soros' programs. The sides are to put up $12.5 billion [as published] each for the programs' development.

Mr. Vorontsov promised to focus the attention of the chiefs of this service on the FCS report so that the "non-professionals who prepared this document be discharged from the organs."

Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Arrives in Moscow for Talks

LD1701163995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1454 GMT 17 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Yuriy Tyssovskiy]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 17 Jan (ITAR-TASS)—Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, Kuwait's first deputy prime minister and foreign minister, arrived in Moscow today on an official visit. The important guest will meet with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and with State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin, and will hold talks with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.

An ITAR-TASS correspondent learned from well-informed sources in the Russian Foreign Ministry that Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah's talks with Russian officials will touch on a broad range of issues, including bilateral issues. Special attention, in their view, will be paid to the Chechen problem. The Russian Foreign Ministry emphasized especially Kuwait's balanced approach to the problem and the emirate's important role in the Islamic community of nations.

Great attention will be paid to the situation in the Persian Gulf region. The difficulties faced by the Middle East peace process both in the Palestine-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli directions will be discussed in general.

The sources stressed that the talks with the Kuwaiti foreign minister will not, in their view, result in any "breakthrough" for the simple reason that Russia's bilateral relations with the emirate are characterized by a high degree of mutual understanding on practically all international problems. At the same time, Moscow highly appreciates the constructive role which Kuwait plays in the world arena and in inter-Arabic affairs.

PFP Signing Shows Belarus Entering West's Colonial Clutches

MM1701114195 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Jan 95 p 3

[Report by correspondent Oleg Stepanenko: "Belorussia Joins NATO Program: En Route to a 'Banana Republic'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Minsk—Belorussian [Belarusian] Foreign Minister Uladzimir Syanko has signed the NATO Partnership for Peace framework document in Brussels. Belarus has thereby become the 24th country to subscribe to the program.

During the signing ceremony Syanko met with NATO Secretary General Willy Claes. According to the press there, during their conversation the sides exchanged opinions on the development of the international situation and on the situation in the countries of the CIS and Belarus.

Claes expressed deep satisfaction at the fact that the Belarus leadership had demonstrated the intention to make its contribution to building the new architecture of common European security by signing the Partnership for Peace program. For his part, Syanko briefed Claes on the internal political situation in the republic and spoke about the measures being taken by the leadership to reform the economy and democratize society.

Syanko met with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott the same day. James Collins, special ambassador-at-large with responsibility for relations with CIS countries, and U.S. NATO mission leaders also took part in the meeting. Talbott stressed the importance of Belarus' joining the program from the common European security standpoint. Questions of considerable significance for Belarus-U.S. cooperation were also broached.

Belarus diplomacy's increased activity toward the West, like the thrust of the reforms being carried out in Belarus, is turning the country, in the opinion of progressive economists and political experts, not simply into a bourgeois republic but into a markedly "banana republic," which will fall completely into the colonial clutches of the West. Its joining the NATO program is yet another step in that direction undertaken by the new architects of "common Euopean security."

Foreign Ministry 'Quite Calm' on U.S.-India 'Security' Deal

MM1701123595 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Jan 95 p 3

[Report by Konstantin Eggert: "Military in Washington and Delhi Want To Make Friends, But Are Not Planning To Trade Arms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry has called the agreement signed by him in Delhi on cooperation in the security sphere with India "historic."

The document contains no hint of military-technical cooperation. It is a question above all of various kinds of consultation. In particular, it is planned to set up a working group comprising civilian experts from the two countries' defense and foreign ministries to discuss regional security strategy. Exchange visits of top military officials and joint exercises at a higher level than before are also planned, as is the expansion of joint scientific research in the defense sphere.

The agreement is mainly of symbolic importance. After all, relations between Washington and Delhi have not always been smooth in recent years. The United States very sharply opposed India's development of its own nuclear program and strove in every possible way to prevent deployment of short-and medium-range missiles by the Indian Army. Nor was any improvement in bilateral relations helped by the scandal over the sale of Russian-made cryogenic engines to India in 1993. At the time the White House opposed the deal not least because Delhi had previously refused to buy similar but more expensive U.S. technology.

The new agreement is designed to draw a line under the not very bright past and, as Perry put it, "open the door to the future." I think that the Pentagon chief's visit shows that the United States does not want to lag behind Russia, which has in recent years continued to maintain an unprecedentedly high level of contacts. Clearly striving to reassure Moscow—Delhi's main partner in the military-technical sphere—the head of the U.S. Defense Department was quick to state that: "We are not making any major steps in trading arms. That will not be a priority at all."

It seems as though Perry was wrong to be worried—the Russian Foreign Ministry was quite calm, not viewing the agreement as an attempt to undermine the stability of ties with India. "We have no problem with the United States in South Asia," this IZVESTIYA correspondent was told by a diplomat. "We jointly advocate that India and Pakistan accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and we are looking for a purely political solution to the Kashmir problem."

Our interlocutor expressed the view that the Clinton administration, having suffered a series of foreign policy failures, is striving to score points through more active regional diplomacy, and the document signed in Delhi is part of this new strategy.

Some independent experts believe that, while staying loyal to military-technical partnership with Moscow (all the more so as Russian weapons are very cheap), India would not be averse to acquiring alternative sources for military shipments.

The agreement with the United States could be the first step toward a future purchase of some equipment, but it is hard to imagine that there will be any dramatic changes in this area. Washington has no interest in destabilizing the situation in South Asia, and therefore neither India nor its age-old rival Pakistan can yet count on reciprocity from the U.S. military-industrial complex.

Moscow Concerned Over Latest U.S. GPALS Missile Test

MK1701131095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 4

[Report by Aleksandr Koretskiy under "The United States Tests New Weapons" rubric: "Fear as a Motive Force"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday's test (according to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) of a new interceptor-missile has become a kind of expression of the United States' attitude to the ongoing events in Russia. This test has not only a political but also a military aspect. It confirms the fact that the United States is continuing work to create a Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system. This means that the time for a revision of the 1972 ABM Treaty is implacably drawing closer.

First of all, the timing of test is noteworthy. As is known, such steps (these can be both nuclear explosions conducted for "scientific purposes" and large-scale army maneuvers) are not made outside the general context of relations between the great powers. The Chechen war, which among other things, has shown up not a few weak spots in troop control; the system of coordinating actions by the power structures; and also in relations between the Center and the Federation subjects does little to promote the view in the United States that Russia's missile nuclear potential is under reliable control. Vice Premier Nikolay Yegorov's demonstration on TV to the entire world of maps and photos of ballistic missile launching pads "which are in the hands of Dudayev's bandit formations" (it was not reported until the next day that the missiles themselves had been dismantled), could be fraught with the most unpredictable consequences. Let alone Yegorov's phrase that shook the world: "We are taking steps to find out what could be located there." It appears that nearly a month after the war began, the vice premier, the Federal Counterintelligence Service director, and several dozen top Russian generals were pretending that they have not the slightest idea whether there are any nuclear weapons in Chechnya. If they thus wanted to frighten somebody, their trick has been fairly successful.

There is no question about the president's being master of the "red button:" He is "officially convinced" that Groznyy has not been bombed since 23 December. If the president is also bluffing, then his actions are again an extra argument in the hands of those who believe that Russia is now in a total mess, which also applies to control over nuclear arms. Until recently the United States has been acting on the assumption that Russia's missile nuclear capability is under control (although power outages are not ruled out, as happened last fall near Moscow), while the possibility of its accidental or unauthorized use, although possible, is not very probable. In spite of the fact that the basic rationale behind this formula remains invariable today, its internal accents are changing visibly. Naturally, Moscow does not care for this.

As concerns the purely military aspect of the test, it well fits into the concept of creating the GPALS system, announced by George Bush back in January 1991. Based on the SDI concept, the Pentagon has developed the most expensive program since the Manhattan Project. Its objective was to create by the year 2005 such an ABM system which would be able to ensure a 100-percent guaranteed protection of America's territory and the theaters of military operations where its advance force contingents are located against accidental or unsanctioned attack by a regiment [polk] of ballistic missiles (100 warheads) or one nuclear submarine with nuclear missiles (200 warheads).

Yesterday's test, described by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) as "an exceedingly ill-timed move," is hardly capable of substantially changing relations between Moscow and Washington. Even though the mere tone of the "appraisal" and its style strongly recall 1980, if not 1962. An unenlightened listener could even think that the test—by the mere fact of its being held—has already caused irreparable damage to the security of the Fatherland. Not everything is that easy, however. The fact is that in working out the 1972 ABM Treaty, it was objectively impossible to take into account the level of missile technology that was achieved a mere 10 years later. As early as the 1980's the capabilities of ABM tactical systems reached a level that had been within the ability only of strategic systems. It is very difficult to draw a line of demarcation between them today, and some experts believe that this is impossible in principle. Moreover, it was in the early 1980's that a modern C-300 system was adopted in the Russian army (today it has the following modifications: -PC, -PT, -PT-1, -PM, and PMU-1). Its latest modification—the C-300 PMU-1, which, according to some experts, has both tactical and strategic capabilities—can hit ballistic missiles in the final stage of their flight path. The United States has nothing of the kind (the much touted Patriot is inferior to the C-300 PMU-1 in virtually all parameters). And so it began, without undue noise, to catch up. Its interceptor missile (experts believe that a new variant of a long-range multi-purpose THAAD missile has been tested) is a kind of response to the "Russian challenge."

True, even if this is not so, there is virtually no doubt today that the question of revising the limitations envisioned under the ABM Treaty will soon be raised (possibly on U.S. initiative, especially considering that it has long been hinting at this while the problem itself is already being discussed at expert level by both countries). As far as KOMMERSANT-DAILY has been able to find out, this inevitability is also realized by Moscow, but it would like the 1972 ABM Treaty to be revised under conditions more beneficial to itself. This is also borne out by the fact that back in January 1992, addressing the UN Security Council, Boris Yeltsin expressed Russia's readiness to work jointly with the United States on a Global Protection System (the Russian analogue of GPALS). The answer has not come until three years later and it has clearly not been agreeable.

Political Issues

Authorities Determined to Clear Up Wallenberg Case

LD1701124795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1100 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 17 (INTERFAX)—The Russian authorities are determined to do their utmost together with the Swedish side to clear up the case of Raul Wallenberg, says a Foreign Ministry statement received by INTERFAX Tuesday [17 January].

The Swedish diplomat was detained on January 17, 1945 in Budapest. "His life was tragic—Wallenberg was sent into the Stalin prison system and most likely perished there," the statement says.

"Today we must give due to the humane efforts of a man who saved thousands of people from death at the hands of the Nazis," the statement says. [sentence as received]

Shumeyko: Press Can Author 'Unifying Russian Idea'

MM1701150995 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Jan 95 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "There Is Not Democracy in Russia But Liberal Anarchy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The multiparty system in Russia has "provided fairly sorry experience"—Federation Council Chairman Vladimir Shumeyko voiced that opinion at a meeting with representatives of the regional press.

According to him, while declaring their commitment to Russia, few parties and movements "think about the state." According to Vladimir Shumeyko, an analysis of various parties' programs attests that most of these documents are "divorced from reality" and consist of unfeasible "promises of la dolce vita."

Vladimir Shumeyko sees Russian society today as a series of "pyramids," at the top of which stand the politicians. There are various "pyramids," according to the speaker.

The "pyramids" interested in the development of a strong state are the most numerous—according to the speaker, these are the "pyramids" of the military-industrial complex, high-technology production facilities, the agro-industrial complex, and the army.

It is the "fourth estate" that can be the author of a nationwide, unifying Russian idea, Vladimir Shumeyko went on to emphasize. He explained: The new Russian Federation Constitution enshrines the idea that no single ideology can be predominant or mandatory. Consequently, there can be no state organ engaged in the formulation of a national idea.

The lack of a state ideology, in Vladimir Shumeyko's opinion, failed to provide an opportunity to as it were prepare public opinion for events in Chechnya.

Fedorov: Chernomyrdin 'Dangerous' for Russia

MM1701124095 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by Russian State Duma Deputy Boris Fedorov: "The Ch.V.S. Phenomenon"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin, or Ch.V.S. as he is called in officialdom, took Gaydar's place as a pragmatic, raising the communists' hopes. These hopes were not fully justified, but even today the communists bear no particular grudges against Chernomyrdin, although they are apparently trying to get rid of his government. Both Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy find it somehow more convenient to revile Gaydar.

At first, it seemed to many people that Chernomyrdin was a weak, temporary figure. But six months went by, the premier adapted, new contacts were established and old ones reestablished, new people came, others were removed, and it turned out that Ch.V.S. was an entire institution of power, and indeed a highly autonomous and firm one.

From the very outset he flirted with the communists and with Khasbulatov and Rutskoy, he received Zhirinovskiy, and at parliamentary elections he fought against "Russia's Choice," albeit not obviously, and supported countless groups such as PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord]. And then the belief became established that he is cleverer than a lot of the others (which is true).

The defeat of the democrats at the elections provided grounds for talking about "the end of economic romanticism" and the beginning of the fight against inflation by non-monetary methods.

Yes, periodically, the president shows Ch.V.S. who's boss by removing and appointing ministers, but no one has yet managed to beat Ch.V.S. **over a short distance.** I remember the story of the redistribution of the vice premiers' duties after Gaydar's second coming: For four months he led everyone up the garden path, knocking their heads together, playing a balancing act, and in the end there was no redistribution anyway. And what about the games played over Gerashchenko!

In the past few months too the struggle for power has developed seriously. But he has not changed.

And take Ch.V.S.' reputation as a reformer! In 1994 he got rid of the refractory economists (apart from the hateful Chubays) and expanded to his full natural might. Both the West and our liberal journalists started to sing his praises. But in the end the entire stabilization process collapsed.

Ch.V.S. likes the numerous journeys he has made around the country and which have been useful in order to get away from everyday responsibility for solving problems, to establish ties with local elites, and to consolidate his own political base. Thus, by means of this constant balancing act, and by putting the blame for everything on his deputies and the president, Ch.V.S. managed to hold out despite all the shifts in Russia's unpredictable political life.

A certain international reputation emerged. If the IMF demands a small budget deficit—we present one. If we have to repeal export quotas on energy sources—we adopt a decree. But in any case, we always deceive. **Just hold out for a month, just stay still for a quarter. Let there be a disaster after we have gone.** For example an enormous foreign debt.

Ch.V.S. is undoubtedly a pragmatic—after all how wonderfully he responded to the question in the State Duma about his own shares in "Gazprom": However many there are, they are all mine, and if you want to talk about it, we can have a private conversation. On the other hand, there is also an element of mysticism: First there is a mysterious Swedish adviser hovering around him, then his personal doctor assumes a role which astrologists have played for certain historical figures.

As an official, Ch.V.S. is steady in having dealings with people he dislikes. He summons them and converses with them so insinuatingly, testing the ground without occupying a clear stance.

Ch.V.S. himself always stands aloof. Black Tuesday—I was on the beach. Chechnya—this has nothing to do with me. Or he is prepared to play at being a peacemaker, but not take responsibility for anything. Chechnya is a watershed. If the prime minister really has nothing to do with things at a moment when the country has been plunged into the most serious crisis for years, then he is not a prime minister. Meanwhile, Ch.V.S. is the second person in the state.

Who is he in fact, this enigmatic Ch.V.S? Quite simply, he is:

an eminent product of the sector nomenklatura: he remains what he was;

he does not know where the country is going and why (maybe he does not want to know?), he does not have the necessary knowledge;

he is a tactician without strategy or principles;

very flexible: promises much, carries out little;

pragmatism bordering on...

Such a figure heading the government does not simply hinder the reforms. This figure is dangerous for the country in the transitional period. Therefore, now that numerous conjectures have arisen about plots against the premier, I would like to advise analysts to dig a little deeper. Maybe something really curious will turn up.

In any case, it is obvious that while Russia is run, or more precisely, not run, by invisible politicians, it will keep falling into potholes.... It is time for V.S. Chernomyrdin to assess the results of two years as head of government. **If there are no results and none are predicted, then why torture the country and the people?**

Security Council Reform Seen Immensely Boosting Its Clout

MK1701123095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 17 Jan 95 pp 1, 3

[Report by Ilya Bulavinov: "Security Council's Restructuring. The Secretary Has a Chance To Become Secretary General"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov was appointed Security Council member. Meanwhile, last week, according to information available to KOMMERSANT-DAILY, a new structure of the Security Council staff was definitely approved. For all their seeming purely bureaucratic nature, these developments may mark a start to the process of reforming the entire security system, for according to the blueprints of reform the Security Council will be tasked with the key functions of coordinating the power structures.

Unlike most previous reorganizations of the Security Council staff, the current revamping is nearly revolutionary. Instead of two administrations—for coordination and collaboration and for information analysis—there will be three. They will be supervised by Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov's deputies: Valeriy Manilov, in charge of the administration for preparing Security Council meetings; Vladimir Rubanov, the information analysis administration; and Aleksandr Troshin, the strategic appraisals and forecasting administration. The heads of the new administrations are yet to approved by the president.

Organizational novelties are taking on a special tinge in the light of upcoming changes in the system of relations between the power agencies—all signs are that the Security Council will take over the function of coordinating their actions as the body that makes crucial decisions on the country's security. If the idea of removing the General Staff from the Defense Ministry's jurisdiction is realized, the Security Council staff will apparently become a link to connect the president with the Armed Forces (represented by the General Staff). The Security Council staff will also possibly have some functions of operational control over the General Staff, and in times of crisis—via it—all the power agencies.

According to KOMMERSANT-DAILY's information, also under consideration is the idea of bringing together in the Security Council's hands the "power" agencies alone, while removing from its jurisdiction other problems—such as environmental safety, health, and so forth. In this situation the Security Council secretaries' clout and powers are bound to increase immensely. Recently speculation has mounted that Lobov may possibly be removed from office—allegedly for Chechnya. But this has never been confirmed yet and it is possible that precisely Lobov will be "Russia's first power tsar." If he is fired after all (which is unlikely given Lobov's personal loyalty to Yeltsin), some experts name among other candidates Viktor Ilyushin, first presidential adviser, and even presidential national security adviser Yuriy Baturin (the latter is unacceptable for the staff of that same Security Council, however, so Yuriy Baturin's elevation is just as unlikely as Lobov's fall).

It is also possible that things will not stop at Security Council reorganization. In that regard there are grounds to suggest that the transfer of the function of coordinating Moscow law-enforcement agencies' activities to the Main Security Directorate under General Barsukov in December 1994 was a harbinger of things to come.

Chief Denies Security Service To Become Political Force

LD1701173595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1620 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 17 (INTERFAX)—Aleksandr Korzhakov, chief of the president's security service, dismissed allegations that his service was becoming an independent political force.

He told Interfax that the service did not set political goals for itself or society or interfere in the country's political life. Its purpose is to protect the president as a person and as a head of state and to create conditions for presidency to function as a stable institution, Korzhakov emphasized.

Korzhakov made it clear that the security service had not been set up for a specific person. He said that an efficient security service, not a mere bodyguard unit, was essential for stability of the state authority.

Korzhakov said that the service duties ranged from planning and carrying out security operations to working out the security arrangements for most important aspects in the president's activities. He said that fighting crime was one of these aspects and that he gave it a priority.

Korzhakov emphasized that he could not stay away from fighting corruption. He believed that those who had organized "a biased discussion" in mass media about his role in the president's entourage wanted to discredit the chief of an important state service which had been engaged in uncompromising struggle against corruption.

Korzhakov strongly denied that this activity would transform Russia into a police state. In his view, a police state is governed by the police while in Russia some criminals try to manage certain policemen and statesmen.

Korzhakov explained that the Federal Counterintelligence Service and the Interior Ministry as well as the president's security service looked after security in the country. He called for the setting up of a body which would coordinate all the special services. Korzhakov did not say whether that body had to report to the government or the president.

Agricultural Decline Blamed on 'Deliberate Policy'

MM1801110595 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 2

[ITAR-TASS report under the "Neither Shall Ye Sow, Nor Shall Ye Reap..." general heading]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Catastrophic"—This is how Mikhail Lapshin, leader of the Agrarian Party of Russia and the agrarian faction in the State Duma, described the situation in Russian agriculture yesterday in a conversation with an ITAR-TASS correspondent after arriving in Bryansk. In his opinion, the 40- to 50-percent drop in agricultural production in recent years was determined in many ways by the "large-scale intervention of imported foodstuffs in the domestic Russian market," as a result of which Russian peasants "were deprived of the opportunity to sell their own produce, even when it was of better quality and less expensive."

The Agrarian Party leader believes that it is a matter of a "deliberate policy to destroy Russia's agricultural sector." In his his view, agricultural production has to be subsidized out of the state budget in order to overcome the crisis.

Yeltsin Tells Chuvash President To Cancel Decree

LD1701132795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1232 GMT 17 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 17 TASS—President Boris Yeltsin told the head of the Russian Republic of Chuvashia on the Volga to cancel his decree which actually rules that there are no legal grounds for the use of the armed and interior forces in Chechnya.

"It is recommended to the president of the Republic of Chuvashia to cancel his decree of January 11 'On the protection of servicemen' as 'not corresponding to the provisions of the Russian Constitution'," the press service of Boris Yeltsin said on Tuesday.

The decree of Chuvash President Nikolay Fedorov was adopted "in connection with the aggravation of interethnic conflicts in the country and the use in them of army and interior units which are morally and professionally not ready for fulfilling inappropriate functions which results in casualties".

Fedorov's decree said that "acting legislature has no corresponding legal norms" for the use of the units in military activities on the Russian territory for solving interethnic and regional conflicts.

Thus, "servicemen cannot bear corresponding legal obligations and responsibility", the decree said adding that the use of interior forces in such conflicts is fixed by the law on "the state of emergency".

However, no state of emergency has been imposed on Chechnya.

Chuvashia's Fedorov hosted two weeks ago a meeting of several regional representatives at which he and other six leaders denounced the war in Chechnya and urged that elected federal heads of all levels be held responsible for the bloodshed.

Kovalev Says Yeltsin Is 'Politically Dead'

BR1701152795 Paris LE MONDE in French 17 Jan 95 p 1

[Dominique Le Guilledoux report on interview with Sergey Kovalev, Boris Yeltsin's human rights delegate, in Nazran; date not given: "'Yeltsin Is Politically Dead,' Sergey Kovalev Tells Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nazran (Ingushetia)—His voice was hoarse. After a visit to the Groznyy area and a series of talks with Ingush leaders, Sergey Kovalev, Boris Yeltsin's human rights delegate who has joined the opposition since Russian troops entered Chechnya, received journalists late in the night of Saturday 14 January. From the hall of his hotel in Nazran (Ingushetia), he predicted: "Of course, Russia will be able to seize Groznyy, but the city will have to be turned into a huge pile of bricks. The picture is scarcely better than it was in Stalingrad in the 1945 war. The geographical site of Groznyy will be liberated of what were its inhabitants; it will be occupied by the Russians. The war will not end there."

Sergey Kovalev thinks that this is merely the start of the "big Caucasian war," which will erupt at times and simmer at others, a war comparable to the Afghan war: "The outlook is terrible for the Chechens and for all the northern Caucasians. But it is also terrible for Russia, because it will have no choice but to introduce censorship, return to the principles of Soviet power, and use violence against the people in Russia itself." Reacting to the statements by Bill Clinton who reaffirmed his support for Boris Yeltsin and his "reform policy," Sergey Kovalev thinks that it is by condemning Yeltsin and the war that it will be possible to "redirect Russia toward reforms": "The escalation in the repression against all those who think differently in the country will also mean the end of economic freedom, it will be an endless chain. The advocates of war will regain control over the production apparatus—agriculture and industry. They will use it to serve the war."

Not denying the descriptions of "trash" and "bastards" which he used to describe Boris Yeltsin's entourage, Sergey Kovalev thinks that the latter is "politically dead." "For him it is a personal tragedy. For a long time, he seemed to be a courageous person, capable of adapting and understanding. Gradually, he started to think that force ultimately proved him right. He proceeded in the same way with Chechnya."

Sergey Kovalev is not far from thinking that "the man has reached his limit" and that he has already failed on the first problem which faces each new president when he comes to power: Forming a good team. "Yeltsin obeyed an old party principle, which consists of hiring people who are stupider and weaker than you, people with no higher ambition than to be nice to the leaders all the time. It is easy, it is quite pleasant to live drinking vodka and frequenting bars. But those people are incapable of working. Yeltsin is responsible for that team. I think this is unfortunate for him and for his personality. His political career has been short, rapid, and courageous. It has led him into a fiasco."

After a visit to Mozdok on Monday 16 January, to the seat of the Russian Army's headquarters in Chechnya, the human rights' militant will make a lightning visit to Moscow and will then return to Nazran where he will establish his office. "Perhaps even to Groznyy, we shall see. At all events, I have decided to set up here," he said, without having any illusions about the possibility of being heeded in the Russian capital.

Justice Minister Kovalev Assesses Chechnya Events

MM1701122995 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Dudayev Protected by Criminals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On returning from the Chechen Republic, Valentin Kovalev, minister of justice and chairman of the Interim Oversight Council for Observance of Human Rights in the Chechen Republic, familiarized the public with his assessment of what is happening.

According to him, the number of "centers of resistance" in Chechnya is invariably diminishing, and the government of Salambek Khadzhiyev has embarked on its work: The key posts in the cabinet have already been filled. The civilian administration has actually been reinstated in five rayons, and law-enforcement organs (their recreation was tackled precisely by Valentin Kovalev and Acting General Prosecutor Aleksey Ilyushenko) in four out of 14 rayons of the Chechen Republic. Military medical detachments are operating, and storage centers for the collection of humanitarian aid have been set up in Mozdok, Kizlyar, and the village of Kurskaya. Kovalev called the sanitary-epidemiological situation extremely complex: In connection with the fact that vaccination has not been carried out for three years, life support systems have been destroyed, and decomposing bodies are lying in the streets, outbreaks of infectious diseases are possible.

Kovalev cited facts attesting that illegal military formations in Chechnya are of a bandit-like nature: According to the information of the minister of justice, several thousand criminals who have gotten out of jail are operating in them, and 25 gunmen had been sentenced to death.

Valentin Kovalev emphasized that "Russian troops are acting worthily," and all violations of the rights of the civilian population in Chechnya are carefully recorded. According to him, there are "a number of facts to which criminal significance can be attached." But there are no mass violations in this sphere. The minister of justice emphasized that large-scale military actions ought to be coordinated with the government of national rebirth of the Chechen Republic. The chairman of the Interim Oversight Council called his relations with Sergey Kovalev constructive and "comradely," pointing out that they are together resolving human rights problems in Chechnya.

Among the reasons which have seriously hampered the federal authorities' actions in restoring constitutional legality and law and order in Chechnya the minister of justice singled out resistance to their implementation in the "upper echelon" of the military command. According to him, there have been three instances in the army group of refusals to move units to places of combat deployment, with the result that subunits of Russian troops suffered heavy losses. "These facts must receive a juridical assessment, and it is perfectly possible that criminal proceedings will be instituted," Valentin Kovalev said.

Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin Discuss Economy, Chechnya

LD1701194695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1758 GMT 17 Jan 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New aspects of the situation in Chechnya in the light of the political initiatives outlined by Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin in his TV address on January 16 were discussed at a regular meeting between President Boris Yeltsin and the Prime Minister on Tuesday.

The essence of Chernomyrdin's peace plan, which has been drafted, according to competent sources, with active help from Yeltsin's aides (among them a group of presidential assistants and speech writers), is to urge "all the sides and forces involved in the conflict in Chechnya to start talks immediately" to end the bloodshed in that North Caucasus republic of Russia.

The new plan of the president and prime minister provides for discussing "issues on a moratorium on troops and military equipment movement and an end to the use of artillery, missiles, armor, and other heavy arms in the zone of conflict."

According to Chernomyrdin, subject for discussion should also be ways of setting up non-fighting zones, where "under guarantees from elders and authorities, it is necessary to start the process of surrendering and redeeming fire arms." A procedure of storing the surrendered arms and controlling their safety is also to be determined. "The start of negotiations would simultaneously signal a ceasefire," Chernomyrdin believes.

He expressed hope that "this is yet another attempt to appeal to the conscience and reason of the leaders of illegal armed units, an attempt that this time will draw a response from them".

Chernomyrdin called for conducting extensive consultations on forming capable and responsible administrative bodies in Chechnya for an interim period until democratic elections. "In the long run, it is the people of the Chechen Republic themselves who can solve this question, it is through elections that the subject of a political dialogue will form, a dialogue that will mirror the view and will of the Chechen people as a whole," Chernomyrdin is convinced. After the elections, in his words, it will be possible to discuss republican status issues and the delimitation of the powers of federal and republican authorities.

According to Interfax information, the president and the premier discussed whether it is expedient for Chernomyrdin to meet with Dzhokhar Dudayev's emissaries in Moscow—Economics Minister Teimuraz Abubakarov and Prosecutor General Usman Imayev.

Dudayev's envoys conducted consultations with Deputy Premier Sergey Shakhray Monday evening.

At a subsequent meeting, Shakhray informed Chernomyrdin about the Chechen side's reaction to the Chernomyrdin's plan of a settlement.

Russian cabinet experts believe that the possibility of Chernomyrdin meeting with Dudayev's envoys depends on whether Moscow views Groznyy's response to the initiatives put forward in the televised address as positive. Groznyy's emissaries are reported to be offering the conclusion of a bilateral accord to cease fire and halt all fighting in Chechnya as crucial to opening a top level dialogue.

Most government experts agree that developments in the zone of conflict give no reason to conclude that the Russian leadership has stepped up its peace efforts because the military operation to capture Groznyy has not been effective enough. As an Interfax correspondent reports from the Chechen capital, fighting has been continuing near the presidential palace, which has still been held by Dudayev's militia. Russian military experts expect the northern and north-eastern parts of Groznyy to be cleared off the remnant Dudayev's troops within the next 3-4 days.

Dudayev's palace in Groznyy has not been captured only because the army command has been trying to avoid unnecessary casualties, Lev Rokhlin, commander of the eight Army corps (western group) declared at a conference with Sergey Stepashin, director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service in Groznyy Monday.

According to Rokhlin, the militants resistance is waning. By intelligence data, Dudayev's loyalists in the palace are short of ammunition. The palace has been sealed off by federal troops. Ammunition and food supply for the militants has been disrupted. Some boxes with mines and cartridges, as Rokhlin said, have been carried into the palace in arms. The militants are reported to be fleeing Groznyy's down town.

By some reports, federal forces are controlling about 30 percent of the capital's territory. However, by information from the military, this does not mean that the rest of the city is under militants control. In a number of areas, the population has been forming self-defence units to counter Dudayev's supporters.

Some observers explain an outburst in Chernomyrdin's peace-making by the executive branch's desire to avoid frictions with parliament, whose both houses wish that the Chechen conflict be resolved by means other than force. Federation Council Tuesday adopted a decision "to invite for discussing the situation in the Chechen Republic of Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin, Russia's Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov, acting Prosecutor General Alexey Ilyushenko, Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, Interior Minister Viktor Yerin, and Sergey Stepashin, and if all these men fail to appear, they must account for their failure."

Lukin: OSCE Observers for Chechnya 'Legal and Sound'

LD1701203095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1925 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 17 (INTERFAX)—The chairman of the State Duma committee for international affairs, Vladimir Lukin, believes that the initiative to deploy OSCE observers in Chechnya is legal and sound, as he told an OSCE envoy, Hungarian diplomat Istvan Gyarmathy, in Moscow Tuesday [17 January].

In an interview with Interfax, Lukin remarked that Russia was a member of the OSCE and had to comply with "the code of behavior of an OSCE member." At the same time, he said he had recommended Gyarmathy to refrain from one-sided evaluations of the situation on human rights, if OSCE observers are deployed in the republic.

According to Lukin, he told Gyarmathy that "signs were visible over the last two or three days," which were evidence that "the authorities sought to lessen the effect of the negative policy pursued until then." He referred to "the decline in the level of military operations and the increase in the level of talks."

Lukin said it was the position of the Russian parliament that influenced that of the executive. "The question is not direct subordination to a decision, but taking into account parliament's point of view and the influence on public opinion exercised by this point of view."

Khasbulatov Seeks Negotiations, Free Elections

MM1801110895 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 15 Jan 95 p7

[Report on interview with Ruslan Khasbulatov, former speaker of the Russian parliament, by Sa'ud al-Nasir in Moscow on 14 January: "Three Solutions to the Chechen Problem"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow—In a private exclusive interview in his apartment in Moscow yesterday, Ruslan Khasbulatov, former speaker of the Russian parliament and prominent Chechen figure, said that he had known since last August of the Russian leadership's decision to intervene militarily in Chechnya to topple General Dzhokhar Dudayev, install a government loyal to Moscow, and keep the Chechen Republic part of the Russian Federation. He added that he held contacts at the time with the various parliamentary blocs to avert such intervention and solve the problem peacefully but these blocs did not respond to his appeals and took a different position, serving their own narrow interests and gambling with the Chechen card at the expense of Chechen and Russian blood. He also said that he had previously discussed this problem with several Russian leaders when he was speaker of the Russian parliament and urged President Yeltsin, Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov (former chairman of the CIS Defense Council), and current Defense Minister Pavel Grachev to pull the heavy weapons out of Chechnya but they did not pay enough attention to that matter. Grachev actually told him at the time that these weapons had been withdrawn but it later transpired that that was a lie.

There have been reports that President Yeltsin, in agreement with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, parliament [upper house] speaker Vladimir Shumeyko, and [lower house speaker] Ivan Rybkin intend to separate the Armed Forces General Staff from the Defense Ministry, place it under the command of the commander in chief of the Armed Forces, and direct it to reorganize the Army and confine the Defense Ministry to the task of raising the Armed Forces' fighting capabilities. Senior Russian generals strongly opposed that.

In his reply to a question about the real reasons for launching the war, Khasbulatov said that the Russian leadership had several objectives, including:

1. To divert attention from the deep socioeconomic crisis in the country and serve a warning to the Caucasian republics neighboring on Chechnya which might consider declaring independence.

2. To portray Russia as a deterrent to the former Soviet republics belonging to the CIS.

3. To serve notice to the West that Russia can solve the most complex problems by force.

He described the Russian authorities as dictatorial and aggressive.

Asked if Dudayev would resort to guerrilla warfare if the Chechen capital Groznyy fell, Khasbulatov did not rule out that possibility but he added that such a war might be launched under the command of some military men who until recently were against Dudayev but had to change their position as a result of the Chechen people's tragedy.

In conclusion, Khasbulatov called for the following:

1. Immediate cessation of the Russian forces' operations.

2. Settlement of the disputed issues peacefully through negotiations with Dudayev and well-known prominent Chechen figures.

3. Free democratic elections within two or three months.

Khasbulatov said that he now cannot hold any meetings with Russian officials without the approval of the top man in the country (Yeltsin). He added that he holds contacts with second- and third-level figures because neither Dudayev nor the Russian leadership liked him.

Gaydar Says Chechnya Conflict 'Yeltsin's Fault'

BR1701153695 Rome IL MESSAGGERO in Italian 17 Jan 95 p 12

[Interview with Russia's Democratic Choice leader Yegor Gaydar by Maria Ferretti in Moscow; date not given: "Gaydar: 'The War Is All Your Fault'"; first paragraph is IL MESSAGGERO introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The war in Chechnya is the result of the policy imposed by a powerful coalition of men surrounding Yeltsin, which, in Russia, is already being called the 'party of war.' I regard it as the party of idiots, since it is in danger of propelling our country to the brink of ruin," Russia's Choice leader Yegor Gaydar said.

[Ferretti] Your bill to stop the war has been thrown out by the Duma. What will you do now?

[Gaidar] We will continue bringing pressure to bear, in the Duma and in the country, in the hope of putting an end to the war in Chechnya as soon as possible. Sergey Kovalev, who is in Nazran in a desperate attempt to achieve a negotiated solution, is in the front line of our campaign. Kovalev is in contact with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin with this end in view.

[Ferretti] Why do you not give a more radical sign of the distance between yourself and the "party of war" by withdrawing your ministers from the government?

Gaydar allowed Russia's Choice deputy leader Boris Zolotukin to answer the question: "Because the armed conflict in Chechnya is not the government's fault: It is President Yeltsin's."

Rybkin Remarks on Mercenaries in Chechnya

MM1701115195 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Jan 95 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "How Much Does a Mercenary Earn?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A large number of highly professional mercenaries from various countries, whose activity is paid in "petrodollars," have gathered in Groznyy. Attention was drawn to this fact by Ivan Rybkin, chairman of the Russian Federation State Duma, speaking at a "Question and Direct Answer" evening at the Central House of Cinematographers on Saturday [14 January].

The Duma speaker's testimony is the latest in the succession of new data on mercenaries in Chechnya. According to a statement by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, the foreign mercenaries are "highly professional in the military respect" and "display particular brutality."

The number of mercenaries can be judged just from the fact that, according to information from the government press service, several dozen mercenaries from Afghanistan and Jordan were taken prisoner in the northern part of Groznyy on 2 January alone.

In this respect the Russian foreign minister drew the attention of the Afghan, Iranian, and Pakistani ambassadors to instances of the recruitment of mercenaries on the territory of Afghanistan and in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.

The Russian foreign minister also acquainted the Saudi and Jordanian ambassadors to Moscow with reports about the participation of mercenaries from certain Arab countries in fighting on Chechen territory.

It is reliably reported that gunmen from Ukraine and the Baltics are participating in the fighting on Dudayev's side, and the fact that the official authorities of these countries call them "volunteers" rather than "mercenaries" changes little.

Several days ago it became known that a Lithuanian citizen named Vladimiras Sasnauskas, who confessed to working in the republic's defense department system, had been detained in Groznyy. In cross-examination the prisoner stated that approximately 80 Lithuanian citizens are currently fighting in Chechnya on Dudayev's side.

Ivan Rybkin revealed another remarkable fact. He reported that a women's subunit is also operating in Chechnya—the so-called "White Panty Hose," who earn $1,000 for every day's fighting, plus $1,500 for every Russian officer killed.

Foreign Ministry on Foreign Reactions to Chechnya

MM1701150495 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 7

[Statement by Russian Foreign Ministry Information and Press Department: "Russian Federation Foreign Ministry: Without Constitutional Order the Reforms Will Have a Sad Fate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is keeping a close eye on foreign reaction to the events in Chechnya. We note with satisfaction that the majority of our foreign partners are displaying a considered approach in their assessments and adherence to the preservation of the Russian Federation's territorial integrity and proceed from the domestic nature of this problem. The dominant viewpoint is that the Chechen crisis is a matter for an exclusively Russian settlement within the framework of and in accordance with our country's Constitution.

The thesis that Russia, like any other state, cannot and must not tolerate the existence of uncontrolled armed formations on its territory is also meeting with understanding. Fulfilling precisely this demand of its Fundamental Law, as well as the obligations stemming from a whole series of international documents signed by it, including the recently adopted Code of Conduct of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] countries, Russia found itself forced to use the Armed Forces in the Chechen Republic.

This commonsense position is understandable. The alternative option of the Russian authorities' offering "nonresistance" to the separatist and essentially criminal regime in Chechyna and admonishing it in some form could lead to the development in Russia of a scenario analogous to the Yugoslav one.

In addition, in recent days we have noticed a tendency toward distortion in the reaction of a number of politicians and human rights organizations. Human rights are undoubtedly one of the most important aspects of the present crisis in the Chechen Republic, and we do not close our eyes to this. At the same time it must be clear that the scale of the challenge which Russia encountered in the Chechen Republic made human tragedies and losses practically inevitable.

The inevitability of tough measures to neutralize the illegal bandit formations in the Chechen Republic certainly does not eclipse for us the problem of human rights. In this sense we are open to contacts. Constant contact is maintained with the president's human rights plenipotentiary, who is in the conflict zone. A special Human Rights Commission has been set up, headed by the present minister of justice. The minister and leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are holding appropriate meetings. Thus, extensive opportunities for exposing and preventing human rights violations have been mobilized. This primarily concerns offenses committed in Chechnya over the past three years. On the other hand, we have an opportunity to make a critical assessment of our own strong-arm actions from this viewpoint. Russia will continue cooperation with the OSCE in the matter of restoring democratic institutions and organizing and holding future elections in the Chechen Republic.

We declare our readiness for constructive cooperation with international humanitarian, rights-protection organizations.

We cannot overlook the inadequate and hasty reaction of a number of politicians and organizations actually calling for a freeze on political and economic cooperation with Russia. Recent examples of this are provided by the proposals to defer the signing of the interim trade agreement between the European Union and the Russian Federation and to suspend examination of the question of the Russian Federation's joining the Council of Europe.

In addition to regret, such rhetoric gives rise to memories of the recent, very sad past of our relations with the West. In a number of cases we are observing a syndrome of chronic reflexes and of a return to the worn-out stereotypes of reaction to events connected with Russia.

A task on an extraordinary scale—that of restoring the constitutional order flouted on part of the Russian Federation's territory—is being tackled today. Without the protection and strengthening of that order, the fate of the reforms will be called in question. The partnership worked out between Russia and the West in the recent fairly short period is now undergoing a kind of check on the touchstone of Chechen events. Until now we have felt the understanding and interest of our partners in the successful resolution of the Chechen crisis.

We would like to believe that the correctly understood legitimate interests of the new Russian State will continue to be supported in the West and that people there will ask themselves whether it is worth destroying so hastily and categorically the accumulated positive experience of cooperation with Russia.

Moscow Agrees to OCSE Mission in Chechnya

LD1701163195 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 17 Jan 95

[Telephone dispatch from Moscow by correspondent Janos Molnar]

[FBIS Translated Text] Good afternoon. Russia has agreed that the OSCE [Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe] shall send a mission to Chechnya. Following his talks today, Hungarian Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, special envoy to the OSCE, announced that the delegation, which is expected to have five members, will arrive Sunday in the Russian capital. According to plans, the delegation will travel to the crisis zone next Tuesday on a fact-finding mission and, after coordination talks to be held in Moscow on Thursday, it will prepare the OSCE's action plan.

The Hungarian diplomat also said that during the visit the delegation members will try to organize meetings with all the parties to the Chechen conflict as well as with representatives of humanitarian organizations to establish the fullest possible picture on the crisis.

Filatov Doubts Status of Dudayev's Envoys in Moscow

LD1701170495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1510 GMT 17 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtork]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 17 Jan—It is evident, judging from the envoys Dzhokhar Dudayev has sent to Moscow, that he is not in control of the situation in the republic. This was stated by Sergey Filatov, head of the Russian president's administration, during a meeting of the conciliation commission on the implementation of the Treaty on Public Accord.

When he explained his comment later at the request of the ITAR-TASS correspondent, Filatov said that judging from appearances, the Chechen delegation could not provide sufficient guarantees for it to be seen as "a party to serious talks."

It is already known that Isman Imayev, Chechnya's minister of justice and procurator general, and Economics Minister Taymaz Abubakarov in the Dudayev government, have recently arrived in Moscow. They held a number of meetings on Sunday with Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray and Vyacheslavl Mikhaylov, first deputy minister for nationalities affairs and regional policy.

At the same time, the Russian Government press service said today that the Chechen side had not yet formed an appropriate level delegation to hold official talks on a peaceful settlement in the Chechen Republic, in which Viktor Chernomyrdin would take part. The issue of the level of the talks was extensively debated at the sitting of the conciliation commission, where the participants, confirming the need for talks, acknowledged that effective dialogue at the present time can only be held with the Chechen fighters field commanders.

Imayev on Results of Chechen Cease-Fire Negotiations

LD1701173495 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1600 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia and Chechnya have reached a preliminary agreement on the beginning of the process to cease military actions. Today talks were held in Moscow between Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and members of the working consultation group of the Chechen Republic government. Taymaz Abubakarov, Chechen minister of economics, and Usman Imayev, procurator general, reported that great progress has been achieved. According to Imayev, a cease-fire can be expected in the next few days:

[Begin Imayev recording] As of today, the aim is to cease combat actions so as to reduce or avoid further casualties and further losses to the national economy, to various facilities, and residential quarters. As a result of this meeting today, we believe that in principle, both sides have given their agreement to this aim, and the first positive results of today's meeting must be evident tomorrow, when we will be in the city of Groznyy by the end of the day, and before tomorrow ends. [end recording]

Chernomyrdin's Talks With Chechens Deemed 'Unofficial'

LD1701172595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1637 GMT 17 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 17 Jan—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin today held "unofficial consultations" with representatives of Dzhokhar Dudayev's government at which Russia's proposals to establish a temporary truce in Chechnya were reaffirmed. However, as Valeriy Grishin, first deputy head of the government's press service said in an interview for ITAR-TASS, the Russian side does not see Chernomyrdin's meeting with Usman Imayev and Taymaz Abubakarov, ministers in the Dudayev government who have arrived in Moscow, as the start of any official talks on a peace settlement to the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic.

Dudayev's representatives supported Russia's initiative to establish a moratorium on hostilities in order to end the bloodshed and to sit down at the conference table, Grishin said. Nevertheless, he stressed, a specific response to these proposals can only come from Groznyy.

Also today, Chernomyrdin met Irgiz Suleymanov, the head of one of the largest clans in the Chechen Republic, and also the heads of a number of Chechen enterprises. The talks were devoted to discussing the possbilities of finding ways toward a political settlement of the Chechen conflict.

Chernomyrdin, Chechen Delegation on Cease-Fire Agreement

LD1701164495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1639 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 17 (INTERFAX)—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and a plenipotentiary delegation of the Chechen republic reached "an agreement to stop bloodshed on the basis of ceasing military operations" at their meeting in Moscow Tuesday. A member of the delegation, Chechen Prosecutor General and Justice Minister Usman Imayev told a news conference after the end of the talks that "it is possible to speak of ceasing fire as of tomorrow evening."

Another member of the delegation, Chechen Economics Minister Taymaz Abubakarov, remarked that the exact date and time of establishing ceasefire had never been discussed with Chernomyrdin. "The ceasefire agreement is the basis for developing a conflict settlement mechanism," he said.

According to Abubakarov, "the ceasefire was the only issue discussed with the Russian side, no other issues were discussed." He intends to report the results of the talks to Dzhokhar Dudayev as soon as he arrives in Groznyy, roughly before tomorrow evening.

Stepashin 'Strongly Opposed' to Dudayev Regime Talks

LD1701203295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1925 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok, North Ossetia, Jan 17 (INTERFAX)—The Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) [FCS] director Sergey Stepashin told Interfax Tuesday that he strongly opposed political talks with people representing the Dudayev regime.

He said that only the conditions under which illegal militias would lay down their arms could be negotiated.

Stepashin said that talks of a political nature or revival of the zero option suggested by Dzhokhar Dudayev in December 1994 were out of the question.

According to Stepashin, there is no question of pulling Russian troops out of Chechnya or of Chechnya's sovereignty. The Chechen Republic will stay part of the Russian Federation, he said.

Stepashin had been interviewed before reports of a truce were made public in Moscow.

Government Issues Statement on Chechen Crisis

LD1701211295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2006 GMT 17 Jan 95

[By unidentified ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 17 TASS—The following statement of the Russian Government was circulated here today:

"The crisis in the Chechen Republic threw light on the most complicated problems of our state. Doubtlessly, it is not merely the matter of a republic of the Russian Federation but of the fate of whole Russia. All branches of the federal power, all subjects of the federation, all political and public figures must act in unison and with full responsibility since this is the way to preserve a single, strong and stable Russian state. This cannot be done with emotions or declarations.

"In accordance with the Russian Constitution and laws the federal authorities had to use force to stop the three-years-long outburst of armed criminality, lawlessness and political provocations on part of Russian territory.

"The Russian Government expresses its support and gratitude to servicemen who are fulfilling their constitutional duty on Chechen territory, and shares sorrow at the loss of life and alarm of mothers for the fate of their sons.

"The Russian Government denounces any speculations on tragic events in the Chechen Republic, including attempts to seed political discord and regional separatism under the pretext of protection of servicemen which violate the fundamental laws of the state. This is the way to estimate decree #2 of the Chuvash president of January 11, 1995, 'On protection of servicemen.'

"This decree of the Chuvash president not only violates norms of the Russian Constitution and federal legislation, intrudes the exclusive competence of the Russian Federation and the competence of its Constitutional Court but also indirectly stirs up disobedience of republican residents and their non-fulfilment of service duties during the active military service.

"The Government of the Russian Federation calls on all heads of Russian power bodies to show wisdom and responsibility and render support and assistance to the state in the soonest settlement of the crisis on territory of the Chechen Republic—a part of the Russian federation, salvation of civilians and restoration of ruined economy."

Chechens Express Pessimism About Cease-Fire

AU1801121395 Paris AFP in English 1133 GMT 18 Jan 95

[By Catherine Triomphe and Paola Messana]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy, Russia, Jan 18 (AFP)—Chechens were pessimistic Wednesday about the possibility of a ceasefire in the breakaway republic as Russian troops continued a relentless barrage of artillery fire on the center and southern districts of the capital Grozny.

Chechen officials awaiting the return of two emissaries sent to Moscow for talks on a potential ceasefire said they were bracing for renewed air raids on Grozny and outlying villages Wednesday as Russian warplanes buzzed overhead.

The thud of crashing missiles and artillery fire could be heard in the capital raising fears the Russians were planning to launch a final assault on the presidential palace, which has come to symbolize the Chechen rebellion against Moscow's authority.

"They're not stopping, even for a minute," said Ruslan Abduzakov, a resident of Zavodskoy, a heavily bombarded neighborhood in the south of Grozny.

As he spoke, the body of a man lay nearby in the snow, an all too common sight for residents hardened by more than five weeks of fighting.

"A car probably drove by and dumped him here," Abduzakov explained, unperturbed by the buzz of Russian warplanes that could be heard circling above the cloud cover.

A neighbor, Ahmed Saydulayev, smiled ironically and said: "It doesn't sound like a ceasefire."

Their pessimism was echoed Tuesday evening by a close aid to Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev who said he did not believe in a ceasefire.

The aid, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the potential ceasefire announcement made Tuesday was simply a gesture "Moscow felt it had to do" because of the meeting in Geneva between US Secreatry of State Warren Christopher and his Russian counterpart Andrei Kozyrev.

"If we ever reach a ceasefire, it won't be in a few hours or a few days," he added. "A ceasefire today would merely serve to give the Russian army a reprieve."

Lechi Ayoubov, a resident of a village on the outskirts of Grozny, said he had no faith whatsoever in any peace offer by Moscow, a feeling shared by most Chechens embittered by the ruthlessness of the Russian assault on their republic.

"Immediately after the Chechen delegation announced the potential ceasefire, (Russian) Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin demanded the surrender of weapons by 'armed gangs'," said Ayoubov, who is taking part in operations to rescue and resupply Chechen fighters. "We have no faith in Russia. They say one thing and then do exactly the opposite."

One of his colleagues Shakhbulat Kizayev said: "All they want is an unconditional surrender."

Meanwhile, Russian troops based at Mozdok, in the neighboring republic of North Ossetia, were also quoted by the Interfax news agency as saying they had little hope of a ceasefire.

One high-ranking military officer said Dudayev would use any break in fighting to evacuate his troops from central Grozny.

He said these troops attempted several times Wednesday to break through the Russian siege of the capital but were rebuffed.

He added that Russian warplanes were continuing to provide air support for ground troops in several parts of Chechnya and had bombed serveral regions outside Grozny Wednesday.

Opposition Party Leader Views Chechen Situation

MS1801095595 London BBC Television Network in English 2230 GMT 18 Jan 95

[Interview with Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, leader of the Democratic opposition party by presenter Peter Snow on 17 January; Yavlinskiy in Moscow and Snow in the London studio; from the "Newsnight" program—recorded]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Snow] Do you believe there has been real agreement on a ceasefire?

[Yavlinskiy] I think that in general this is one more misunderstanding between the prime minister and Chechen's representatives, and I am very pessimistic about the possibilities just today or tomorrow.

[Snow] So you don't think there will be a—you don't think there has been a ceasefire agreed or that a ceasefire if agreed would hold, is that right?

[Yavlinskiy] According to the statement of the prime minister, the Russian side is still insisting on the same points they were insisting all the time, and those conditions Chechens wouldn't agree for stopping the fighting.

[Snow] What are the points you think that Russia should not be insisting on then?

[Yavlinskiy] The first point is that Russians all the time saying that Chechens have to give up the arms, to lay down the arms, and as far as I understand for Chechens today this is not acceptable.

[Snow] If you were president now what deal would you like with the Chechens?

[Yavlinskiy] I can start the negotiations about stopping the fight, then exchange of the prisoners from both sides, and then to start the political negotiations about the political status of Chechnya.

[Snow] But these people, Mr. Yavlinskiy, are fighting for their independence from Russia, would you give them independence?

[Yavlinskiy] As the consequence of what happens already in Chechnya I think acceptance of their independence in this or other way is already inevitable, unavoidable.

[Snow] So if you were president of the Russian Federation you would be saying to one of the republics that demanded independence, alright you can go, separate, what would be the message you would then be giving to other republics in the Russian Federation that might feel the same?

[Yavlinskiy) I want to explain that at the moment that the largest number of the territories—national territories of Russia, the people got very good lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union which shows that the independence is not a solution of their economic and political problems, that independence in many cases brings more difficulties than before. So in this sense if my economic policy would be really market and democratic orientated, if my internal policy would be really democratic one, in this case I have no threat of disintegration of Russia. The case of disintegration is so sharp today especially because Yeltsin is trying to rule the country in the unitarian way by force, this is the main reason of the possible disintegration of Russia.

[Snow] Has the outside world, Mr. Yavlinskiy, reacted as you would like it to have reacted, has it been strong and vigorous enough in condemning Mr. Yeltsin's actions?

[Yavlinskiy] I think that what is going just now in Russia in many cases is a Russian internal problem, and from my point of view theses cautious statements from western leaders about what's going on in Russia is right and correct, but at the same time I want simply to underline that if the Chechen conflict would develop in a military sense and in a political sense—to all Russia conflict and that is possible, that will be a real threat not only for Russia but for the others too.

[Snow] But how would you react Mr. Yavlinskiy if Western ministers in the next few days were to say to President Yeltsin, look unless you stop what you are doing in Chechnya we will reduce aid to Russia, we will end cooperation with Russia, would that damage your democratic cause, your opposition to President Yeltsin?

[Yavlinskiy] I would say that this is a very diplomatic thing because if Russia would got just now the isolation, if Russia would be in isolation from the West for one hundred percent—that would create very strong nationalist and fascist movement inside the country, so it is necessary to be very correct and very straight, very direct to Mr. Yeltsin that this is not the way to solve the problems, but this is not reason to isolate Russian people from the West.

Military Issues

Army Reform Scenarios Reviewed

MK1701115095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 17 Jan 95 pp 1, 4

[Report by Ilya Bulavinov in the "Situation in the Armed Forces" column: "The Guard Is Tired: The Army on the Threshold of Changes"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Main Military Prosecutor's Office has opened a probe into Russian military personnel's refusal to carry out orders in conducting the military operation in Chechnya. Meanwhile in other Moscow offices the discussion on ways of reforming the army is entering a decisive phase. [passage omitted]

Reform of the army command and control structure is becoming increasingly inevitable with every passing day. As KOMMERSANT-DAILY has managed to find out from responsible sources, the structure for the interaction of the power structures proposed by the Security Council staff envisions removing the General Staff from the Defense Ministry and making it subordinate to the president. Formally, via the Security Council. The minister will be a civilian with purely political, economic, and administrative functions. In the event of crises or combat actions the General Staff will coordinate the actions of the Defense Ministry, counterintelligence, the border troops, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Emergency Situations Ministry, and the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information. Earlier, the "civilian minister-staff" scheme was to be tested in the border troops (their chief commander, Andrey Nikolayev, was to take off his shoulder straps). But the idea of such an experiment was abandoned (possibly, only for the time being). [passage omitted]

According to information in KOMMERSANT-DAILY's possession, the Defense Ministry leadership maintains a different view on command and control reform. It is proposed to preserve the General Staff chief's subordination to the minister, while the latter will have charge, in addition to administrative and economic matters, of command and control bodies (including the General Staff) and cadres. The first to be reformed and downsized are the main commands of those armed categories whose excessive independence hampers the pursuit of a single army-wide policy as well as the officers' military service performance system. It is planned to change the status of the servicemen who deal with purely administrative matters, and raise the prestige (including along official and social lines) of battlefield officers.

About cadres. Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff, enjoys respect both with the professional military and in the Kremlin, although he has never been "one of their own" like Pavel Grachev. Kolesnikov could suit the main interested sides. But, according to information at KOMMERSANT-DAILY's disposal, he is also against the General Staff's being taken out of the minister's control. While sharing the idea of giving the General Staff the functions of coordinating the power structures in crisis situations, he proposes that the General Staff chief remain subordinate to the minister (with his status upgraded: making him a member of the Security Council and giving him the right to report personally to the president).

It could have been Kolesnikov's rejection of the idea of General Staff "sovereignization" that prompted the "reformers" to take an interest in his personality: The president is now being told that "protectionism and incompetency are rampant" in the General Staff, while the general's name is beginning to be linked to the issue of weapons transfer to Dudayev. Kolesnikov's removal (although he is not the only one in the Defense Ministry leadership who is against General Staff separation) could seriously affect reorganization of the Defense Ministry.

Reshuffles are also imminent at other levels. The generals who opposed the introduction of troops to Chechnya will apparently be dismissed after all. But whereas the army will abide the dismissal of, say, Deputy Minister Georgiy Kondratyev or Eduard Vorobyev, Ground Forces First Deputy Commander, another deputy—Valeriy Mironov—may rally around himself the officers and generals who are outraged at the actions by politicians who, in their opinion, are again turning the army into a scapegoat. Mironov is one of the most authoritative generals whose name is formally not linked with politics. He has long been in charge of cadre matters at the Defense Ministry and his resignation can only boost his authority.

The vacated positions will apparently be manned by "local cadres." The chances of Volga Military District Commander Anatoliy Sergeyev are rated quite highly. The 54-year-old general with an unprepossessing appearance was made famous by the fact that during Tatarstan's confrontation with Moscow he quietly withdrew heavy weapons from the republic, thus preventing a possible Chechen scenario. Thereupon Kazan's demands that local conscripts be left to serve in the republic subsided. Sergeyev is an "Afghan" veteran and a Hero of the Soviet Union. Another likely candidate is Viktor Chichevatov, Far East Military District commander, who has shown high professionalism in directing one of the most "difficult" districts, with his relatively young age (50).

It is clear in any event that the army has already embarked down the path of transformations. So far the discussion has not gone beyond the framework of "under-the-carpet" struggles, and the main thing today is who will lead the reform and in whose interests it will ultimately proceed.

Vorobev Explains Refusal To Command Chechnya Ops

MM1701193595 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 95 p 2

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "Acting General Prosecutor Vindicates Chechen Action and Threatens Those Who Refused To Fight. Foremost Among Them—General Vorobev"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Colonel General Eduard Vorobev, first deputy commander in chief of the Russian Land Forces, is currently in Mandryki Second Central Clinical Military Hospital in Sokolniki. The general's request for discharge into the reserve has been circulated at his own insistence. And he is currently undergoing the military medical examination that is mandatory in such circumstances. Indeed, in recent days—apparently as a result of nervous stress—he has developed cardiovascular insufficiency and is having to undergo minor medical treatment. The general reacted to the acting general prosecutor's statement that he, Vorobev, could be prosecuted for nonfulfillment of an order with unconcealed surprise.

"I was given no orders to lead military operations in Chechnya," E. Vorobev said in conversation with me. "I had a conversation on this theme with the defense minister, but Army General Grachev did not use categorical terms such as 'order' or 'I demand,' or anything of the sort."

According to Vorobev, the minister informed him that General Mityukhin, commander of North Caucasus [Military] District, who had been in charge of the operation in Chechnya, had suddenly been taken ill, and suggested that Vorobev should replace Mityukhin as leader of the operation. This is a usual practice, the deputy commander in chief remarks—even when a man is offered the post of compnay commander, he is consulted as to whether or not he is prepared for such duties.

Vorobev told the minister that he had already reported his position to the chief of the General Staff. He considered that he was not ready to lead the operation in Chechnya. Arriving there, he familiarized himself with the situation, listened to the reports of the commanders of the combined units and other units which had been sent into the armed conflict zone, and understood that the troops under his command were absolutely unprepared for participation in combat operations, especially in conditions of the restricted use of aviation, artillery, and other weapons.

The soldiers and officers needed at least two months' special training before fighting. And sending inexperienced young men, who had still not learned to handle their weapons properly, into battle and under fire, could, in Vorobev's opinion, lead to great bloodshed, and to pointless, unjustified casualties. Unfortunately, the general believes, political objectives got the better of military expedience and commonsense. In such circumstances he could not take on responsibility for an operation which he had not devised or elaborated or began to carry out. Therefore he considers his request for discharge from the Army a normal, civilized reaction to his own disagreement with the combat operational methods which have prevailed in Chechnya.

Meanwhile, last Saturday Colonel of Justice Anatoliy Permyakov, an investigator of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office, invited Vorobev to see him for a conversation. The General successfully requested from the hospital authorities that he be allowed to spend the weekend at home, and it was there that the military jurist found him. Their conversation lasted over one hour.

According to the general this conversation should be called neither an interrogation nor the taking of evidence. Minutes were not taken. He signed no papers, but simply explained to the colonel of justice the situation as he told it to the journalist. Otherwise he would have spoken in the Prosecutor's Office only in the presence of his attorney. Vorobev does not know what new actions by the military law-enforcement organs will follow this, or whether they will proceed from the requirements of the law or from political, and perhaps other criteria. He refused to discuss this subject with me. He remarked only that he was treated with great respect in the Main Military Prosecutor's Office. They apologized for interrupting his Saturday relaxation and even offered to send him home in an official car.

Colonel of Justice A. Permyakov, an investigator of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office, refused in conversation with me to discuss this situation. Moreover, he stated that he could neither confirm nor deny even whether the meeting with Col.Gen. Vorobev on Saturday actually took place.

Analyzing Acting General Prosecutor A. Ilyushenko's statement on criminal prosecutions for the nonfulfillment of orders regarding senior Ministry of Defense officials at a meeting with journalists, many observers were of the belief that the country's political leadership is seeking thereby to divert public attention from the true culprits for the military tragedy of the assault on Groznyy at the New Year. From those who sent untrained and inexperienced soldiers and officers into battle, who did not ensure collaboration between units and subunits nor gunfire and material support for them, and are now trying to shift the blame onto others.

Dudayev Moscow Bombing Plan Rumors Discounted

MM1701143595 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Khokhlov: "Will Dzhokhar Dudayev Bomb Moscow?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dzhokhar Dudayev's statement on the possiblity of bomb attacks by the Chechen Republic's military aircraft on the Russian capital can be treated as unfounded threats. At least that is the belief of the military responsible for the safety of the air space over Moscow and all Russia.

"First, Dudayev has absolutely no aircraft left," says Aviation Lieutenant General Nikolay Grigoruk, deputy chief of general staff of the Air Force for flight duty. "All the former USSR Air Force L-29 and L-39 aircraft that have been 'privatized' in Chechnya were destroyed at the very start of the fighting in November-December 1994. Second, the Chechen guerrillas have no airfields left. Khankala, Kalinovskaya, and Groznyy today are in the hands of the Russian troops. There is no longer anywhere on Chechnya territory from which to take off."

Air Force General Staff specialists also doubt that the "L-series" training aircraft, built in Czechoslovakia a long time ago, can fly as far as Moscow. The Chechens have equipped them with bomb mountings, which has considerably "weighed down" the structure. If the bombs are also weighed then it is believed that such an aircraft could theoretically fly a few dozen kilometers and possible hundreds of kilometers—no more. The Chechen L-29 and L-39 aircraft, in fulfilling their "international duty," took part in the Georgian-Abkhazian war and bombed the Georgian troops' positions quite successfully. But the troops were Georgians and not Russians, whose troop air defense potential is several orders of magnitude greater.

The military airmen are convinced that even if some Chechen aircraft (and there aren't any) were to take off from some airfield (and there are no airfields either) then it would not fly beyond Chechnya's territory. In addition to the MIG-25 aircraft which at speed can "leap across" the entire Chechen Republic, the Air Force grouping in the North Caucasus also now has Su-27 aircraft fighting. These combat aircraft which are able to "crank up" their speed, will not allow any alien aircraft to fly for long. Air Force specialists have also given an assurance that the conflict zone is really covered by the facilities of the radiotechnical troops which are attentively "eavesdropping" on the sky.

The air space from Voronezh to Moscow is watched over by the troops of the Moscow Air Defense District. Since Rust's famous flight they (like all air defense troops) have been undergoing ruthless "reform" for several years now. Despite that regrettable incident the officers of the Moscow Air Defense District Staff assure us that so far they nonetheless have more than enough combat potential for countering aircraft attacks. Naturally, they are not speaking of Chechen aircraft but of armadas by "likely friends."

Incidentally, about the possibility of "friends" flying in. Rumors that Turkish Air Force combat aircraft could fly in to bomb Moscow at Dzhokhar Dudayev's request are also only rumors. All competent sources are 100 percent convinced of that....

The radiotechnical and antiaircraft missile troops and Moscow Air Defense District aircraft are in a state of constant combat readiness. It could not be more constant. So that we need not fear an air raid warning in the region of the "Marksistskaya" subway station for the time being: Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev is delivering propaganda strikes.

Media Issues

Only 14% Trust Government Reporting on Chechnya

MM1701162195 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 1

[IMA-PTRESS report: "Little Confidence in Government's Words"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As a Russia-wide poll conducted by the "Public Opinion" foundation has shown, only 14 percent of Russians trust reports from government sources of information about events in Chechnya most, while 46 give preference to nongovernment sources.

Chernomyrdin's TV Address Viewed as 'Turning Point'

LD1701215095

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1725 GMT on 17 January broadcasts the 15-minute "Details" program, in which Nikolay Svanidze dissects Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's 16 January television address, which he describes as a "turning point" in the Kremlin's position on fundamental issues, not least because the prime minister himself has come into the spotlight after being in the background for so long. Using extracts from the prime minister's address, Svanidze takes up various points in it. First, he cannot remember any Russian official before Chernomyrdin expressing condolences to the victims of the Chechen war. While defending the Army, he notes that the prime minister, unlike others, did not make any "ritual damnation" of the media, nor were there any signs of "bellicose aggressiveness" in his speech. Svanidze is impressed by the constructive tone of Chernomyrdin's speech and his emphasis on rebuilding the Chechen economy, particularly his references to privatization.

Premier's Televised Address Seen Upstaging Yeltsin

MK1701120095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 17 Jan 95 pp 1, 3

[Report by Georgiy Bovt, Dmitriy Kamyshev: "Viktor Chernomyrdin's Televised Address. Boris Yeltsin Has Missed a Chance"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The past several days have indicated increasingly clearly the Russian premier's desire to make public his independent—pronouncedly peacemaking—stance on the Chechen conflict. Yesterday Viktor Chernomyrdin appeared on television screens with an address to the people. Against the background of the state flag. On behalf of the president. But he spoke on his own behalf. It is from the prime minister that the Russians heard the word "tragedy" for the first time. It is from him that the whole world heard for the first time the resolute and uncompromising: "Reform in Russia will not be scaled down!"

All that contrasted particularly sharply with Boris Yeltsin's refusal yesterday to attend the World Economic Forum in Davos under the pretext of the Chechen crisis—in other words, being fearful lest they ask him there about the fate of reform. If the day before yesterday the world was guessing as to "Where is an alternative to Boris Yeltsin after all?," now some will probably see the answer in the stature of the prime minister. [passage omitted]

It is worth noting that Viktor Chernomyrdin's resolute statement was preceded by a whole range of developments. First, one cannot but notice that he chose an extremely propitious moment for making an address: the fighting in Groznyy has drawn to a close as much as possible, while Dudayev's fighters are near complete exhaustion. For this reason the premier's current initiatives—and he could not but take that into account—are fully feasible. Unlike, for instance, the president's "guarantees" given on New Year's Eve, when the army was literally "pregnant" with an assault, which it actually delivered on New Year's night. Second, some invisible—to an outside view—shifts in the alignment of forces have taken place at the very top of the Russian political elite. They have possibly been reflected in rumors (which have been denied, though) about "removing" Oleg Soskovets from Chechen affairs and bringing Sergey Shakhray back in command, and a harsh criticism of the special services close to the president—given that it was apparently orchestrated by someone's influential hand. Third, a watershed of sorts has emerged in the Russian elite, dividing it into those who have been "tarnished" by Chechnya and those who have not. It so happened that all those "tarnished" turned out to be close to the president. Yeltsin could not or did not want to distance himself from them. As a result, nor will he be able to distance himself from personal responsibility for this war. The premier, however, has long kept a low profile. Fourth, Chernomyrdin spoke up at a time of the visibly stepped-up activity of regional leaders, who are sounding increasingly critical of the methods being used in Chechnya, which they regard as a Federation component. Fifth, the premier also delivered his address on the eve of Andrey Kozyrev's crucial meeting with the U.S. secretary of state (which will largely determine the prospects of the West's attitude to Russia) and also on the eve of the London meeting with representatives of financial organizations to discuss external borrowings for the Russian budget, of the IMF mission's arrival to hold talks on credits, and of the Davos Forum. Sixth, public opinion has long been prepared for this initiative. And, finally, most important: public opinion, parties, regions, and the entire world alike cannot fail to notice and heed the fact that it was not Russian President Boris Yeltsin in person who donned the attire of peacemaker.

TV Views Chechnya Situation, Interviews Officials

LD1701142095 Moscow NTV in Russian 2215 GMT 16 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer Mikhail Svetlichnyy] Good evening. "Tonight at Midnight" is live on air. Analyzing yesterday's events one can see again that military actions in Chechnya have a direct connection with the maneuvers of various representatives of the Russian authorities, and not only in Moscow. [passage omitted]

According to our source in the Kremlin, the fact itself of [Prime Minister] Chernomyrdin's address signifies a serious shift in the strategy toward a political settlement. It appears that the timing is quite propitious for this, too. According to different reports, Dudayev's detachments are demoralized and their unity is broken. This is the opinion of Andrey Loginov, the head of presidential administration's department for connections with political parties. He returned from Groznyy yesterday.

[Begin Loginov recording] According to reports from operational sources which we heard at the meeting, Dudayev's formations are panicking mainly due to shortages of munitions and the lack of fresh support. One can hear commands, intercepted on the radio, urging to pull up all possible forces, snipers, and grenade launchers to the city center in order to defend the presidential palace, and to send as many munitions as possible. According to forecasts by our military, Groznyy will be fully controlled by Russian troops within a week. [end recording]

Our program learned from well-informed sources in the White House that the Russian president will hand over the Defense Ministry's functions to the appropriate Interior Ministry structures on the Chechen republic's territory within the next two-three days. According to our source, the military will still be stationed in the republic, but they will not take part in military actions. The same source said that the system of location of Russian army units which existed in the Soviet Union in 1991 will be restored in Chechnya. [passage omitted]

[Begin Loginov recording] As for the guerrilla war, most certainly hotbeds of resistance will appear. These hotbeds will move to mountain villages and I certainly do not exclude support for these armed bandit formations from the local population, more or less across the board. But they will not last as long as it was in Cambodia or Afghanistan. I doubt that Georgia, Azerbaijan, or Armenia would offer their territories for the transit and delivery of weapons to these bandit formations. This is the first thing.

Second, Dudayev's financial resources, coming from his illegal oil deals, are of course rather substantial. However, refilling them has been made impossible. There is no set-up which would enable additional financing of all these operations. [end recording]

Commenting on the prime minister's address, Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray told our program that he held talks on Sunday and Monday in the Nationalities Ministry with Chechnya's Minister of Economy and Finances Taymaz Abubakarov and [Prosecutor General] Usman Imayev. These talks were held within the framework of the preparation for talks with the Chechen side. Sergey Shakhray said that the meeting was held on the prime minister's instruction and the main purpose was to find ways and means of stopping the bloodshed in the region.

Deputy Nationalities Minister [Viktor] Mikhaylov also took part in the talks. According to Sergey Shakhray, the prime minister has been informed of the results of the talks. Similar negotiations and consultations will be continued with other interested parties in the Chechen republic. [passage omitted]

A big article by the president's press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov, entitled "Good Name On a Bad Day" [Dobroye Imya v Nedobrye Dni] appears today in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. [passage omitted] Vyacheslav Kostikov continues the discussion in the interview he has kindly given to our program.

[Begin recording] [Kostikov] In assessing the political actions of the authorities, the Russian intelligentsia and the liberal intelligentsia have never been able to ignore ethical and moral problems, and this is probably right. As the conflict in Chechnya is rather tough, it caused a wave of critical emotions among the intelligentsia. These emotions were virtually poured out on the government and the president and created the impression that there is now a deep split between the government, the president, and the Russian liberal democracy, and also that it would be extremely difficult to fill that gap.

It seems to me that this is a premature assumption. I believe that both the president's team and the political staffs, including those of the liberal democrats, will carry out an analysis of the Chechen situation after the operation is completed. Democrats should understand that the president was not acting out of some kind of ill will; nor was he guided by the desire to use his presidential muscle to show the power of the Russian machine. He was acting out of the necessity to preserve the Constitution and the integrity of Russia.

At the present stage of Russia's democracy, a split between the democrats and the president would be far too painful, far too disadvantageous both for Russia and for democracy. The president, as a more mature politician, should probably make a first step, provide some kind of explanation to democrats, probably meet them—I believe democrats would not turn away from the hand stretched out to them.

[Correspondent] While the democrats are criticizing the president, people of very certain opinions whom I do not want to name now have come to his support. Do you believe that while, on the one hand, the president's democratic support has been reduced, the support of people who espouse a certain well-publicized stand has, on the contrary, grown unconditionally?

[Kostikov] I do not think that the democratic support of the president himself has shrunk. I would assess the situation under a somewhat different light. I think that what has shrunk is the support of our electorate for democratic leaders. I believe that the leaders of our democratic wing have not quite perceived the emotional and psychological state of their own people. Both Russia's Choice and democrats in general have miscalculated a bit here because although we all understand that a politician does not exist outside political competition, there are always such steep tragic turns in the life of the country and the nation in which competition should retreat into the background, and Russia's interests in general and the interests of the population as a whole should take priority.

[Correspondent] However, the estimates are mainly pessimistic now—mostly they are based on what is really happening. Voices are heard that Russia cannot avoid an authoritarian regime. This is an objective reality: We are entering an authoritarian stage, a very tough political regime with all the attributes of a police state. [passage omitted]

Will the voice of the intelligentsia be needed then, will it be heard at the top level?

[Kostikov] This is a very difficult question. The intelligentsia should insure today that its voice continues to be heard. That is why it should most certainly fight against authoritarianism but, rather than criticizing the president and the authorities across the board, it should try to relate to these authorities. Because if the intelligentsia simply removes itself from the political scene right now, as if to say: The authorities and the president are bad so we are leaving in our white suits for our places of worship and we will stay there waiting for an opportunity, in 10 or 20 years, to return from our democratic castles and bastions.

This will be the worst option, because people in boots and armor will be only too pleased to replace the intelligentsia at the president's side. If I were to make an appeal to the intelligentsia, I would say: Do not go! [end recording] [passage omitted]

Federal Assembly

Upper Chamber Committee Supports Chechen State of Emergency

LD1701175895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1624 GMT 17 Jan 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 17 (INTERFAX)—The Federation Council committee for international affairs has supported imposing state of emergency in Chechnya in order to sooner normalize the situation in the republic.

In its statement published Tuesday, the committee said that "the armed forces and other power structures must be used in strict accordance with state of emergency in future."

The deputies supported the Federation Council's sooner considering amendments to the Russian Constitution and laws "On security," "On defense" and "On state of emergency."

According to the committee, this is necessary to "prevent the possibility of uncontrolled use of the armed forces and units of other power structures on the territory of the Russian Federation."

The deputies are convinced that further use of military force in Chechnya becomes "senseless and dangerous." "The war with the Dudayev regime becomes a war between the federal authorities with the armed Chechen people, which does not makes impossible its restoration," they stated.

According to the deputies, "the huge expenditures" on the restoration of Chechnya at the expense of other items of the federation increased the danger of confrontation between the center and items of the federation.

"Under the pretext of deterring aggressive Russia, nationalist forces in CIS countries intensify their activities to break up the Commonwealth, the probability of new bloc confrontation will increase in case NATO is enlarged with Central an East European countries. The Russian Federation's influence upon Moslem countries is facing growing threat," according to the statement.

Duma Backs Zhirinovskiy Proposal To Hear Security Report

LD1801090895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0857 GMT 18 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 18 TASS—Russian nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy claimed on Wednesday that "armed units from foreign states have penetrated in Moscow and are ready to fight at a proper moment".

Speaking in the State Duma he said some 100,000 militants had arrived in Moscow, but did not name the source of the information.

Zhirinovskiy demanded that the Duma hears a report of the Interior Ministry and the Counterintelligence Service on the situation in the Russian capital.

The State Duma backed Zhirinovskiy's proposal.

Duma Rejects Proposal To Consider Grachev's Dismissal

LD1801094295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0913 GMT 18 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 18 Jan—Today by an overwhelming majority of votes the State Duma rejected

Russia's Choice deputy Lev Ponomarev's proposal to consider the issue of dismissing Russian Federation Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev.

Lev Ponomarev said it is necessary to consider this issue in view of the army's operations in the Chechen Republic, where, as he put it, it is not just Dudayev's militants, but also Russian civilians who are being killed.

Federation Council Members Seek Shumeyko's Dismissal

LD1701131295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1207 GMT 17 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 17 TASS—Only five lawmakers out of nine members of the Federation Council (Russian parliament upper chamber) Committee on Security and Defence voted for hearings at the upper chamber on the release of Vladimir Shumeyko from his post of speaker, ITAR-TASS learnt from committee chairman Petr Shirshov here on Tuesday.

The committee chairman personally does not support this proposal.

The question was raised in connection with Shumeyko's position on the Chechen problem and allegedly his incorrect information of his colleagues about decisions taken by the Russian Security Council.

However, the reasoning of the committee's decision is not ready yet, Shirshov noted, adding that it will be discussed at an interval between plenary sittings today at a committee meeting where the speaker was also invited.

Shirshov does not preclude a chance that committee members would not approve the reasoning, and the question will be stricken out of the agenda. He expressed opinion that some decisions by deputies were caused by the poor knowledge of the status and tasks of various organisations, including the Security Council and its members.

Federation Council Drops Motion

LD1701161095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1525 GMT 17 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 17 TASS—The security and defence committee of the Federation Council decided to drop from the agenda of the Tuesday session of the upper chamber the motion to relieve Speaker Vladimir Shumeyko of his duties.

The motion was made by opposition Senator Petr Romanov who criticised Shumeyko's position on Chechnya. But TASS learned that the committee met during a break in the session and decided that Romanov's proposal was poorly substantiated.

Committee Chairman Petr Shirshov said that the position of Shumeyko regarding the Chechen crisis can be discussed in the framework of the issue on the state role of the upper chamber which was included into the agenda.

Shumeyko has openly backed the use of force in Chechnya.

Regional Affairs

Defense Ministry Denies U.S. 'Spy Plane' Forced To Land

LD1801110995 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] An official spokesman of the Defense Ministry in Moscow has denied reports which appeared in the press on Wednesday [18 January] that Far Eastern border district troops forced a U.S. spy plane to land at Kamchatka Yelizovo airfield for violating state borders. The Defense Ministry spokesman told INTERFAX that no air space violations were registered on Kamchatka on 17 January.

At the same time, the duty officer of the Kamchatka territorial directorate of the Federal Counterintelligence Services has also denied that a U.S. plane violated the state border in the Kamchatka region.

Yeltsin: We Want Grassroots Talks in Chechnya

LD1801120595 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We have a report from the Kremlin. I remind you that the Russian president received foreign ambassadors here today.

[Begin recording] [Yeltsin in progress] ...an all-embracing approach toward talks. We do not want to hold talks with Dudayev who has simply organized a genocide against his own people. We want to hold talks with the grassroots. We want to hold talks with the field commanders and with the districts and municipalities. We want to hold talks at a federal level with leaders who want to live peacefully, co-exist, and to be at one and the same time—as it were—independent and sovereign within the Russian state. That is the first thing: an all-embracing approach toward talks.

The second thing, as I have said, is the gradual transfer and ending of military action by the Defense Ministry and the handover of the task to the Interior Ministry and the Internal Troops. That is the second thing.

The third thing is giving the Chechen people as much help as possible in all their affairs. We are calling on the constituent parts of our Federation as well to render humanitarian aid. It should to be said that the constituent parts of the Federation are already very actively providing such humanitarian aid now.

Yeltsin: Combat in Chechnya Will Be Over Soon

LD1801120795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1152 GMT 18 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 18 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin ruled out any talks with Chechen rebel leader Dzhokhar Dudayev and promised that the army operation in Chechnya will be over in soon.

"We do not want to hold talks with Dudayev who launched a genocide against his own people. We want to hold talks with field commanders, district and urban leaders", the president told reporters in the Kremlin on Wednesday [18 January]. "The Chechen issue will be settled, everything will be quiet and normal and there should be no ballyhoo", he told journalists.

The president denied rumours that he did not control the situation in Chechnya and that his ministers were deciding themselves what to do there.

"I strictly control the power ministries, daily know the situation in Chechnya and nothing serious happens there without my knowledge", he stressed.

"In the coming days we shall complete combat activities in Chechnya and interior units will maintain order there, protect the Chechen population, restore buildings and normal life", Yeltsin said.

He outlined three key issues of the Chechen settlement. The first one concerns the impossibility of talks with Dudayev. The second one is the end of the army operation and the takeover by the interior ministry. The third one concerns humanitarian aid.

"We call on the subjects of the Federation to render hunaitarian aid and it has been already coming to Chechnya", Yeltsin said and admitted that the relief does not often reach those for who it is intended.

"It is necessary that it (aid) is not stolen. There are such negative phenomena. Sometimes the humanitarian aid is received and then sold through commercial structures", the president said.

Speaking on the future Chechen government Yeltsin said it should be created by "a legitimate way", but said Russians should also work in it as there is Russian population in Chechnya.

The president said that new leaders are already in office in a half of Chechen regions and cities. He admitted that it would be initially hard to restore normal life in the republic, but stressed that this will inevitably happen in the long run. "With our help the Chechen republic will develop normally within the Russian Federation", Yeltsin said.

Chechens Said Ready To Detonate 'Entire Nuclear Arsenal'

MM1801093195 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Svetlana Turyalay: "Do Dudayev's Men Have a Nuclear Bomb?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Baku—At least two sensations—which, naturally, require confirmation—have been reported by Rustam Susayev, military correspondent of the CHECHENPRESS agency, who is visiting Baku. According to him, if Groznyy falls, the Chechens will blow up the entire nuclear arsenal that they have allegedly "bought." "Nuclear warheads are the strongest argument against the Russians," the CHECHENPRESS military correspondent stated.

In a TV report on a military parade in Groznyy there was indeed a brief shot in which many people spotted a tactical nuclear missile. Admittedly, there are no guarantees that it was nuclear-tipped—it might even have been a dummy.

The CHECHENPRESS spokesman also claims that if Groznyy is taken, the gunmen will blow up a dam at a reservoir near the Chechen capital. It has currently been mined, but if it were blown up, Rustam Susayev states, the Russian soldiers and anyone left in Groznyy would find themselves under 7-8 meters of water.

They are trying to scare us, but we are not scared, are we?...

Chechens Not Taking Russian Prisoners

LD1701215795

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian at 2122 GMT on 17 January carries a two-minute live or recorded report on the situation in Groznyy. The correspondent says: "Chechens no longer take prisoners, as a rule, and shoot Russian soldiers on sight."

The correspondent adds that illegal armed gangs are leaving Groznyy in droves and that, according to the Chechen militants, Russian soldiers are fighting more fiercely and are refusing to be taken prisoner, as was the case earlier.

The correspondent then quotes an INTERFAX report that approximately 1,160 bodies of Russian soldiers who died in Chechnya have been delivered to the morgue in Mozdok.

Stepashin Says Dudayev's Whereabouts 'Unknown'

LD1701204095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1925 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok, North Ossetia, Jan 17 (INTERFAX)—FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service, FCS] Director Sergey Stepashin said in Mozdok

Tuesday [17 January] that the whereabouts of Dzhokhar Dudayev were unknown. He assumed that Dudayev was moving around the city through secret underground tunnels which were excavated in Groznyy during the three years of Dudayev's rule.

Stepashin said that forces had been ordered to detain Dudayev "and see what happens."

Anti-Dudayev militias loyal to Beslan Gantemirov and Umar Avturkhanov will enter Groznyy tomorrow or the day after to mop up the city, Stepashin said.

He explained that a semblance of central enemy command existed only in the defense of the presidential palace and the center of Groznyy where Aslan Maskhadov, chief of the Chechen headquarters, is believed to be in charge.

Federal Troops Continue Clearing Center of Groznyy

LD1701211495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1925 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy, Jan 17 (INTERFAX)—An Interfax correspondent reported from Groznyy that federal troops continued to clear the center of Groznyy of pro-Dudayev militants. The presidential palace is heavily damaged. Only the lower floors are still being defended.

Well-informed sources told Interfax that Russian casualties in Chechnya totalled 505 killed and 1,860 wounded servicemen on January 16. A considerable number of servicemen are missing.

Russian servicemen who fought in the first clashes for the city continue to return to the Russian positions. They arrive in small groups after hiding in the ruins for several days in districts controlled by pro-Dudayev militants. According to the military, Groznyy residents hide wounded servicemen.

A high-ranking Russian officer, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told Interfax that the 131st Maikop motorized infantry brigade which stormed Groznyy on December 31 1994 had not suffered such considerable casualties as was reported by the media. A total of 210 out of 450 servicemen proclaimed missing were discovered in other units and hospitals. Only 26 servicemen were registered as killed, including two of them after exhuming a communal grave in Groznyy made by local residents.

Troops Still Unable To Capture Presidential Palace

LD1801100295 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Information agencies report that the intensity of the fighting in Groznyy has subsided in the last 24 hours. Russian federal troops are still unable to capture the presidential palace.

Viktor Chernomyrdin, head of the Russian government, has declared that Dzhokhar Dudayev and his entourage are fully responsible for any further bloodshed and loss of life in Chechnya. He said that yesterday in Moscow at a meeting with Dudayev's representatives.

Lobov: Groznyy Palace Capture 'Not Priority'

LD1701214795 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The capture of Dudayev's palace is not of priority importance within the framework of the operation being carried out in Groznyy, Russian Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov told an RIA correspondent. Moreover, the Security Council never gave federal forces the task of taking the palace regardless of the cost.

Lobov said that the main task of the federal forces was to disarm the illegal armed formations. This envisages not so much using force as holding talks with the leaders of these formations and explaining to them the hopelessness of their position and also disbanding them.

At the present time, attempts are being made to reach agreement with the fighters in the palace to hand over their weapons. In any event, Lobov said, our aim is to preserve the lives of Russian citizens in Chechnya.

Continued Military Actions Reported in Groznyy

LD1701125495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1135 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 17 Jan (ITAR-TASS)—The Russian Federation government press service distributed the following report today:

"According to a report from the advance group of the Russian Federation government press service:

"Over the past 24 hours Russian troops continued military actions in the center of Groznyy, surrounded illegal armed formations, and cleared various districts of the city. Basic emphasis was on establishing the locations of bandit formations and active steps were taken to disarm and eliminate them.

"The location of groups of fighters and mercenaries is being established operationally and information about it is taken immediately to the army command and also to the internal troops.

"Troops are helping refugees in all possible ways and this is one of the elements in broadening the sphere of federal influence.

"There is information that foreign citizens from a number of Arab states, who are taking part in the armed conflict as mercenaries on Dudayev's side, have forged documents as citizens of Afghanistan, which they obtained in Pakistan before crossing to Chechnya.

"Information has been received about rumors being spread among the population of Dagestan that on 17 January Britain and Turkey may call for an end to military actions in Chechnya in an alternative form. The possibility is not ruled out that Dudayev's supporters may carry out acts of terrorism in the central regions of Russia and the North Caucasus.

"Steps are being taken to localize attempts to draw national movements in districts bordering Chechnya into provocative actions against the Russian army and the border troops.

"According to information received, the mood among the Chechen authorities about the illegal and provocative nature of the actions of Dudayev and his entourage is strengthening."

Imayev Says Heavy Gun Ceasefire Possible

LD1701224495 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2054 GMT 17 Jan 95

[From the "Nota Bene" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer Dmitriy Sychev] The main news connected with the crisis in Chechnya came from Moscow today, where attempts to find a peaceful way out of the Chechen crisis were stepped up in the past few days. According to the assessments of experts, Chairman of the Russian Government Viktor Chernomyrdin has been playing an increasingly independent role in this process.

[Begin recording] [Chernomyrdin] Our main aim today is to stop the bloodshed.

[Unidentified correspondent] This was stated yesterday in his address to Russians. And today, on the president's instructions, Chernomyrdin met representatives of various socio-political forces of the Chechen republic. But the most important of these meetings was perhaps the brief and unofficial conversation with Dudayev's representatives, Chechnya's General Procurator Usman Imayev and Economics Minister Taymaz Abubakarov. Also taking part in the meeting were Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray and Deputy Minister for Nationalities Vyacheslav Mikhaylov. Shakhray could not find the time to give an assessment of this meeting, and the government press service restricted itself to only a brief statement to the effect that it had taken place. Imayev and Abubakarov themselves said that it had been possible to come to an agreement on stopping the bloodshed on the basis of the cessation of combat operations. Even though the precise dates of the truce had not been fixed, as early as tomorrow they intend to meet with Dudayev and start the preparation of the measures which are necessary for this. However, the use of heavy military equipment and artillery could be stopped even tomorrow.

[Imayev] Somewhere from about 1800 onwards [1500 GMT], one could already be speaking of the cessation of combat operations from heavy types of guns.

[Correspondent] The main question now is whether Dudayev is capable of controlling the armed units fighting on his side. In reply to this Imayev gave the following assurance.

[Imayev] The government and the Chechen people are controlling their territory. To date it is able to control the armed units or groups, whatever they are called.

[Correspondent] The prime minister's statement yesterday and his specific steps today have shown evidently that:

[Arkadiy Volskiy, chairman of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs] Indeed, Viktor Stepanovich has taken the reins of government into his hands.

[Correspondent] But it looks as if the prime minister's more active peacemaking is not to the liking of everyone in the Kremlin and the White House. In an interview to ITAR-TASS at a session of the reconciliation commission, Sergey Filatov said that, to all appearances, the Chechen delegation was unable to present sufficient guarantees for it be perceived as the subject of serious talks. Some newspapers, including KOMMERSANT-DAILY, note that the prime minister has started his own political game. [end recording]

Spokesman: Dudayev Forces Attempting Break-Out

LD1801110095 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A Russian Defense Ministry spokesman in Mozdok reported that Dudayev's men launched several attacks on federal troops this morning. He said that this indicates the militants' attempts to break free from the center of the city which is virtually blockaded by Russian troops.

The unnamed spokesman said he doubts that the militants would stop the resistance even if a cease-fire were to be reached.

Dudayev's Militants Commit 'Atrocious Crimes' in Chechnya

LD1801112495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1009 GMT 18 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Styazhkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pyatigorsk (The Stavropol Territory) January 18 TASS—Dudayev's militants reportedly blow up houses of local civilians in Chechnya to lead the world community to believe that the Russian federal forces are committing "atrocious crimes" in the area.

According to many of the refugees, who arrive from Chechnya in the Stavropol territory without a break via the Mineralniye Vody railway station, these provocations are widespread there, a spokesman for the Pyatigorsk division of the Tersk Cossack district, told ITAR-TASS on Wednesday.

Groznyy Shelling 'Less Intensive'

LD1801113495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1013 GMT 18 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ruslan Maisigov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nazran January 18 (TASS)—The shelling of Groznyy became less intensive on Wednesday, city residents who arrived in the Ingushi capital of Nazran told TASS.

They hope military activities may stop in the near future.

The flow of reinforcements to Chechnya via Ingushetia has also decreased.

Kovalev Assures 'All Necessary' Help for OSCE Observers

LD1801141595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1238 GMT 18 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Belski]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow January 18 (TASS)—The Russian federal authorities will provide all necessary help to an international delegation of observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) planning to visit the Chechnya conflcit area, Valentin Kovalev, the Russian justice minister, told Istvan Gyarmati, reperesentative of the OSCE current chairman, on Tuesday evening. According to the Ministry of Justice press service, the composition of the delegation and its programme of visiting the zone of conflict were provisionally agreed to during the meeting.

Valentin Kovalev also received Jean-Francois Deniaur, the chairman of the French National Assembly Human Rights Committee, and discussed problems of observing human rights in context of events in Chechnya. The ministry's press service told that during the meeting Russian justice minister emphasised that these questions are in focus of attention of the Russian leadership. "These violations are stopped irrespective of the side they ensue from," Valentin Kovalev noted. According to him, a number of materials of this nature have been submitted to the prosecutor-geenral's office. "Russia is prepared to make available all necessary information about what is happening in Chechnya," the Russian justice minister emphasised during the talks with the guest.

Russian Air Force Strikes at Targets Outside Groznyy

LD1801143195 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1300 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian aircraft today continued to provide air support for ground force operations in Chechnya. The Defense Ministry said that strongpoints held by Dudayev fighters outside Groznyy were subjected to air strikes. The artillery and mortar bombardment of the center of the Chechen capital continued, but the intensity with which Groznyy was shelled eased today. The movement of armor and troop transports through Ingushetia to Chechnya also fell off.

Opposition Leader Looks To Chechnya's Future

MM1801115195 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 18 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Report by Boris Prokhorov: "When the Terrible Smoke Clears Away, What Lessons Will Russia Learn from the Bitter Pages of the Chechnya Tragedy?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Groznyy—[Passage omitted] Despite the reports from various mass media of the disappearance of Dzhokhar Dudayev, it is believed in Groznyy that Dudayev is still in the presidential palace bunker, where from time to time he gives interviews to Russian and foreign journalists. The Chechen Republic president claims that he is pinning his hopes entirely on Allah and his people and does not intend surrendering.

"This task cannot be resolved by military means. Even if you bring all the armies together it is impossible to crush the nation's spirit; it is a gift of nature. The Almighty created created the Chechen people such that they cannot be slaves. This struggle has been going on for 300 years. It is better to talk peace with us; in peace we are very good, but in war we are very fierce.

"Neither my military education nor my military experience plays any part here. Actual people are fighting here. I just let the junior commanders take the initiative.... Well, their armies have come and razed Groznyy to the ground. But they cannot flatten the mountains.... I would like things to be different, but no one will let me. But by peaceful means: Please, sit down, let us talk, let us agree. So long as it is without threats, blackmail, lies, violence, or deception but with honesty. Like men.

"The treaty which we offered Russia from the very outset does not infringe its interests in the least; on the contrary, it strengthens its position. There is no tragedy. We have already won. Russia has been exposed in all its nakedness."

Then on to the military plan. The whole territory of the Chechen Republic is divided into 31 squares, with 420 population centers, to which the plan gives hypothetical names. These squares show the homes of people who must either be deported completely or be annihilated. There is also a military program to carry out these tasks: the routes of the convoys, movement plans, distances, attacks.... They have new names for our villages nowadays: square number such and such, "spruce," "oak." Square No. 31 is called "tree trunk...."

Dudayev is sure of himself, he is calm, he cracks jokes, uses strong language, but up above the fighting continues. [passage omitted]

Leaving the military plans to one side you can form an opinion on the prospects for life in the future in Chechnya. The prospects are as follows: Agriculture is in such a state here that the harvest is sufficient for only two months. Industry has virtually ground to a halt. Reports from the Interim Council claim that in 1992-1993 the Groznyy refinery processed oil worth $2.1 billion from Tyumen, from neighboring areas, and from Chechnya itself. Where has that money gone? Pension and wage arrears in Chechnya in that period amounted to 230 billion rubles [R]. Essentially we are talking about stolen money here. It is unlikely to be found. Consequently the interview given by Salambek Khadzhiyev, head of the Chechnya Government of National Rebirth, deals with the question not only of "what to do?" but also of "who is to blame?"

"It is now becoming increasingly clear what forces are behind Dudayev: Those who are thirsting for complete power over vast areas. Chechnya was their proving ground."

[Correspondent] "Can you give any specific names?"

[Khadzhiyev] "Just remember who joined Dudayev in Groznyy to celebrate its 'independence.'"

Naming names today would be like fanning the flames. Let us hope that history will come back to that point. But in general terms it may be said that the groupings that became embroiled in Chechnya were arms dealers, the drugs mafia, and up to a certain stage the oil dealers. The oil shipments from Tyumen continued until August last year, from Stavropol and Dagestan until this winter. Dudayev created a typically criminal regime, yet had we seen in the newspapers and on television in Russia in the past two to three years any protests about the opposition suppressed by Dudayev in 1993, about the newspapers closed down, or about the arrests without trial or investigation? There are grounds for wondering: Might a section of the Russian mass media not be under the control of those people in Moscow who support Dudayev? [Khadzhiyev ends]

Salambek Khadzhiyev is one of the people in Chechnya with whom you can discuss the business and normal life of the republics and the country without political distortions. We talked with him when he was director of a scientific research institute; he is a practical and pragmatic man. Even now he is trying hard to get out of politics, but how can you leave politics?

Unquestionably the criminal and political mafia are not averse to bribery and cover their tracks very well. The venal mass media have learned very well how to demonstrate their independence. But their scraps of truth are too superficial and too primitive.

What kind of atmosphere is it that enables the brilliant general, the heroic Dzhokhar Dudayev to turn overnight into a criminal, a bandit, and the bloody persecutor of his people? How in three years could proud Chechnya break away from the fraternal Veinakh Ingush and plunge them into a bloody battle with their neighbors? How could a republic with a very high industrial potential instantly be transformed into a den of gangsters, a morass of crime, a "black hole"? Is it alone to blame? Or does the trail lead to Moscow?

What kind of conscience, what loathsome spiritual and intellectual qualities must the gods of our political Olympus possess to pin all the blame on the evil Dudayev? With what eyes must the leader of the blasphemously named "Russia's Choice" party look at the world—the man who a year ago by the Kremlin walls blessed the bloody chalice bought with the treasury's money but is now posing as Chechnya's guardian angel?

Yes, politics is a grubby business. But bloody deeds are not politics, they are crimes.

No, it is not courage but self-publicity that people in Chechnya are now calling the panic visits by representatives of the various democratic deputies' factions. Just yesterday they were tearfully beseeching the president not to turn aside from the path of the the country's democratic transformation, from the path of reforms, from the path to a civilized society. He has not.

A man is responsible not for his intentions but for the results.

How can you believe in Bonner's protests or in the crown of thorns of that sufferer for human rights Kovalev? They contain neither pain nor courage. They will acquire courage when they confess before the whole people that they are personally involved and that they bear responsibility for the blood of Abkhazia, Tbilisi, Tiraspol, Dushanbe, Vladikavkaz, Tskhinval, and Moscow.

But the conversation with Khadzhiyev continues.

[Correspondent] "How do you see events in Chechnya developing?"

[Khadzhiyev] "A Dudayev resistance base in the mountains is unlikely, but it will all depend on how sensible our subsequent activity is."

[Correspondent] "It is claimed, however, that it is senseless to try to create a Chechen government in Groznyy after Dudayev. The people will not accept it, it will be a 'government of condemned men.'"

[Khadzhiyev] "Rubbish. The condemned man will be the one who enters the government to steal; things will be bad for him."

[Correspondent] "So the appointment of Yegorov as Yeltsin's plenipotentiary in Chechnya—is that not the appointment of Yegorov as governor general of Chechnya?"

[Khadzhiyev] "Yegorov's mission is to organize work not in Chechnya but in the Russian Government to help Chechnya."

[Correspondent] "Is the government that you head officially recognized by Moscow?"

[Khadzhiyev] "That is the most difficult aspect. Legal recognition is very complex. On the one hand we are a government which has not been elected, on the other—who else is there who can work in these conditions? If Yeltsin issues a direct edict on Moscow's recognition of us, people will start shouting about a 'puppet regime.' I have already discussed this situation in Soskovets' urgency commission. I expect a solution to be found in the next two weeks."

[Correspondent] "A year ago the opposition said that a referendum was needed on relations between Chechnya and Russia. Is that still relevant in the present conditions?"

[Khadzhiyev] "Our position now is this: Dudayev must resign immediately and unconditionally, all participants in the conflict must disarm, and free elections must be held. A new parliament, elected in a free vote, will undertake all negotiations with Russia, and the Government of National Rebirth will play the part of the executive until the elections are held."

[Correspondent] "And the role of the Interim Council?"

[Khadzhiyev] "It will assume the functions of a parliament for that period or will dissolve itself if such a decision is made. It has to be said that the Government of National Rebirth and the Interim Council are not one and the same thing. The Government of National Rebirth is the result of talks between the democratic movement of Chechnya and the Interim Council."

The "victorious" war in Chechnya is coming to an end. It may not come in two hours, a week, or even a month, but sooner or later Dudayev's illegitimate regime will end. Regrettably the price of that victory is several hundred young Russian and Chechen martyrs cut to ribbons, gunned down, and crushed. They are all our people.

We will establish "constitutional order" in Chechnya. But what then? Will we preserve Russia's integrity? Will we strengthen state power? Will we wash our hands clean of blood, stare blankly, and go on building a Russia of equal peoples?

I like to think that I am an optimist but not an idiot.

Commander Denies Low Morale Among Paratroopers in Chechnya

MM1801130195 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 95 First Edition p 2

[Report by Nikolay Senchev: "Assault Troops Asking To Go to Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ulyanovsk—At a meeting with Ulyanovsk journalists Major General Vadim Orlov, commander of the 104th Airborne Assault Division, has talked about the everyday conditions facing the assault troops fighting in Chechnya.

Talk that soldiers taking part in the disarmament of the Dudayev bandit formations are not equipped with hot food, warm clothing, or drinking water has no foundation, the general stated. Following orders a composite regiment of the 104th Airborne Assault Division has blockaded the northeast of Groznyy. Its losses—20 killed and 40 wounded—were suffered in the first three days of fighting. Despite the very tense situation, the men of the composite regiment are equipped with everything they need for life under field conditions.

Vadim Orlov refuted the claim that morale among the men is allegedly low. He is convinced that the assault troops are courageously doing their duty as soldiers. The fact is that 36 servicemen who were to have been demobilized have asked for their discharge to the reserve to be deferred and for them to be sent to Chechnya.

Text of Defense Ministry Disclaimer on Chechen Arms

MM1801130395 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jan 95 p 1

["Statement by Russian Federation Ministry of Defense"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The possession by Dudayev's bandit formations of a large quantity of arms and equipment is today raising legitimate questions to which reasoned replies should be given.

At present a number of figures, who ex officio were directly connected with the problem in question, are making public statements disclaiming their involvement in it and openly attempting to shift from themselves onto the present Russian military leadership all responsibility for the presence of arms in the Chechen Republic.

In this connection the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense considers it essential to state that such pronouncements do not reflect the true state of affairs and are aimed at discrediting the Armed Forces' highest leadership.

Those individuals who are today making the accusations are well informed as to why part of the arms fell into the hands of Dudayev and his bandit formations, and what role they personally played in this, inasmuch as in 1991-1992 they held leadership posts. It was at precisely this period that complete chaos reigned in the units stationed on the territory of the Chechen Republic, criminal groups were running riot, servicemen were being murdered, and mass seizures of arms and ammunition were taking place. The relevant officials did not take any serious measures to stabilize the situation in this region. As a result, by the time of the troops' withdrawal from the Chechen Republic, up to 80 percent of the arms and military hardware had been looted and seized.

The document on dividing up the military hardware, to which Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov is now referring, was a measure taken under duress and resulted from the inaction of the Union, then the Russian Government, and of the former USSR defense minister personally, who subsequently became commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.

This document was signed after the Chechen Republic's parliament adopted a decree placing all military units, military hardware, and arms situated on the territory of Chechnya under its jurisdiction, and after the Chechen side had actually seized the bulk of the military hardware. Under these circumstances, raising the question of dividing up the arms was conditioned by a desire to retrieve at least part of them.

In the light of recent events, the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense is in favor of a thorough investigation into this problem and is ready to assist in the work of the relevant commission.

Moscow Chechen Community Head on Talks With Premier

MK1801114095 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 18 Jan 95 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Replacement for Dudayev Has Not Been Discussed at All"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow University Professor M. Iorailov, "Daymakhk" Chechen-Ingush elders council chairman, has made a statement regarding coverage in the mass media of the meeting in Moscow of the local Chechen community with Russian Federation Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin.

"The mass media have alleged that the Chechen community in Moscow unanimously spoke in their meeting with Mr. Chernomyrdin for a temporary transfer of power in Chechnya—until elections have been held—to the former chairman of the former Supreme Soviet of the former Chechen-Ingush ASSR. An aide to the prime minister has spoken in the same spirit in the press. This is surprising for me because, rising to speak twice in that meeting, I spoke in no uncertain terms for talks with the Groznyy officials even if only because any other option—be it Khadzhiyev imposed by Moscow, or an attempt to go back to the former Supreme Soviet—implies bringing down Dudayev with arms, that is to say, continuation of the war in Chechnya. In the meantime, the unanimous demand to the Russian Federation Government by the Chechen community is to halt immediately all combat operations in Chechnya.

"Besides, we have passed on to V.S. Chernomyrdin the text of the Chechen community's appeal to the Russian Federation Government which contains no point whatever on the forming of any provisional government in Chechnya.

"Finally, I have to point out yet another fact of no minor importance. In anticipation of the meeting with Chernomyrdin, the Chechen community discussed and announced a list of seven negotiators reflecting the entire spectrum of views of the Chechen community. It came as a total surprise to us that the community was represented by 17 people at the meeting. The 10 people in addition to our delegation—I do not know who invited them—were found during the meeting to be "a pressure group" [tolkachi] behind the idea of holding talks on Chechnya with D. Zavgayev, former Supreme Soviet chairman of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR.

"I must state in this connection that the statements voiced by these persons do not reflect the views of the majority of the Chechen community in Moscow."

More on Chechen Emissaries' Talks With Chernomyrdin

MK1801111095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 18 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Natalya Gorodetskaya, Sergey Parkhomenko in the "Chechnya" column: "Dudayev's Emissaries Say They Have Agreed With the Premier on a Cease-Fire"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Fighting continued near the presidential palace in Groznyy yesterday. A Russian Federation state flag has already been brought from Mozdok to be hoisted over the palace. Downtown was bombarded by artillery. Russian army, marines, and Special-Purpose Militia Detachment units were combing the northern and northeastern parts of the city and the Pervomayskaya Street area in search of Dudayev gunmen, the Russian Federation Government Press Service reported. According to military experts, in three or four days the city's northern and northeastern parts will be cleared of the remaining armed supporters of the rebellious general.

Meanwhile in Moscow, Russian Federation Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray met, in his expression, "with very many representatives of particular structures of Chechen society" to find out whether they are influential enough to affect the execution of the terms of a possible cease-fire agreement. Sergey Filatov, for instance, was openly skeptical of the Dudayev government's ability to control the situation in Chechnya in the event of a cease-fire.

During a meeting with General Dudayev's emissaries—Chechnya General Prosecutor Usman Imayev and Economy and Finance Minister Taymaz Abubakarov—according to Shakhray, the possibility of "stopping the bloodshed" and disarmament was discussed. Groznyy representatives described the conclusion of a bilateral cease-fire agreement and stopping any combat actions on the territory of the Chechen Republic as "an indispensable condition for high-level negotiations." The vice premier stressed that the question about the republic's status was not discussed because "Chechnya is an indisputable subject of the Russian Federation."

An informed source in the Ministry for Nationalities Affairs and Regional Policy, however, doubted the effectiveness of future high- level Russian-Chechen negotiations because "a number of armed formations are acting independently and do not report to Dudayev." In its opinion, much will depend on field commanders' positions. Furthermore, "foreign mercenaries, kamikaze-fanatics, and intransigent gunmen" will hardly lay down their arms, the ministry representative said.

The Russian prime minister nonetheless was yesterday inclined to meet with Dzhokhar Dudayev's representatives, but this question was to be decided only after a meeting with the president. And the meeting took place after all.

At the meeting, Abubakarov told SEGODNYA, "General agreement was reached on ceasing fire in Chechnya." The rest, Dudayev's representative stressed, including the disarmament of the Chechen president's supporters, the republic's sovereignty, and the upcoming talks, will be decided after hostilities are stopped. According to Abubakarov, fire will be ceased as soon as Dudayev's representatives "return to Groznyy and talk with their leaders and field commanders," while "Gen. Dudayev is in a position to control the situation."

The Russian Federation Government Press Service, however, mentioned the prime minister's meeting with the Dzhokhar Dudayev mission merely among one of the many consultations held "with representatives of various political forces in the Chechen Republic." The press service release confirms virtually nothing except the mere fact of Abubakarov's and Imayev's visiting the White House. "Viktor Chernomyrdin stressed," the press service reports, "that D. Dudayev and his entourage have the last chance to prove their wish to renounce further bloodshed and demonstrate a real ability to manage the situation: stop senseless combat actions, destroy heavy weaponry, and start surrendering small arms."

"D. Dudayev's representatives received no promises of a personal meeting with V. Chernomyrdin or guarantees of his political future," the document says. It makes no mention of a reportedly concluded mutual cease-fire agreement.

Meanwhile an official at Sergey Shakhray's secretariat told SEGODNYA that the meeting between the Russian premier and Groznyy representatives indeed discussed the Dudayev government's ability to control the situation in the republic. Responding to the Chechen ambassadors' proposal that hostilities be stopped, the premier for his part invited them unilaterally and fully to end armed resistance across Chechnya territory. Viktor Chernomyrdin promised the emissaries that if they can really do this and report this to Moscow, the Russian side will immediately cease fire.

Ingushetia's Aushev on Chechen Crisis

MM1801171595 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 95 p 2

[Interview with Ingush President Ruslan Aushev by Aleksandr Gamov; place and date not given: "Ingush President Ruslan Aushev: If War Goes On It Means It Is to Somebody's Advantage"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Gamov] Ruslan Sultanovich, you know the Caucasus like the back of your hand, and you fought in Afghanistan for over four years. It seems to me that you cannot have failed to sense the approach of the current tragedy....

[Aushev] I saw the first ominous signs of the "Chechen War," as it is customarily called, back in 1992, when the so-called Ingush-Ossetian conflict broke out. The "Chechen problem" was coming to the forefront even then. The thought process was as follows: Suppress the Ingush who have taken it into their heads to recover their own lands, these will appeal to Dudayev for help, he will meet them halfway, since the Ingush and Chechens are essentially the same Veinakh people, and then it will be possible to solve all the North Caucasian problems in one fell swoop, by using armed force against both Chechnya and Ingushetia.

[Gamov] Can you say whose thought process this was?

[Aushev] It must be assumed that it was that of the figures who intended to pursue—and are pursuing—Russian nationalities policy in such a scheming way. It is no accident that the official spin on the tragedy in Prigorodnyy Rayon was in keeping: It was said that despite the law the Ingush want to seize by force lands that do not belong to them. The mass media had a blackout so that they "did not say too much." Do you recall what "Ostankino" leader Yegor Yakovlev was removed from his post for? For "letting through" reportage showing what was from the authorities' viewpoint an "untypical" situation: Peaceful Ingush in Prigorodnyy Rayon being shot by regular Russian troops.

After those events certain figures here in Moscow became firmly convinced that the problem with Dudayev could be solved in the same way.

[Gamov] Many people are now arguing: Could the Chechen problem have been tackled immediately, that is to say in 1991?

[Aushev] Of course it could. But for some reason it was remembered only in 1994. For all that time was it really constantly on the lips of the broad masses of the Russian and the whole world's public? No.... I would have understood it had society openly discussed these questions: Here is the Chechen side's opinion, here is the federal authorities' proposal.... You will recall that when Gorbachev sorted Lithuania out the whole country followed it. Even I myself flew there. At that time conclusions could have been drawn: The problem has become deadlocked, it could have been said. In Chechnya's case this did not happen.

[Gamov] Many people are inclined to believe that all this is a consequence of the country's lack of a concept for pursuing a nationalities policy.

[Aushev] The point is that nobody is dealing with it—they are too busy. Remember Shakhray, the recent head of the State Committee for Nationalities Policy? He was simultaneously a vice premier, a minister, a party chairman, and a State Duma deputy. Can one man take on so much at the same time? Now it is Yegorov. He has put on a military uniform and ensconced himself in Mozdok.

The person in this post should not be commanding a front but preparing proposals for the government on how to avoid such wars. Of course, he must know the history of Russian peoples, know how to work with them, and pursue a more delicate policy that has scientifically based approaches in its arsenal, not military formations.

[Gamov] Ruslan Sultanovich, you are closer to things there, you can see more clearly; please reveal the secret of why it happens that there are hundreds of analysts and aides in the Kremlin and that such forces were thrown at Groznyy, yet Dudayev is outsmarting them.

[Aushev] This is where I would start: Moscow thinks roughly as follows—what is Chechnya? A small people. If necessary we will crush them. You must understand that there is no respectful attitude toward the people.

As for Dudayev.... Let us put it this way: A fool would not have been made commander of a strategic bomber division. Furthermore he is a Chechen. Do you know how many Chechens and Ingush have been promoted to senior posts, especially in the Army? You could count them on the fingers of one hand! And if a Chechen or an Ingush have become generals—it came to them late and by sweating blood.

Of course, Dudayev is currently outsmarting the Kremlin. What is he relying on? On "bandit formations," do you think? No, on his own people. Dudayev is perfectly well aware of how Chechens live and what they want.

[Gamov] When troops were ordered through Ingushetia your republic's population opposed this. Why?

[Aushev] First, we are fundamentally opposed to deciding such questions by force. Second, Chechens are our fraternal people. Third, around 40,000 Ingush were living in Groznyy. Incidentally, my parents lived there too. That is, supposing I say that I approve of the introduction of troops, that means I am giving consent and saying: Come and kill my mother and father.

[Gamov] What have you personally done as president of Ingushetia to avoid bloodshed?

[Aushev] I have tried as far as I am able to avert this tragedy. When I was read a document in which the heads of North Caucasian republics were supposedly requesting the Russian president "to impose order," I refused to sign it. I telephoned Yeltsin and tried to convince him that he was receiving incorrect information and that this problem must not be solved by using military force. But the president stated that he was right on top of the situation.

[Gamov] There is a theory that the war in Chechnya is to the presidential entourage's advantage—it is said that the preservation of tension in the Caucasus will make it possible to postpone the elections, which Yeltsin and his team have already lost.

[Aushev] Everything is possible, not a single theory can be discounted, this included. But something else might be at work here. Can you imagine how many resources will go on solving the Chechen problem? Just try mentioning that there are troubles with the budget and high inflation in the country.... And I think there is every chance that, after the so-called "opposition" that took it into its head to seize Groznyy failed, somebody wanted to muddy the trail of shame and drown it in blood. If the war goes on the question must be put as follows: To whose advantage is it?

[Gamov] In recent days the Russian Government has nonetheless made attempts to switch the conflict into a peaceful direction.... You have met with Chernomyrdin several times. Have you maybe formed the impression that somebody is getting in his way?

[Aushev] I do believe so. According to my observations he is not autonomous in his actions. Maybe that is why the government's peacemaking efforts have not yet yielded any results.

[Gamov] What is the solution?

[Aushev] There is only one solution: It has to be stopped and not considered that a victory over Chechnya is a great achievement for the Russian Armed Forces. It is necessary to stop the shooting on both sides. To look after people—the killed and wounded. To get old people, women, and children out of cellars and feed them. To take this first step at least! Then to disperse the troops. And start talks on a wide range of questions. Above all on the status of the Chechen Republic, on reviving its economy, and so on....

[Gamov] Incidentally, the Kremlin is already inclining toward the view that Chechnya should be governed not by a puppet government but a freely elected organ....

[Aushev] It is all a matter of who is going to organize these elections. We must talk to the people. So far this problem has been discussed by two speakers, the president, and the premier. Whether Dudayev is liked or not he is currently basically governing the republic.

[Gamov] Why did you support the initiative of the heads of Russian Federation republics which provoked a negative reaction from the authorities?

[Aushev] The Council of Heads of Republics was set up under the president, it convened once a month for a meeting with the head of state, and I believe that we worked fairly effectively; at least we could regularly exchange our thoughts and ideas with Boris Nikolayevich. Now it is not only difficult to get to see him but also to get through to him on the telephone. But there are many questions—with whom can they be tackled?

[Gamov] Your forecast: How will the Chechen crisis develop further?

[Aushev] If the center has enough wisdom to get out of it competently, without descending into personal agendas [ambitsii], everything will be all right. But if continued reliance is placed on a solution by force, it is hard to say what that will lead to. Most likely to some kind of prolonged crisis.

The people can be stifled. But they cannot be beaten. Nobody has yet managed to crush the mountain people....

Economic Issues

Livshits on Economic, Social Policy

MM1701160395 Moscow TRUD in Russian 14 Jan 95 p 2

[Interview with A. Livshits, assistant to the Russian President for economic questions, by Vitaliy Golovachev; place and date not stated: "Aleksandr Livshits: Money, It Transpires, Can Be Protected From Inflation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is an innovation in the Kremlin: Nowadays, a security service staffer meets all journalists near the entrance doors, where the guard carries out a thorough inspection and escorts them to the office indicated on the pass. After the interview, each one is accompanied out. Not understanding what it was all about at first, I was anxious not to put the official to any bother, saying that I could make my own way from here, a stone's throw from the exit, but my companion explained: "From now on it is not permitted to leave journalists alone in this building"....

Okay, to the point. How is the economic situation viewed from here, from Red Square? It was with this question that we began our conversation with A. Livshits, assistant to the Russian president for economic questions.

[Golovachev] Aleksandr Yakovlevich, it is the done thing in our country now to issue soothing statements: "The most difficult times for the Russian economy are already behind us"; "An opportunity to emerge from the period of crisis development is opening up"—these were recent comments by one of the vice premiers. In the overall scheme of things, do you believe that "everything's just fine"?

[Livshits] I have never said that "everything's just fine," but neither have I ever sought to paint a completely black picture. Life is multifaceted, contradictory processes are under way in the economy, and there are both positive changes and errors, miscalculations....

[Golovachev] The positive side is always interesting. What do you have in mind?

[Livshits] For instance, individual housing construction. In the space of last year, its volume rose by 34 percent. There was nothing equivalent in the whole of the previous 75 years. And anybody who does not believe the figures should take a trip outside the city—cottages, comfortable dachas, and residences are springing up like mushrooms. This is the picture not only in the Moscow region, but in the areas surrounding many other cities too.

Or take a sensitive question like the slump in production. In the period from October through to the end of last year, the average daily volume of industrial output in relation to the preceding month remained constant....

[Golovachev] Is this expressed in terms of cost—when, at the expense of price hikes, volumes increase in terms of rubles?

[Livshits] No, it is in physical terms. Of course, it is a little too early to draw far-reaching conclusions as it is necessary to watch for another one or two quarters, but there are, nevertheless, definite signs.

Certain structural advances are also visible—exports, for instance, increased by 7 percent last year....

In short, when positive changes occur it is essential to talk about them without fear of being accused of embellishment.

[Golovachev] A year ago, in his message to the Federal Assembly, the president criticized the government very severely, stressing that in the space of two years of reforms it had not even been able to elaborate an effective structural policy, that the cost of reform was too high, and that progress was accompanied by grave errors. Has the situation changed in a year?

[Livshits] I will not presume to conduct a critique of the activity of the government, because it gets enough of that from all sides. Powerful pressure is being exerted, and there are forces which want to bring the government down and change course. The premier is having a hard time, and it is he who, most of all, must resist the onslaught. Today, nevertheless, the president and the premier are the main guarantors of the continuation of reforms.

[Golovachev] There is some anguish over the fact that negative trends are increasing in the economy: Inflation is up, store shelves are depleted, shortages are evident....

[Livshits] Don't draw hasty conclusions. At present there would seem to be three unfavorable circumstances which have taken hold: Namely, the peculiarities of the month (January is always "difficult" for the economy), the events in Chechnya, and pessimistic forecasts from well-known people which are believed by a sizable proportion of the population. There are complications, and they must not be overlooked, but there is no need to whip up passions, to exaggerate the danger, to issue incorrect forecasts of predetermined inevitability.

Inflation rates are a clear example of this. For the fourth straight month there has been fairly tight control of the money supply. In February through March, according to all the laws of economics, the rate of price hikes will lessen noticeably. But here a great deal depends on whether or not speculative demand continues. Inflation could come down both to 8 percent or to 15 percent. That is, these very inflationary expectations increase the pace of price hikes twice over! This is why it is so important not to whip up a mood of panic.

[Golovachev] Which trends predominate in the economy now?

[Livshits] The picture is constantly changing. In the summer things were going fairly well, and it looked as though we were about to come good. Now the situation has grown complicated. And I would say that at this stage there exists a kind of dynamic equilibrium of positive and negative processes.

[Golovachev] How much will the war in Chechnya cost the budget, and will this affect inflation? Very diverse figures are being named....

[Livshits] At the moment, the estimate for total expenditure on Chechnya in 1995 stands at between 4 and 5 trillion rubles [R]. There may be a certain increase in the sum depending on how events develop. But compare this with the expenditure part of the federal budget—R230 trillion. We are talking about 2 percent of federal expenditure. Of course, the state could do with these trillions, and all this is bad news, but it is not the end of the world. And it should not have too great an effect on inflation.

[Golovachev] Vladimir Polevanov, the new leader of Goskomimushchestvo [State Committee for the Management of State Property], is pushing for nationalization in the most important spheres of the economy (oil, metallurgy, and so on). THE WALL STREET JOURNAL cites V. Polevanov's words: "The Presidential Staff supports me." It is rumored in government institutions that the new Goskomimushchestvo leader was appointed specifically so as to radically alter the guidelines in privatization....

[Livshits] This is not so. The statements by Mr. Polevanov reflect his personal point of view, and not the stance of the government. Without rejecting flexible management of state assets (this is perfectly normal), it is worth stressing categorically: There will be no nationalization. Two days ago I spent a long time chatting with the president, and as such I can say with confidence that there will be no change of course. Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin also defends this stance.

[Golovachev] But how can reforms be carried out if people in key posts in the government are going to "pull the rope," figuratively speaking, in different directions?

[Livshits] It is necessary simply to avoid orchestrating public "showdowns," and to coordinate positions....

[Golovachev] But what if they are diametrically opposed?

[Livshits] This simply means that it is essential to know how to work in a team and not for personal ambitions—there is nothing more to be said here....

[Golovachev] In all honesty, can you really say that you are not, deep down, harboring fears regarding attempts to change the economic and political course?

[Livshits] I do harbor fears. But not over attempts at a radical change of course, but rather, how shall I put it, over a mild, gradual shift to another tack. This fear is understandable: In a country where armed conflict is in progress, a nucleus of instability appears, and in conditions of instability there is always the temptation for someone to exploit the situation to their own ends. There have always been people who would like to "overturn" everything in the country, and they have not disappeared. So such a fear is not groundless, but there is no cause for panic as yet.

[Golovachev] Let's switch to the other issues which are troubling everyone—the social sphere. You have talked about the rapid pace of individual housing construction. Indeed, those who have the money are building houses. But at the same time, over 30 million Russians live below the poverty line. Stratification in society is becoming ever more pronounced. Are you attending to this problem? Does the country's president know about it?

[Livshits] Not only does he know, but he considers it a problem of extreme importance. A number of drafts whose implementation should improve the situation in the social sphere are in the process of being elaborated right now. Certain steps have already been taken. For instance, the edict of 20 December last year on aid to war veterans. It is a powerful document. As of May, every veteran will receive a boost to his pension of no less than R90,000 a month. And this is not just for the anniversary, but for ever. The material position of 2.3 million people will improve drastically. This is a terrific boon for the elderly. This money has been put into the Pension Fund, and it will be paid out.

[Golovachev] Large families are in a very difficult position. Many of them are experiencing horrific poverty.

[Livshits] This area also has a high profile. I will not give any details yet, but a wholly specific task has been set: namely, to find opportunities to increase benefits to large families.

[Golovachev] And the minimum wage? Discussions on the subject of increasing it go on and on, and it is still only R20,500. Today this sum can only be described as shameful....

[Livshits] My view is that it has to be indexed immediately. Experts from the Ministry of Labor apparently suggest increasing it as of 1 March. I believe that this has to be done as of 1 February.

[Golovachev] Have you walked around the stores? There is no meat in many of them, and the only milk you can get is the expensive, long-life stuff....

[Livshits] The milk situation is always bad in January. In February and in March things will sort themselves out. It is the same with butter, among other products. But the local authorities ought to demonstrate some initiative here. If you know that the milk and butter situation will be difficult in December and January, you would be well advised to find out where it can be bought and bring it in beforehand.

[Golovachev] Here is what Petr Yevseyev, a reader from Moscow, writes to the editorial team: "I feel like a foreigner in my own state. It is indifferent to my fate, my hardships. I bought two shares in a widely publicized fund—it went 'bust' (thankfully, I did not lose too much). Now I don't know what to do with my money—it is dangerous to take it to a bank which offers the best interest rates, as it will probably 'crash' out of the blue, but interest rates in the Savings Bank are half the rate of inflation...." What would you say to the sender?

[Livshits] There are many such letters. What would I say in reply?... In general, it is not done in our country to talk about documents which are in the stage of preparation, but in this case I will make an exception. A presidential edict is being prepared on guarantees for the protection of bank depositors. In other words, there must be a system of insurance whereby, if a bank crashes, the investors do not lose their money.

Now a word about how citizens can protect their money from inflation. The state cannot give directions to the banks, but to issue state bonds which it would be beneficial to buy is another matter. For instance, the Ministry of Finance will sell you a bill of exchange at market interest rates for a certain period (say, three months) and secure it on behalf of the state. So behind it stands the full financial might of the country—that is, there is 100 percent reliability here. This draft is virtually "signed and sealed." I think these securities will be in great demand. After, say, three months, you get the full sum plus extra after calculating the market interest rates. This is an answer to the writer of that letter.

Now a word on the immediate outlook. The idea of consumer credit seems like an attractive one to me. Look at what happens. Many families, particularly young families, need furniture. It is available in the stores, but they cannot buy it—it is very expensive. This is bad for the family and bad for the furniture factory, as its product is not being sold.... The solution is clear—sell it on credit. Admittedly, in conditions of inflation, this is a fairly complex matter, but it is nevertheless worth a try.... There are other plans too in that most sensitive social sphere, but as yet it is too early to talk about them....

[Golovachev] And is anything new being prepared in the development of economic reform? Can you give just one or two examples....

[Livshits] Our monopolists are a source of great concern. A market means competition, and monopolism is the diktat of the producer, a market strangler. This is why it is so apt to talk about the issue of regulating the activity of natural monopolies. I am talking about railroad transportation, electricity, pipeline conveyance. It is a well-known problem, a neglected "disease." It is a pity! There was no need to conduct any kind of liberalization at all here. Under socialism, everybody was "suppressed." To a certain extent, these spheres ought to have been left in a "suppressed" condition. Of course, everything must be done sensibly. It is possible that, as of 1996, these spheres will be subsidized (this is not enshrined in this year's budget). Or else we will find other forms and mechanisms. But it is essential that we do something with this, as the negative influence of monopolism on the economy is enormous.

[Golovachev] Criminalization of the economy has hit enormous scales. Many enterprises sell products abroad for less than Russian partners are prepared to buy them for. Often a criminal personal plot between the director of the enterprise and the manager of the foreign firm stands behind this. Western banks sacredly guard the secrecy of accounts....

[Livshits] I agree. This is a complex knot. We are trying to take specific measures. But there is fierce resistance, insofar as the matter is one of huge personal gain. This is a very difficult battle.

[Golovachev] And nevertheless, will it be possible in the foreseeable future to cope with this evil?

[Livshits] Mm...I don't know, to be honest, I simply don't know.....

[Golovachev] One final question. What is the situation regarding state enterprises? A year ago it was said that the state has as yet not managed to set in motion effective regulation of the economy, in particular the administration of enterprises belonging to it....

[Golovachev] There has been some progress here. In May last year, as we know, an edict came out on state plants. The government drew up the state plant charter. And I think that, in the coming months, such enterprises will emerge in our country. And not one or two, but dozens. This is a major reform. In conclusion, I want to stress that it is very important to look beyond surface, immediate events and facts, beyond individual misfortunes and successes, to see the profound processes, and to imagine clearly the alternative to today's course. Then it will be clearer who is trying to rock the boat and why, and who is spreading wild rumors and absurd projects....

Today, each of us must learn to dig deeper into the economy and politics. The country's future depends on this too....

Chubays Sees No Grounds for Panic on Economy

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[Interview with First Deputy Premier Anatoliy Chubays by Igor Karpenko; place and date not given: "Anatoliy Chubays: There Are No Prerequisites for an Economic Catastrophe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The war in Chechnya has sharply upset economic as well as political stability and has prompted a new wave of inflation in Russia. Specialists and the mass media are now questioning the feasibility of a balanced budget in 1995, and are talking about the government changing course and winding up its market reforms. IZVESTIYA asked First Deputy Premier Anatoliy Chubays to analyze the situation.

[Chubays] "Policy has changed. Reform has stopped. There is inflation. The ruble and the budget have all collapsed...." I hear this too often these days, expressed not even in the form of a question but in the form of an abiding truth. I would like assessments to be made on the basis of facts rather than emotions. I assess the situation not on the basis of some assurances from the government, but on the basis of its actual decisions. Thus, 1 January saw the abolition of oil licenses and quotas. The prime minister signed a decree liberalizing the oil market. It was ready back on 1 July, but was not published. The press unanimously claimed that nothing successful could be done with oil, and that the government had lost out, since the forces behind it were too great. As you can see, this prediction was not borne out. Now specialists are claiming that through this decision alone we could gain 15 trillion rubles [R] for the federal budget, not to mention equalizing price structures and eliminating a known source of corruption.

Other fundamental decisions have also been made, but they, as it were, are not part of the sphere of public attention, for quite understandable reasons relating to the Chechnya events. For instance, the government has sharply reduced the licenses needed for different types of activity—instead of 144 there will now be just 70, and most of them are being transferred from federal to regional level. Formerly licenses used to be issued for three months—once they expired you needed a new one. Under the new procedure they will last at least three years.

Other major decisions are in the pipeline—and in spheres where, as they say, the reformists had never set foot before. Thus, the entirely uncontrolled import of alcoholic products into the country was very destructive for the economy. We undermined prices in the domestic market, put Russian producers in a difficult position, and gave rise to enormous underground production. Some 120 million dekaliters were produced in Russia last year, but sales volumes were twice that amount, in the opinion of specialists. There is no getting away from the need for serious measures in this area, and they will be brought in shortly. Figuratively speaking, we want to pull the rug from under the feet of those engaged in the illegal alcohol business, the scale of which runs into trillions of rubles. In much the same way measures are being drawn up for the diamond complex, the gold market, and so forth. I believe that more was done to reform the Russian economy over the new year period alone than in the previous six months.

[Karpenko] But, Anatoliy Borisovich, surely in another important area—changing ownership—the reforms are floundering? Not a single enterprise has yet been privatized on the new terms, and sales of shares in enterprises that were privatized previously—at the check stage—are dwindling. The new chairman of the State Committee for the Management of State Property [Goskomimushchestvo] has openly stated that privatization is over and it is time to engage in nationalization. What has happened at Goskomimushchestvo? I know that leading specialists at the committee are now voicing their lack of confidence in their leader. Isn't this all a change of policy?

[Chubays] I accept the critical tone of your question. The pace of privatization has indeed fallen off substantially. This is not normal. The second half of your question is fair too. Unfortunately, I have to agree that a number of the statements made by Vladimir Pavlovich Polevanov have run counter to existing legislation, the privatization program, and presidential edicts. They reflect his personal view, which he has presented as the official position.

The consequences of this "freelancing" have been serious. I know of dozens of projects which have been halted in the wake of these statements. I know the reaction of many leaders, enterprise directors, entrepreneurs, and bankers who have asked themselves whether they can trust a government which unexpectedly changes its position on such a basic matter as privatization. Several Western entrepreneurs have simply broken off a number of deals, and Russia has lost many millions of dollars thereby.

In this connection Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin decided to change responsibilities within the government—Vladimir Polevanov, as leader of Goskomimushchestvo, was made directly subordinate to First Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays. On the premier's instructions I held a collegium session at Goskomimushchestvo Thursday at which, I have to say, there was a very difficult discussion about all these matters. The collegium session fully reaffirmed the correctness of the government's policy and considers any statements that differ from this policy to be absolutely impermissible. Moreover, there is the question of elementary government discipline, within the framework of which not a single person—even a minister or department leader—is entitled to alter the government's position through a personal statement. This is impossible, such things do not happen. I think Vladimir Pavlovich Polevanov drew his own conclusions.

The collegium session also drew its own conclusions—which were quite tough and unambiguous. The decisions which Goskomimushchestvo considers it necessary to repeal were bluntly stated. It was stressed that privatization policy will continue as before. There have been no changes to it, nor can there be any. This is not the policy of Polevanov or Chubays, it is the policy of Russia.

[Karpenko] IZVESTIYA has published an interview with Dmitriy Vasilyev—your deputy on the Securities Commission—in which he spoke in detail about what is currently being done to establish and develop a stock market and to strengthen its material and legislative base. But the latest surge in inflation has sharply affected its activeness.

[Chubays] That is true. The situation is difficult. Last summer we were able to boldly talk about a stockmarket boom. According to our figures the volume of monthly operations had reached $500 million and was accompanied by share price rises for the overwhelming majority of Russian enterprises. In December the volume of Russian and foreign investment fell to $30-50 million—an almost 10-fold decline.

We have to honestly say that the hostilities in Chechnya have had a severe impact on both the stock market and the financial market. The uncertainty and nervousness of the situation are creating inflationary expectations, which themselves engender inflation. There are two sets of reasons for inflation and price growth—on the one hand, objective economic reasons relating to the money supply and the government's financial policy; and, on the other, purely psychological reasons.

In October, November, and December the growth dynamics of the monetary base did not exceed 6-7 percent. Inflation, which, as a rule, occurs after a slight lag, should not have exceeded these indicators—it should have been around 5-7 percent. But in fact December inflation was 16.4 percent! How did that happen? It was the result not only of objective factors but of people's psychology.

It has to be bluntly stated that in early January an attempt was essentially made to repeat "Black" Tuesday. Pretty major financial resources were brought to bear to achieve this end in late December. Those who prepared this were perfectly well aware of the situation and had taken account both of people's mentality and of objective factors. They concluded that the number of bargains would fall sharply because of the holidays. This is the most dangerous time, since it is hard to maintain the same inflation dynamics over two or three days instead of a normal week. But we knew about this in advance and, in conjunction with the Central Bank, had made preparations for this period—although, of course, we waited anxiously for events to unfold. On the first day of trading the dollar was up R44, on the next day it was up R38, the following day saw a rise of R29, and on 12 December it was up by R24. The attack on the ruble was beaten off. The planned explosion did not happen. We not only defused the situation but we know that we have already exhausted the ruble resources that were built up for the attack. The Central Bank now has sufficient foreign reserves to keep the situation stable....

At the same time, we must understand that the Chechnya events are exceptionally painful and dangerous for the economy. Above all, because of the war's impact on people's outlooks. The logic is as follows—this is the end, everything has now failed, and all the money will go to Chechnya. What should we do? Rush to buy dollars. The most unlikely rumors are multiplying every day. Either that an exchange of rubles is in the offing, or that the R50,000 notes will be withdrawn and others issued. The Central Bank chairman angrily told me that she was tired of listening to rumors that dollars would be exchanged. Which dollars, why, what would they be exchanged for, and who would do it? Now we have had the latest piece of "news": Accounts held by all corporate bodies will be frozen as of the middle of the year. Totally absurd! Both from the financial standpoint and from the technical standpoint. Nothing of the sort is in prospect, nor could it be. But people believe it—there is a war on! Some people are rubbing their hands at the prospect of inflation and are making money out of it.

[Karpenko] Under these circumstances can the government defend its concept of a tight budget?

[Chubays] I personally have an unambiguous answer for this, probably one of the most important questions. If we are talking not about some expectations but about the specific expenditure on the war in Chechnya, then amendments will, naturally, have to be made. Nobody could have envisaged this expenditure in October, when the draft was considered by the Duma in its first reading. We have only just discussed the possible sum involved with the finance minister. For all the tragedy of what is happening in Chechnya, I can say that, from the economic standpoint, its scale is not comparable to the scale of Russia. We can argue about whether it will come to R4 or R5 trillion, but this is only 0.5 percent of the country's GDP! Even if it were 1 percent, it would not undermine Russia's economy or destroy its budget. The atmosphere of uncertainty and nervousness is far more dangerous. That does not sit well with reform....

I can firmly state that there are no realistic, objective prerequisites not only for an economic catastrophe but even for a serious deterioration in the situation. I am convinced that we must solve the problems of Chechnya—which were created both by objective factors and, to a considerable extent, by our own mistakes—as quickly as possible. We must solve them and get back to normal. And complete our reforms.

Chubays Replaces Soskovets as Head of Government Commission

LD1701202895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1925 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 17 (INTERFAX)—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin has decided to appoint First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays as head of the government commission for improving payments and settlements procedures, sources close to the Russian government told Interfax. Prior to this, the commission responsible for tackling non-payments was headed by First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets.

According to the decision, Soskovets is to concentrate on chairing a special committee for coordinating the activities of federal power bodies responsible for restoring Chechnya's economy and social services. In addition, Soskovets will still head the government commission responsible for the acutest issues in the basic branches of industry.

Soskovets will also head the commission for improving the system of executive bodies instructed to cut government machinery by 30

and coordinate the activities of various ministries and bodies.

Economics Minister Informs Chamber on Investments Policy

LD1701225895 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Jan 95

[Report by Mikhail Aleksandridi; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Government believes that it has exhausted the possibilities of a moderately tough financial policy and intends to attain macroeconomic stability, first of all, by stimulating investment and introducing tough anti-inflation measures, Yevgeniy Yasin told today's meeting of the Public Chamber under the Russian president.

According to the economics minister, Russian enterprises and banks have up to $30 billion in their accounts and now the process of transforming the savings into investments in production has to start. Yevgeniy Yasin believes that bringing inflation down to one percent per month by the end of the year will make it possible to attain steady stabilization of production and renewed economic growth in 1996-97. The minister said that in late February, the government plans to discuss a three-year economic program which, specifically, envisages boosting investments into high-performance and competitive production, implementing a tough budget policy, and putting a stop to inflation.

Statistics Committee Releases 1994 GDP Figures

LD1701203895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1434 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 17 (INTERFAX)—Russia's GDP in 1994 stood at 630 trillion rubles, falling 15 percent against the previous year and 39 percent against pre-reform 1991, according to official figures released by the Russian Statistics Committee on Tuesday [17 January].

In 1994 most of the GDP (62 percent), for the first time, was a result of the non-state sector. In 1993 the GDP fell by 12 percent, in 1992 - by 19 percent.

The rate of decline in industry in 1994 appeared higher than in the two previous years of reforms and amounted to 20.9 percent (against 16.2 percent in 1993 and 18 percent in 1992). However, the fourth quarter, as compared to the previous one, witnessed signs of production growth - by 17.8 percent, while earlier production had constantly been falling.

Figures for 1994 also indicate a continued reduction of capital investments into the economy - a fall of 27 percent. Investments have fallen 61 percent since 1991.

Last year retail prices grew by 220 percent. Wholesale - by 230 percent.

The population's real income grew by 14 percent against 1993, while the number of unemployed in Russia grew by 28.6 percent, up to 5.3 million.

Signs of Stabilization in Defense Industries

LD1701203595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1434 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 17 (INTERFAX)—In 1994 Russia's Defense enterprises witnessed a production decline of 38.8 percent. The State Committee for Defense Industries reports, however, that signs of stabilization made themselves felt in September 1994.

Head of the Department for Information and Statistics, Vitaliy Vitebskiy, told Interfax that the rate of stabilization stood at about 40 percent of the 1991 production volume. In December 1994, production decline was 26.1 percent of the level typical of December 1993.

Decline was the greatest in the rocket-space industry (38.6 percent in December 1994 compared with December 1993), electronics (37.5 percent), aviation industry (35.4 percent) and radio industry (32.6 percent). Decline in the production of civilian and military output stood at 11.4 and 39.6 percent in December and at 38.6 and 38.9 percent, respectively, at the beginning of the year.

International Affairs

U.S. Provides Computer Technolgy for Export Control

AU1701142295 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 12 Jan 95 p 4

[URYADOVYY KURYER report: "American Aid"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The New Year started well for officials of the Technological Expert Committee at Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers. They received a shipment of U.S. computer technology worth $27,000 and will use it to create a computer network for Ukraine's national system for export control.

V. Shmarov, Ukraine's vice prime minister and head of the government commission for export control, sent a message of thanks to U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine W. Miller and expressed the hope that cooperation between our countries in the sphere of export control will contribute to strengthening [nuclear] nonproliferation and collective security and stability in the world.

Russia Unable To Prove Chechen Involvement

WS1801120495 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0020 GMT 18 Jan 95

[Report by Halia Pavliva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Jan. 17—Despite Russian media reports to the contrary, Ukrainian officials say the Russian Government is unable to produce proof of Ukrainian mercenary involvement in the Chechen conflict.

"On the one hand, Russian media is consistently attempting to blame Ukraine for involvement in the conflict, but on the other hand no Russian investigative body can produce evidence of Ukrainian participation," Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko said Wednesday in a letter to Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev.

The Ukrainians say that their embassy in Russia requested official confirmation from the Russian Counterintelligence Agency and the Internal Affairs and Foreign Ministries of reports of Ukrainian military involvement in Chechnya released by the Russian State Information Agency ITAR-TASS and Russian State Television.

No evidence was produced, according to the Ukrainians.

The Ukrainian Government in earlier statements has said the Chechen conflict is an internal Russian affair and appealed to Ukrainian citizens not to travel to Chechnya and refrain from involvement in the conflict.

The Russian Government press service continues to report the presence of 50 Ukrainian mercenaries fighting in Chechnya. According to Volodymyr Safonov, head of the Russian Counterintelligence Service, there are 60-70 Ukrainian mercenaries fighting on the Chechen side.

Russian Foreign Ministry representative Boris Pastukhov recently told Ukrainian Embassy officials in Russia the Foreign Ministry is unable to document these claims, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry reported Tuesday.

Mercenary activity can only be proven if the names, passport information, site and time of involvement are provided, said Serheyev.

"We believe that someone in the Russian Federation has a great interest in finding the traces of Ukrainian involvement in Chechnya, whether they exist or not," said Serheyev.

It is impossible to control the travel of Ukrainians to Chechnya because Ukraine continues to recognize Chechnya as part of the Russian Federation, according to Serheyev. Visas are not required for Ukrainian citizens to travel to Russia.

Ukraine is very concerned about the latest Russian media campaign, Udovenko told Interfax last week, saying Russia should influence state media to stick to the facts.

Egyptian Delegation Discusses Cooperation

LD1701221495 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1630 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 17 Jan—The Egyptian Government delegation's visit to Ukraine is another step in the direction of boosting relations between Ukraine and the Arab Republic of Egypt, Ukraine's Foreign Affairs Minister Hennadiy Udovenko said at a meeting with Yusuf Butrus-Ghali, the head of the delegation and the Arab Republic of Egypt's minister of state for international cooperation affairs [name, title as received].

Mutual relations between our countries, however, must not be confined to trade and economic cooperation, Hennadiy Udovenko underlined. They should develop in every area, including politics, the economy, science and technology.

Goods turnover between Ukraine and Egypt at present stands at as little as $50 million, which certainly cannot satisfy our countries as their potential is sizably greater.

As part of the USSR, Ukraine accounted for a very considerable portion of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation. So now Ukrainian specialists could take part in geological prospecting, irrigation, ore-dressing and so forth.

During the conversation Mr. Udovenko told his Egyptian guests about the political and economic situation in Ukraine, pointing out the presidential and parliamentary elections were held democratically.

IAEA To Assess Safety of Nuclear Power Plants

LD1701230695 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in English 2200 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] An IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] mission started its work at the South Ukrainian nuclear power plant on Tuesday, 17 January, with a view of appraising its management's activity involving coping with accidents and technical mishaps and classifying these in accordance with the accepted international scale of diverse faulty behavior of nuclear power plants. The mission is led by British expert [name indistinct] and includes experts from France, Spain, (?the Czech republic), India, (?Slovenia), Russia, and Philippines.

Its work is expected to last ten days, after which the mission will pass its judgment on the nukes' safety and overall performance, based on its record of accidents and technical failures over the last three years.

National Affairs

URP Leader Berates West's Stance on Chechnya

WS1701155095 Kiev SAMOSTIYNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 11-17 Jan 95 p 6

[Article by Ukrainian Republican Party Chairman Mykhaylo Horyn: "Chechnya—Gauge of Western Democracy's Moral Health"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The imperial information service efficiently manipulates the mass consciousness and heats up colonial and servile moods. And in places in which this is not enough, it resorts to weapons. Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Cisdnestr region... And now it is Chechnya. Tens of thousands of drilled servicemen have been thrown at a fistful of patriots, who do not want to kneel. The Western world has even refused to morally support the Chechens. In unison with [Russian Foreign Minister] Kozyrev, the leaders of European countries and the United States have stated that the Chechen conflict is an internal affair of Russia. Thus, Boris Yeltsin has in advance been granted indulgence for the crucifixion of Chechnya.

History repeats itself. The world has already experienced indulgence toward an aggressor or, more precisely, aggressors, for which it paid in 60 million casualties. At that time, as well as now, Western democrats expected that, having thrown a small territory into the empire's muzzle, they would be able to quench its appetite. However, neither the Sudety, nor Lithuania and Estonia satisfied the aggressive ambitions of Hitler and Stalin. Moreover, the easy prey merely inflamed their greed and added the conviction that, given appropriate acceptance and indulgence from one's neighbors, one can conduct large-scale actions and succeed. A clash between the two aggressors led to a division of Europe, crushing defeats of the German, Hungarian, Polish, and Czech insurrections, and years-long slavery. However, the mighty of this world ignore even lessons of history. Western sharks are currently licking Russia's wounds, and do not want to look into the past.

What will be next? Where will this political blindness lead to? Has the truth that an empire only becomes stronger if it consolidates its despotic regime and expands its borders not become academic? This particularly relates to Russian colonizers. The following slogan has become the symbol of their faith: The will of Moscow rules in places on which the foot of a Moscow invader trod; places in which his blood was shed are the empire's property.

Before overcoming the economic ruin in their home, Russian neo- imperialists have already set about "collecting lands," by inflaming colonial wars in the bordering regions. This is their hereditary disease. The Yeltsin government is acting identically as the Lenin government did. The latter also, before mastering the Russian territory, sent an ultimatum to the young Ukrainian state and waged an anti-Ukrainian aggression in December of 1917. Is it worth providing more analogies? Boris Yeltsin is currently trying to advise politicians from NATO, even though his own state mechanism is extremely fatigued. So, Messrs. Western democrats, set him on his feet as soon as possible, and you will not have to wait long for a repetition of the Stalin scenario.

They are currently trying to convince us that Chechnya is a Russian territory, and the Chechen people—Moscow's subjects. Was it not Russia that in 1817—not so long ago, in terms of history—began the aggression against Caucasus? The legendary [Chechen leader] Shamil declared Hazavat—the holy war—and a bloody battle with Russian invaders lasted for 25 years. And although democrat Lermontov [famous Russian poet] called "Submit, Caucasus, Yermolov is coming," Caucasus continued the unequal battle. It was not until 42 years later, in 1859, that Chechnya was defeated, but as we have just learned, it is still inexorable. It was not "incorporated," as REUTER slyly reports, but conquered. And since then, as soon as the slightest opportunity would emerge, the proud Chechens have stood up to battle with Moscow imperialism. They even tried to make use of the clash between the two imperial monsters in 1941, for which almost the entire nation was evicted from its motherland in 1945.

Is Chechnya really an internal affair of Russia? Let international lawyers answer the question of whether a nation has the right to fight with a colonizer for its freedom, regardless of when it was enslaved. No matter how casuistic the response might be, history shows that no date for imposing slavery has ever become a legal basis for making the slavery eternal. The Bulgarians suffered from the Turkish slavery for 600 years, but they finally made use of a weakening of the Ottoman empire and won independence. The Kurland would change hands of its invaders for hundreds of years, but at the beginning of the 20th century the Lithuanian people won freedom anyway. The new proletarian emperor Lenin endeavored to return it to the empire, but failed. The Lithuanians withstood, because Clinton or Mitterrand, who would have blessed an aggression, having untied the aggressor's hands, did not exist at that time. A nation's right to establish its own state, as well as human rights, is guaranteed by the UN Declaration. And if a nation, which has stood to a battle for freedom, encounters cynical indifference from the Western democratic community, it confirms the latter's deep moral crisis. The Ukrainians experienced President Bush's offense, who recommended them to return to the USSR's "clutches." They put up with Thatcher's intellectual "pearls," who was convincing us from the rostrum in the Ukrainian parliament that Ukraine is something like a North American state. Well, we forgive these respectable people their historic incompetence. However, we must stipulate that illiteracy does not relieve a political or state leader from his responsibility before history. Mrs. Thatcher should have known that the Ukrainians are ancient people with a rich culture, and that their fate more than once crisscrossed the fate of Great Britain in the early and late Middle Ages. The "iron lady" should have remembered that Ukraine is almost twice as large as insular England in terms of territory, and in terms of population it does not fall behind the Englishmen either.

For us, it is currently difficult to fathom paradoxes of the West's policy. After all, the Bolshevik- Moscow empire has run foul of the interests of many nations. After World War II, the USSR's aggressiveness made the Western world allot a significant part of its national wealth to armament and remain in a state of permanent anxiety. However, in places where illusory personal interests become more important than humanistic principles, people disregard logic. They do not want to learn from history.

Well, Messrs. Western politicians! Feed the Siberian bear, lick his wounds, and help him "equip" his lair. It will soon recover under your supervision. But if one day, having run amok, it tears apart one of your children, do not forget that it was you who pulled it through and set it on its feet.

The bear is currently slicing Chechnya. Ukraine learned about its cannibalistic nature a long time ago. Chechnya has Groznyy—we had Baturyn and Kiev. It is our state that should have raised its voice in defense of the freedom-loving people. Nevertheless, only tiny Estonia dared to take such a step. A short period of time will pass, and the moral health of the ruling circles from the West and Central Europe will be judged by their stance toward Chechnya. But even now it is understandable that states, which gave [Chechen Republic of] Ichkeriya to the Moscow beast as a prey, have soiled their conscience.

The Afghan adventure led to the USSR's collapse, and the Chechen adventure should mark the beginning of a second stage of the disintegration of the empire named the Russian Federation. Let us not set ourselves at ease with the hope that historical justice alone will protect the holy case of the Chechen people. Much depends on our activeness and support for Chechnya. Russian neoimperialists expected to finish with Groznyy in one strike. They failed. Time is working for Chechen patriots. And we have once again learned about the essence of Russian pseudo-democracy, and have forever buried the myth about Russia as a democratic state. Small Chechnya has currently become great in our eyes, because in the name of freedom it countered a ruthless and deceitful enemy, which, under the slogan of disarming "bandit formations," is killing children, crushing women with tanks, and razing villages and city districts to the ground. In this time, so hard for the Chechen people, we are talking to them not with Lermontov's threat, but with [famous Ukrainian poet] Shevchenko's advise: "Fight, and you will win!"

Economic Issues

Presidium Reaches Impasse on Privatization

954F0904A Simferopol KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by O. Shakhnyuk under the rubric "Topical!": "State Property Fund—Privatization Lever or 'State Within the State?'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the meeting of the Crimean Supreme Council Presidium on 10 January, most of the time spent on forming the agenda was devoted to improving the mechanism of privatization in Crimea and its legal aspects. However, as much as a week ago, when Presidium members discussed the same sore topic of privatization, they ran into the same stumbling block—the question of the subordination of the State Property Fund [SPF] of Crimea.

Let me remind you that at the previous meeting of the Crimean Supreme Council Presidium, two drafts "clashed." One, drafted by the parliamentary permanent commission on budget and financial policy, could not be reconciled with the other, born in the bowels of the Crimean government. Judging by the remarks of Kh.D. Mustafayev, deputy chairman of the parliament's permanent commission, neither could the desired compromise be found a week later. According to him, the parliament commission cannot agree with the Crimean government's proposal to subordinate to it the SPF, which is currently under the jurisdiction of the Crimean Supreme Council. Neither was agreement reached as to which state property facilities are to be privatized. And finally, there is no agreement between the legislative and executive branches on the question as to where the money realized from privatization is to go—to a single privatization fund subordinated to the government, or directly into the SPF.

Minister of Economics of the Republic of Crimea V.M. Shishkin, who spoke at the meeting, pointed out logically that all exhortations to speed up privatization on the peninsula will remain empty until the key question of the fund's subordination is resolved. He recalled that the fund originally was subordinated to the president of Crimea, who at the time was head of government. Now that the head of government is Prime Minister A.R. Franchuk, the supreme body of executive authority of Crimea essentially has been deprived of the ability to realistically manage privatization processes, since the State Property Fund, also a body of executive authority, nevertheless is not part of its structure. In this situation even the work of the fund's staff on the lists of entities subject to privatization remains a mystery for the government. So how can the government comply with the parliament members' demands to speed up a privatization whose "keys" are not in its hands?!

From the Crimean minister of economics' remarks it became clear that as of now for all intents and purposes Crimea does not have a comprehensive privatization program. The list of privatized enterprises included in the state property fund has not yet been coordinated with sectoral ministries and state committees. In addition, the statute on the Crimean State Property Fund says that all normative acts involving alienation of property must necessarily be coordinated with the Ministry of Justice, which has not yet been done.

Thus, it turns out that a very topical issue of privatization in Crimea, due to be discussed in substance at the parliament session, is not yet ready for it. And this is after many months of work in parliamentary commissions, in the government, in presidential structures, and finally in the State Property Fund itself, which, as member of the Crimean Supreme Council Presidium A.S. Danelyan pointed out, as a result of the current chaos has turned into a "state within the state."

If we dismiss, however, the ambitions and the "who-is-the-bigger-chief" arguments typical of different branches of authority, the outwardly confusing and complicated question of the fund's subordination can be resolved very easily. It should of course be operationally subordinated to the executive branch of authority which is directly involved in privatization of state property. At the same time, the entire activity of the property fund, as well as of the government itself, should be under the vigilant oversight of the legislature.

This tug-of-war does not portend any real benefits for either participant of this competition. The precious time allotted for preparation of privatization in Crimea is being irretrievably lost. Meanwhile, privatization itself is coming despite what individual ambitious politicians or economic managers may wish. And its scenario is not being written in Simferopol. As is known, a regional branch of the Ukrainian SPF in Crimea has already been set up. Before 1 February, in keeping with President L.D. Kuchma's edict, it will put together a list of facilities subject to immediate privatization. And this is happening against the backdrop of the fact that negotiations regarding delineation of property ownership between Crimea and Ukraine ground to a halt in the fall of 1993.

In this situation it is obvious that the main actors involved in the notorious arguments of who will govern the Crimean SPF may find themselves in the unenviable role of owners of a fund without property.

Cabinet Approves Draft Privatization Program

LD1701205395 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1550 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no dateline as received]—A meeting of Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers presidium chaired by Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol has approved in principle a draft state program of privatization in 1995, the cabinet press service told UNIAN.

The program defines state policy objectives in this field as provision of conditions for accelerated structural reorganization and development of Ukraine's economy.

According to the draft 22,700 companies are to be privatized in 1995 including 13,500 small- and 8,000 medium-sized and large businesses, as well as 1,200 unfinished construction projects. A network of voucher auctions is to be set up to sell shares to private individuals for property privatization certificates.

The presidium approved a procedure for evaluation of privatized objects. The draft program with amendments will be submitted to the third session of Ukraine's Supreme Council.

Economy Shows Signs of Improvement

954F0905A Simferopol KRYMSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by UKRINFORM correspondent Sergey Balykov: "Signs of Overall Economic Improvement Seen"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "In recent months we have seen definite signs and conditions of overall improvement in the national economy." This was the note of optimism inserted in the final document of the Ukraine Cabinet of Ministers session by its participants, who on 5 January discussed the trends of development of the economic situation in the country at the end of 1994. The document notes the reduced rate of industrial production decline and the trend towards increased production of coal, gas, electric power, and a number of products. As well as stabilization of the national monetary unit, on which First Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Pynzenyk particularly insisted, improvement in the status of fulfillment of foreign-payment obligations, an improved investment climate, and receipt of significant volumes of international financial assistance. The government views the fact of having avoided hyperinflation as a great victory.

Not so optimistic were the speeches of Minister of Economics Roman Shpek, who stated that by autumn of last year Ukraine was bankrupt, Minister of Finance Petr Germanchuk, National Bank Director Viktor Yushchenko, and other heads of ministries and departments. They believe many of the deficiencies in the economy are related to incompetent management decisions.

In the opinion of Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol, one of the "mines" along the path to reforms is the energy problem. As of January we have 8.6 billion cubic meters of gas on hand, having consumed 10 billion cubic meters in December. Fuel must be paid for on time, he emphasized. The head of government also noted the negative role for the exchange rate of the national currency played by Ukraine's negative trade balance and the lack of markets for selling Ukrainian production output. In a few days we will examine the draft budget for 1995, the prime minister stated, but no budget will help us, even the most balanced one, unless we see a growth of production.

Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, presiding over the session, stressed that we will not be able to extricate ourselves from the crisis only by intensifying production. Structural transformations of the economy are needed, without which we cannot make our output competitive and there is the risk of throwing Western credits to the wind. The main task of government, he noted, is to engage in reforms on a daily basis in specific and all-encompassing fashion. Reforming the economy is a very lengthy process, L. Kuchma continued, but we cannot drag it out any longer—the country has no reserves left. The measures the government will take to carry out reforms will not be popular, but they are necessary. I am aware that the limit of confidence placed in the president during the elections is eroding, the head of state noted. I am not afraid of this, since I am looking into tomorrow, he emphasized.

It was resolved at the session to consider the stabilization of production and standard of living of the populace as priority orientations of our economic policy. Also cited among the major benchmarks in the future activity of the Cabinet of Ministers was financial improvement of the economy, reducing the budget deficit to not more than 5 percent of the gross domestic product, liberalization of foreign economic activity, reform of the system of taxation and agrarian relations, and the development of privatization.

Belarus

Lukashenka's Program on Second Day in China Reported

WS1801110395 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0800 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Belarusian President] Alyaksandr Lukashenka's visit to China continues. The current day of the president will also be filled with multifarious events. Alyaksandr Lukashenka will lay flowers at the monument to the People's Heroes and hold negotiations with Chinese leaders. A ceremony of handing over a humanitarian shipment to the Chinese side will be held in the first half of the day.

Alyaksandr Lukashenka will pay a visit to the Peking [Beijing] Zone of Technical and Economic Development and meet with Qiao Shi, chairman of the Permanent Committee of the Chinese Assembly of People's Deputies. Alyaksandr Lukashenka will meet with Premier State Council Li Peng in the second half of the day.

The official Belarusian delegation headed by Alyaksandr Lukashenka will leave for Shanghai today.

Friendship Declaration With China Signed

LD1701232995 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1900 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The first day of the official visit of the Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka to Peking ended with the signing of a joint declaration on the further development and deepening of cooperation between Belarus and China. With the details is our correspondent Yuriy Sverko:

[Sverko] Apart from the declaration, Belarusian-Chinese agreements on avoiding dual taxation and on air traffic between the two countries were also signed in Peking on 17 January. Until now, there have not been regular flights between Minsk and Peking. There have only been charter and, on occasions, presidential aircraft.

Lukashenka's visit to Peking is not only about Chinese-Belarusian problems. On the way to the Chinese capital the Belarusian president's plane made a stop at Novosibirsk, where Lukashenka had a conversation with Anatoliy Sychev, head of the oblast's representative authority. Problems of economic cooperation between the regions of Russia and Belarus were discussed. The Belarusian president discussed these same problems in China. After all, Russia lies between China and Belarus. It is destined to be a bridge between Minsk and Peking.

An agreement on setting up a Belarusian-Chinese enterprise for the production of Belaz-type heavy-freight trucks was signed in Peking on Tuesday, but the parts for these machines will still be sent via Russian territory. [passage omitted]

Government Approves Treaty on State Border With Lithuania

WS1801121395 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1100 GMT 18 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus has approved a treaty on the establishment of a state border between the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Lithuania—signed in Minsk on 21 February 1994—by its resolution and directed it to the Belarusian president for submission to the Supreme Soviet for ratification.

Bloc of Centrist Democrats Formed; Communists Picket Supsov

WS1701154595 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1200 GMT 17 Jan 95

[Report by Candidate of Philosophy Lew Krivitski: "The Right Are Dividing, the Left Are Uniting" from the "Commentaries, Analysis, Forecasts" feature No. 14, 10-16 January 95]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On 10 January a sitting was held in Minsk by representatives of the United Democratic Party, the Party of People's Accord, the Civil Party and the Party of All-Belarusian Unity and Accord. They discussed the possibility of creating a political bloc of "Civil Concord" in preparation for the elections to the Supreme Soviet. Leaders of the women's party "Nadezhda" (Hope) also expressed a desire to join the bloc. The idea of uniting the outlooks of these parties into one was considered, to take the liberal platform. The initiative for the creation of the bloc will first be discussed in the parties and their ruling bodies and then the creation process will be continued. This new bloc is the centrist democrats' answer to the alliance of the Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada [BSDH], the Belarusian Popular Front [BNF], the Belarusian Peasant Party, and two small parties. As a result, an absolutely new situation is forming in the democratic movement of Belarus. The centrist parties consider that a union with BNF on an equal basis is impossible, BNF is capable of subordinating its allies to itself. As concerns BSDH, its leaders are already in union with the BNF within the framework of the parliamentary opposition. Completely naturally the leaders of BSDH are aspiring to make use of that knowledge acquired by participation in the opposition, and together with BNF seat as many of its people as possible in parliament. The leader of the Party of People's Accord [PNZ) Henadz Karpenka emphasized that the former Deputy Prime Minister Viktar Hanchar is as before on the executive committee of PNZ, although he is not present at the sittings of this body. As Karpenka recognized, PNZ consists of people with entirely different political opinions, but soon the party intends to define its political line more concretely. It is not out of the question that this will include the transition from social democracy to liberalism.

On 9 January, members of the neocommunist Movement for Democracy, Social Progress, and Justice picketed the House of Government, where work had been resumed at the 16th sitting of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus. The MP's were given a petition with demands to cut down privatization, repeal the price rises, eradicate speculation, recognize the unlawfulness of the Byelavezhskaya Pushcha Agreement, support the proposal of the Russian State Duma for conducting a sitting with the Belarusian parliament with the aim of restoring state unity on a mutually acceptable basis, recognize the equal status of the Russian and Belarusian languages, refuse to sign the program "Partnership for Peace," tell the truth about state symbolism currently in practice, restore the celebration of the 7 November holiday, and to decline MP privileges. In this way, the communists are initiating a wide program for the destruction of Belarusian statehood, quite attractive for the "lumpenized" sector of the population, with demagogic promises and bribes. The Coordinating Committee of the Popular Movement of Belarus [NDB] passed a resolution to join the centrist-leftist bloc. This time it was not the bloc formed by the Party of Communists that was absorbed into NDB, but NDB that joined the bloc. This example of unbelievable political flexibility is linked with the desire of the leaders of the NDB to preserve its "unifying" position in the union of chauvinists with communists even if only in appearance.

In a statement by the BNF faction, signed by 22 MP's (there are approximately 30 in the whole BNF opposition), support was expressed for the "courageous struggle of the freedom-loving Chechen nation," and also indignation at the "forces of imperialism, aggression and war," coming from the leaders in Russia.

Supreme Soviet Passes 1995 State Budget

LD1701224995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2016 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Minsk, Jan 17 (INTERFAX WEST)—The Belarussian parliament passed the 1995 state budget with a deficit of about 2.7 trillion Belarussian rubles ($230.37 million according to the National Bank's rate of exchange on January 17), or 4% of the GDP Tuesday [17 January].

The chairman of the planning and budget commission of the Belarussian parliament Stepan Pisarevich has said that the budget's revenue was set at over 13.06 trillion Belarussian rubles ($1.11 billion), and spending at 15.74 trillion Belarussian rubles ($1.34 billion).

Taxes remain the main source of revenue. The income tax is expected to account for 29.2% of all incomes, VAT for 28.7%, excise duties for 12.9%, income tax for 7.2%, and the Chernobyl tax (an emergency tax to finance spending on the elimination effects of the Chernobyl disaster) for 5.9%.

Pisarevich said the 1995 Belarussian budget was geared to developing social services. The greatest share of the budget will be spent on social security - 3.03 trillion Belarussian rubles (19.28%), including 1.04 trillion on the health service (6.6%) and 701 billion on education (4.45%).

Measures to eliminate the effects of the Chernobyl disaster are estimated at 2.129 trillion rubles (13.5% of the budget). Spending on external economic activity (embassies, etc,) is estimated at 1.23 trillion rubles (7.8%). Law enforcement agencies would receive 630 billion (4%), and defense, 892 billion (5.7%).

Pisarevich said the government planned to compensate for 50% of the budget deficit at the expense of credits from the National Bank of Belarus. The rest of the deficit will be compensated for by government securities, incomes from privatization and external financing.

The 1995 GDP is expected to treble as compared with 1994 to constitute 66.2 trillion rubles. Inflation is going to be reduced from 5-6% at the beginning of the year to 2% at the end of the year.

Moldova

Council of Europe Visit Said 'Fairly Successful'

AU1701135495 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1930 GMT 16 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 16/1/1995—"After Moldova was visited by delegation of the Council of Europe [CE], we are more optimistic about Moldova's admission to the international forum in near future," said Dumitru Diacov, Chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee.

In his opinion, the four-day visit of the high-ranked delegation last week was fairly successful.

"It is very important for us that the delegation have got convinced of the stable socio-political situation in the republic, and offered no serious remarks. There do exist some problems with freedom of the press and legislation, but they cannot be a substantial obstacle for Moldova's admission to the Council of Europe. The most important thing is that the guests saw the Moldovan leadership's firm political will," Diacov emphasized.

Another important factor is that the delegation seems to have understood that the Dniester conflict is a political, not ethnic one, and that it was inspired and is being backed by certain political forces from outside Moldova, he said.

Diacov has stressed as "principally important" Lord Finsberg's assurance that the reporters on Moldova would never allow the Dniester problem to become an obstacle for Moldova's accession to the Council of Europe.

"The current situation is very favourable for our admission to the forum. And we strongly hope that the question will be considered at the plenary session of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly in April-May," Diacov said.

CIS Interparliamentary Body Aids Settlement

MM1701144995 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 13 Jan 95 p 3

[Interview with Mikhail Krotov, general secretary of the Council of the CIS Interparliamentary Association [IPA], by Andrey Mazhorov under "Report on a Mission" rubric; in St. Petersburg, date not given: "Dniester Region on a Fine Day"—from the "RT-Sodruzhestvo" section published jointly by the CIS IPA and RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the invitation of the parliament of the Republic of Moldova a peacekeeping group of the CIS IPA headed by Valeryan Viktorov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Federation Council, had a number of meetings connected with the problem of settling the Dniester conflict. Mikhail Krotov, general secretary of the IPA Council, told our correspondent about certain aspects of that trip.

[Krotov] The IPA's peacekeeping efforts today cover all the "hot spots" on the territory of the former Union. Our emissaries have been to the Tajik-Afghan border, Abkhazia, and Karabakh. Now a mission to the Dniester region. All this undoubtedly attests to the Commonwealth's strengthening role and to the fact that precisely its organs can play not the least role in settling the conflict.

I would not like to belittle the role of the CSCE, the United Nations, and other international organizations, but our positions, founded on common interests and on traditional economic and cultural ties, are far stronger. Let us recall, incidentally, that it is the "Bishkek Protocol" initiated by the IPA that has now been "keeping" the peace in Karabakh for nine months. It is not detached observers who work in our peacekeeping groups but frequently representatives of the actual sides involved in a conflict. We are not strangers to those who find themselves in trouble. Hence—trust. When people asked us during the last trip "Who do you represent?" we said: "Inter alia Moldavia [Moldova], since it is a member of the IPA."

[Mazhorov] What is the situation in the conflict zone today?

[Krotov] I can state confidently that serious preconditions exist for achieving lasting peace. These are the economic necessity of the integration of the Dniester region and Moldavia and the change in the political climate in connection with the new makeup of the Moldavian parliament. Today the political movements in that country which advocate union with Romania have suffered a crushing defeat.

The program of our stay was very full, for the group was seeking to study the situation as well as possible. We met with parliamentarians and with Prime Minister A. Sangheli and talked with the ministers of defense and foreign affiars and with the leadership of the Dniester Moldavian Republic. As a result, a common desire was revealed to reach agreement within the framework of the formula "the unified state of Moldova incorporating the Dniester region as a territory with the maximum possible status as part of a state." Peace has reigned there for two years. But the tears of wives and mothers, figuratively speaking, have not yet dried, and the mutual alienation has not been finally overcome. Therefore we consider it one of our chief tasks to create an atmosphere of trust.

[Mazhorov] What specifically has been done?

[Krotov] Two areas have been worked out in which it is possible to develop the process of a peace settlement. The first is the strategic definition of the status of the Dniester region (within the framework of Moldavia's legislation). The second is specific steps to create confidence-building measures—the rebuilding of bridges, the removal of customs barriers, the resolution of cultural and linguistic questions.

Incidentally, the Moldavian Constitution adopted 24 July 1994 on the one hand proclaims Moldavian (based on the Latin alphabet) the state language, while on the other hand recognizing the right to preserve and develop Russian and the other languages used on the country's territory. This is extremely important for the Dniester region, since both sides are aware of the need for the equitable use of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Moldavian languages.

Meetings with residents of villages which are in the Dniester region but which are subordinate to Moldavia's central authorities left me personally with my most vivid impression of the trip. Also participating in those meetings, incidentally, was the chairman of Dubossary City Council.... Yes, grievances were aired and people recalled the recent past with bitterness, but at the same time yesterday's enemies openly shook each other's hands and said: We have to go on living here together, and we must come to an understanding.

We visited the Dniester region along with Moldavian deputies, and vice versa—Dniester region residents traveled freely to Moldavian population centers. Although I saw all the attributes of "hot spots"—weapons, checkpoints, etc.—it was clear that a transition to peace here does not mean crossing a front line. There are no ethnic roots to the conflict here. Suffice it to say that no less than half the people in Kishinev [Chisinau] are Russians. Not to mention the fact that this district of amazing beauty cannot and simply must not be an arena for fratricidal carnage.

[Mazhorov] Why cannot the 14th Army pull out of there?

[Krotov] In addition to the political reasons, there are also purely technical ones. We met with General Aleksandr Lebed, who painted a very detailed picture of the situation. Weapons were removed from the GDR [German Democratic Republic] and Hungary to there, to that region, and they have accumulated there. And this means thousands upon thousands of tonnes of munitions which it is not safe even to move and which have to be guarded. But these are solvable questions, and three years is sufficient time to emerge from the situation which has been created.

As regards the guarantor of the armistice and control of the security zones, peacekeeping forces are used for this too. This constitutes a political phenomenon, since these forces consist of Russian troops and the sides in the conflict.

[Mazhorov] Did you meet with President Mircea Snegur?

[Krotov] Yes, and it was a very substantive meeting. In the course of the conversation we realized that he too is in favor of using parliamentary means to accelerate the peace settlement process. In this connection the president approved the idea of a seminar, which will soon take place on the Aland Islands. There, I hope, the sides will see from a specific example how problems of territorial formations with truncated statehood are resolved in a civilized way. While being part of Finland, the Alands have their own flag, their own government, and their own special status. We are looking to this seminar with optimism, for it was right there, on the Alands, in December 1993 that the "Bishkek Protocol," which subsequently saved thousands of lives, came into being.

President Snegur on Hopes for Dniester Settlement

MM1701140395 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jan 95 First Edition p 6

[Unattributed interview with President Mircea Snegur; place and date not given: "We Will Live and Hope for the Best"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mircea Snegur, president of Moldova, takes an optimistic view of the problem of settling the Dniester conflict.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Mr President, how do you assess your actions and those of the Republic of Moldova Government before and during the armed conflict in Bendery?

[Snegur] What happened in Bendery was regrettable. Thank God that it proved possible to end the armed conflict comparatively quickly. Since then all my actions have been aimed at consolidating that success, as is said in the statement of 28 April last year which I and Igor Smirnov, leader of the Dniester region, signed.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] The Republic of Moldova's laws have not operated in the Dniester region for several years now. How feasible is the preservation of the PMR [Dniester Moldavian Republic] as the successor to the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR]?

[Snegur] You know, everyone tries to use our historical past to his own advantage. When the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] was part of the USSR, of course, no politicians in Tiraspol thought that the time would come when they would hark back to the Moldavian ASSR.

I do not think it advisable to divide this small part of Moldovan soil and form a new state system. This is a futile venture. We must proceed from the premise that Moldova, now the Republic of Moldova, was formed in the postwar years as a single national economic complex. The left bank cannot live without the right bank and vice versa. People will object to me: The left bank has a highly developed industrial complex, the right bank doesn't. Yes, that is true, but in addition to its no less developed industry [as published] the right bank also has a more diversified agricultural complex and the Dniester's industrial region cannot manage without it.

Thus it is not a question of whether or not I believe in the statehood of the left bank.... I simply do not believe this venture will work. It is not just that it is scientifically completely untenable; there is nothing involved here but political ambition. It is simply necessary to face up to the truth. Once all ties are restored Moldova in its complete borders could very quickly become a prosperous country. I believe that common sense will prevail.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] What is your attitude toward the idea expressed by certain Tiraspol politicians on the possibility of forming a single coalition government of the Republic of Moldova?

[Snegur] This is news to me. Have there already been some statements made? I have no information about that. The entry of Tiraspol business people into the government cannot be ruled out at all within the framework of a united Moldova. Our government has now been formed by the parliamentary majority on a professional basis so that if there is a positive solution of the Dniester conflict, and I do not actually doubt that, experienced business people from the left bank will undoubtedly enter the government.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] Power structures whose strategy reflects a polarization and mutual distrust have been formed in Kishinev [Chisinau] and Tiraspol. Does this not complicate the situation?

[Snegur] I believe that this question will be resolved with the definition of a legal status for the Dniester region. But speaking of Moldova as a state, any state must possess all the necessary attributes, including an army. We also have other forces to maintain internal order. That is why these forces, which both banks have, must be united under the common leadership of the Republic of Moldova.

Many people are now asking: What will happen if the 14th Army leaves? Let us suppose that it is replaced by a motorized rifle brigade belonging to the Moldova national army—where former officers of the 14th Army may serve, by the way. Generally speaking they can serve wherever they want. But we are ready to offer them service under contract and find accommodation for those who do not want to leave.

In Moldova everything must be united—the army, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] What wishes do you have for the inhabitants of the Dniester region?

[Snegur] My wishes remain unchanged. It is necessary to live, work, and produce more goods, our whole life depends on that. Our position remains unchanged: the Dniester region is part of the Republic of Moldova. I think that gradually, step by step, we will move toward compromise and remove all the barriers and rebuild the bridges of human relationships.

Moldovan, Dniester Region Delegations Confer

MM1701141595 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jan 95 First Edition p 6

[Unattributed report: "And Meanwhile..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moldovan Vice Premiers Valentin Kunev and Grigore Ojob have discussed the problem of resolving the consequences of the Dniester region conflict and restoring economic links at a meeting in Tiraspol with Viktor Sinev and Nikolay Kiboy, deputy chairmen of the Dniester region government. Draft documents, which are to be signed at a summit meeting between Moldovan and Dniester region leaders scheduled for 8 February, were discussed. These drafts concern above all the restoration of economic links destroyed during the conflict, the organization of the work of the customs services, and the restoration of bomb-damaged bridges over the Dniester. Special attention was devoted to questions connected with the finalization of trade and economic agreements with the Russian Federation and Ukraine for the current year.

At the forthcoming meeting the Moldovan and Dniester region leadership will begin discussion of proposals on a special status for the Dniester region prepared by experts from Chisinau and Tiraspol with the mediation of Vladlen Vasev, the Russian Federation president's special representative, and an OSCE permanent mission. A statement to this effect was made by Nikolay Osmonescu, Moldovan first deputy foreign minister, who is heading the delegation of Moldovan experts at the talks in Tiraspol on the elaboration of special status.

In the deputy foreign minister's words, the talks were not easy, but the sides agreed many provisions of the draft law. Most importantly—they managed to reach agreement that the Dniester region is part of a unified and indivisible Moldova, he stressed. However, on a number of articles the experts were unable to make compromises, and the contested points will be presented in two versions. The Moldovan and Dniester region leaders are themselves to decide at the talks which version is better, and elaborate a compromise decision.

Kazakhstan

'Azat' Movement Opposes Russian as Second Language

LD1701203795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1434 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Almaty, Jan 17 (INTERFAX)—The civil movement Azat (Independence) has come out against land privatization and the proclamation of Russian as Kazakhstan's second official language. Protests were voiced at a rally attended by 200 people.

As Azat's First Deputy Chairman Zhasral Kuanyshalin, a member of Kazakhstan's parliament, has declared to Interfax, the movement is "categorically against the private ownership of land and the proclamation of Russian a state language alongside Kazakh." In his opinion, "this" will deprive the Kazakh people of the statehood it has gained at last." Kuanyshalin dismissed as "provocative" a proposal put forward by republican businessmen to hold a referendum on these issues.

Earlier, several noted businessmen offered President Nursultan Nazarbayev to hold a national referendum on these matters since Kazakhstan's legislature refused to debate them on December 15 last year.

Kuanyshalin believes that the results of such a referendum would be "predetermined" since Kazakhs account for not more than 50 percent of the republic's population.

New Government Viewed After First 100 Days

954F0912A Almaty KARAVAN in Russian No 2, 13 Jan 95 p 9

[Interview with First Deputy Prime Minister Nigmatzhan Isingarin by Sergey Volkov; place and date not given: "Not All Will Feel Real Relief in the New Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Shymkent-Tashkent-Shymkent—**The Akezhan Kazhegeldin government will soon be enjoying its first memorable date—its "100 days." It is customary in Western countries to arrange for this period a kind of "honeymoon" between the authorities and the press. This would not work with us—there has been too much of an unsuccessful period for exchanging pleasantries and peaceably observing the events occurring in a country tormented by restructurings. The conversation with Nigmatzhan Isingarin, first deputy prime minister of the republic, was not that "celebratory," therefore. Especially since it took place in the deputy prime minister's official car during the trip of our government delegation to Uzbekistan, where the question of the price of the gas supplied to the republic was decided.**

Legacy

[Volkov] It is well known that your trip to Tashkent was connected not only with the signing of the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation Between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for 1995 but also with a resolution of the problem of the supply of Uzbek gas to our republic at a price acceptable to us.

[Isingarin] The problem of gas is a strategic problem for Kazakhstan. Not only the entire industry of the south of the republic but also practically the entire domestic sphere operate on it. And we were simply physically unable in the past year to pay Uzbekistan $84 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas supplied from there. And Kazakhstan's obligations in respect to a similar agreement for 1994 were not met either. We were confronted, therefore, with the task of persuading the Uzbek leadership that we would not only fulfill our past obligations but could cope with similar obligations in the new year also. A reduction in the price of the gas was an even more difficult task.

[Volkov] That is, you had, in fact, to disentangle the mistakes of the Sergey Tereshchenko government?

[Isingarin] There is no doubt that we will have to disentangle much of what has been left over from the times of the past Cabinet of Ministers. It can be seen even from the example of the Uzbek gas that a more responsible approach to the negotiations would have enabled Kazakhstan to have avoided having to agree to $84. Whence the debts in the millions. There are more than enough present problems of the building of financial and economic relations, and it will be hard to expect real improvements in our affairs unless these are cleared up.

[Volkov] You say that the past government was guilty of not having fulfilled the obligations ensuing from the agreement. But more than half of Mr. Tereshchenko's cabinet was composed of members of the present government. Both Akezhan Kazhegeldin and yourself were part of it. Do you not feel moral responsibility for the work in the cabinet of that time?

[Isingarin] I cannot speak for all members of the government. Only for myself. I was never, if you like, a silent apparatchik. Back in November 1993 I had a very long conversation with Tereshchenko, in which I tried to show him the need for the restoration of state control in the sphere of material production. Not in the socialist understanding but in the normal, civilized understanding of this word. When the government is in control of the situation in the economy, when it can regulate it. But none of this happened at that time.

Black Holes of the Budget

[Volkov] An odd situation has resulted for all that. No, there was little that worked in the past government. But the mechanism of the issue of government guarantees operated perfectly....

[Isingarin] I do not entirely agree with this assessment. In the complex transitional period the previous government prevented, for all that, the collapse of the economy. But the times and circumstances demanded, of course, more decisive action. As far as the guarantees are concerned, it was greatly to the advantage of business entities to put the state under the press of such guarantees in order themselves to escape the liability in terms of foreign credit.

I see as one of the main tasks of the present government, therefore, a tough fight against such operations. This is a most difficult struggle. If we win it and shift the credit liability to the business entities, I assure you that the situation will improve sharply throughout the economy.

[Volkov] Is the present government not attempting together with the revocation of the guarantees to also conduct an investigation into how and to whom such guarantees were issued and why? To ensure against a recurrence.

[Isingarin] We have taken a somewhat different path. The work is proceeding here in several directions simultaneously. First, we are trying to make the enterprises that consumed foreign products and raw material pay. Second, the cabinet is now attempting to create a mechanism whereby government guarantees are issued only after positive findings of the Ministry of Economics, the Agency for Foreign Investments, the banks, and all interested state organizations. Sometimes this will take six months, sometimes a year. These are not bureaucratic games but a normal process of the state's weighing of all the pros and cons—this is ultimately, after all, money not from the pocket of Akezhan Kazhegeldin or Nigmatzhan Isingarin but from the budget, from the pockets of all the country's taxpayers. The most important thing is that we should not take out loans but enlist foreign partners in overall business.

[Volkov] What other "sources" of the drain of monies from the state budget are there today?

[Isingarin] The following, for example: The cabinet receives a great deal of mail daily. Half of it is composed of requests, from the deputies included, for assistance to this particular enterprise, city, or district or the other. Were we to attempt to fulfill them, no budget could withstand this for six months even—it would crumble.

[Volkov] It is interesting: Members of parliament in session are constantly berating the government for sluggishness in the compilation of the state budget, for the fact that it is insufficiently economical, and for, in their opinion, the excessive items of expenditure of the budget. And are hereupon tossing the cabinet requests for additional subsidies....

[Isingarin] This needs to be perceived as vestiges of the socialist understanding of the functions of the deputy as a commonplace fixer. Today everyone should understand that the key to the success of the economic reforms is the strictest financial and economic discipline and regulation. The principle of this regulation should, for example, be the same as on the highways: how to drive and where to drive is the personal business of every participant in the traffic, but he is required to observe the rules.

Problems, Options, Approaches

But today the problem is, additionally, the fact that the government cannot control not only the private businessmen but the state-run enterprises also.

[Isingarin] This is the No. 1 problem. The director of a state-run enterprise now has more rights than the leader of a private firm. Today the first may do whatever he wants with the profits of his own plant—although he is merely a hired employee of the state. Just try doing this in a private structure—the owner who has hired you would have you out in a trice.

[Volkov] Does it not seem to you that the fight against inflation has assumed some exaggerated forms in Kazakhstan? Whereas, in my view, no one, virtually, is helping the commodity producers today because on the one hand everyone in the government is enthused over a strict monetarist policy and, on the other, the Supreme Council, admiring its opposition character, is impeding in every possible way the adoption of a package of new laws on economic reform.

[Isingarin] No, it does not, for the monetarist policy, the stand-by, and other such programs mean for the state, if translated into simple language, merely that it is possible to spend just as much as is earned by society. Our government is emphatically oriented here toward all-embracing support for the commodity producers. Neither the president of the country nor the prime minister tire of reiterating this. We are currently analyzing dozens of options. But the main ones are a fight against the prices of the products of the monopoly producers and the problem of the enterprises' sale of their products. The enterprises themselves must find customers, not wait to be helped by kindly uncles from the government. Our task is to create all the conditions to ensure that their economic independence be profitable to them.

[Volkov] And parliament? After all, the deputies still cannot find the time to discuss the new tax code, a package of legislative acts on a securities market, or questions of a change in the strategy of privatization. Nor are they willing to discuss the question of the introduction in the republic of private ownership of the land....

[Isingarin] I believe that since the Supreme Council is itself continually raising the question of an improvement in the strategy of market reforms, the government will ultimately reach a common denominator with it.

[Volkov] And if it does not?

[Isingarin] This would be a most absurd situation, where members of parliament would be in opposition to the government's proposals merely for opposition's sake. After all, before the cabinet adopts some decision, we perform a great deal of analytical work—it has in the future to be realized in practice, after all. No work needs to be done simply to put forward an idea. So it is that ideas like support for the commodity producers by way of their being granted supplementary public monetary and material resources come to certain politicians, for example. Is this a serious approach....

Forecasts

[Volkov] Let us mount a short lightning assault on the subject "Kazakhstan by the end of 1995": a brief question, a brief answer.

[Isingarin] Very well, only I will do so not as a deputy prime minister but as an economist.

[Volkov] Good. So, the overall economic result?

[Isingarin] In the last four months the volume of production in the republic has been growing 1 or 2 percent compared with the previous month. This is negligible, of course. But if January is the same in relation to December, February, to January, and so forth, 1995 will be a year of economic stabilization. But visible results will for the ordinary people always lag behind—real relief in the new year will not be felt by everyone in all things, therefore.

[Volkov] Average pay....

[Isingarin] About $150-160.

[Volkov] The monthly rate of inflation....

[Isingarin] No more than 10 percent.

[Volkov] The price level....

[Isingarin] Prices will have risen no less than twofold by the end of the year.

[Volkov] The increase in production....

[Isingarin] Will be at the level of the final quarter of 1994.

[Volkov] The grain harvest....

[Isingarin] At the level of 20 million tonnes. But you should consider here that I am not an agricultural specialist.

[Volkov] The value of the dollar....

[Isingarin] By the end of the year the dollar will be worth approximately 100 tenge. That we need to ensure that this year the tenge also be worth 100 Russian rubles is another matter.

[Volkov] And the number of unemployed?

[Isingarin] I shall not venture a forecast here because there is such a concept as hidden unemployment (an incomplete working day, furloughs, and so forth). I believe, therefore, that it would be normal were we by the end of 1995 to have achieved a considerable reduction in hidden unemployment.

In Place of a P.S.

[Volkov] Are you more a pragmatist or a revolutionary?

[Isingarin] A pragmatist, of course. Because I believe that everything always needs to be weighed very seriously before any decision is made. It is for this reason, most likely, that I am the sole minister who has remained in the Kazakhstan Government since Soviet times.

Murat Rayev on Nazarbayev, Supreme Council

954F0910A Almaty KARAVAN in Russian No 2, 13 Jan 95 p 6

[Interview with Murat Rayev, the president's spokesman in the Supreme Council, by Viktor Verk; place and date not given: "The President Has No Intention of 'Dispersing' This Parliament"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Verk] Murat Kumarovich, why, in your view, did the parliament so ignominiously bring down the president's proposal and vote against official bilingualism and private ownership of the land?

[Rayev] Although the deputies had the constitutional authority to submit these matters for discussion by the session independently, they waited, seemingly, for the initiative to be displayed by the president. Each of us will still have for a long time to come the "gulag mentality"—a fear of being misunderstood. Even many of those who voted for these matters to be brought up for discussion were unsure (as my conversations with them showed) that their position would meet with understanding in parliament.

[Verk] What is the problem here? The division of the corps of deputies along national lines, perhaps?

[Rayev] I am far from thinking this. It is, rather, a question of geographical (or regional) contradictions, as it were. Many people were afraid, evidently, of finding themselves "ahead of the train," some had no wish to be charged with populism....

[Verk] Very well, and what next? There is talk to the effect that the president will be forced to call a referendum.

[Rayev] I realize that things need to be viewed realistically. However strong the traditional psychological stereotypes, the country cannot develop without private ownership of the land. As far as I know the president, he is following very closely what is happening both in parliament and in society. It is hard to forecast his decisions unequivocally, but I do not exclude his taking such a step, even if tactically this would not play to his advantage.

[Verk] In connection with the results of the popularity poll there have once again been rumors of the possibility of an early termination of the activity of the present parliament. How realistic, in your view, is such a course of events?

[Rayev] I am convinced that it is possible and necessary to work with this Supreme Council. It is another matter that far from all deputies have yet understood the simple truth that in having crossed the threshold of Parliament House they have become politicians. A politician should not only grasp the niceties of socioeconomic processes. He should have a firm moral position also—what it is customary to call political convictions.

[Verk] In this case, does it not seem to you that the incident involving Deputies Kobzev and Subbotin, who were removed from the Supreme Council on the recommendations of the Prosecutor's Office, testifies to the reverse? How realistic is a possibility of a repetition of the "Kobzev-Subbotin syndrome"?

[Rayev] It should not be forgotten that, of these two, only Subbotin was a deputy of the present Council. As far as a "syndrome" is concerned, there is Article 68 of the constitution prohibiting deputies from engaging in entrepreneurial activity and combining deputyship with positions outside of parliament. This article was adopted precisely to avoid such precedents. Unfortunately, the Supreme Council is still, in fact, in violation of the constitution—there is in the present corps of deputies a group of people continuing to combine positions.

In my view, parliament should set an example of strict compliance with the letter and spirit of the law, having determined its position in respect to that same Article 68.

[Verk] So until the deputies have determined where they stand as regards the article of the constitution, no one can guarantee that the Subbotin business will not be repeated?

[Rayev] The Subbotin case involved credit. But now, when a decision on the allocation of credit only on a competitive basis has been adopted, it is hardly likely that any deputy would risk becoming involved in this business. On the other hand, the deputies are as yet unduly engrossed in all kinds of investigations, inspections, and so forth.

It should not be forgotten that for this there is the Control Chamber, the auditing service, and the Prosecutor's Office, which, incidentally, is accountable to the Supreme Council. And it is perfectly sufficient for the deputies, as representatives of the legislature, to adopt laws, monitor their execution, and vote the budget.

[Verk] Parliament is not being all that successful here, evidently, since many deputies, judging by the lobby talk, are concerned with fetching up as quickly as possible in the magazine of the executive. This trend was clearly traced in the previous Supreme Council also, for that matter....

[Rayev] Yes, this is a trend. And I see nothing to be ashamed of here. Parliament has produced many excellent members of the executive. People who have graduated from the school of deputyship do not, as a rule, betray the principle of the supremacy of the law....

[Verk] But perhaps the aspiration to change "from one ship to another" is dictated by doubts as to the longevity of the present parliament?

[Rayev] There was a sense of this initially, particularly in the course of the first session of the Supreme Council. Many deputies expressed such misgivings openly. But after the president addressed parliament on 9 June, the corps of deputies came to feel more confident. I can affirm with full responsibility that the president has no intention of somehow compromising parliament, even less "dispersing" it.

Sobolev Sees 'Tough' 1995 Budget Choices

LD1001193495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1923 GMT 10 Jan 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Pokrovskiy; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In an exclusive interview with INTERFAX, Vice- Premier Viktor Sobolev said that "Kazakhstan's budget for 1995 will be very tough." He made the statement after Nazarbayev's meeting with the government on strategy of economic policies and principles for shaping budget for 1995.

According to Sobolev, several alternative versions of the budget for 1995 have been drafted. One of them is based on the existing tax system, the other one relies on the prepared tax code, which, according to the vice-premier, will be put into effect in the second quarter of the year.

Sobolev said that the concept of the budget policy envisages the budget deficit up to 3 percent. The government also intends to "hold the price growth," by reducing its dynamics almost six times.

The monthly inflation, believes Sobolev, should not exceed single-figure numbers, while it should amount to 1-2 percent by the end of the year. "We must make people sure of normally forecasted tomorrow," he said.

According to him, the president at the meeting insisted on the creation in 1995 of economic conditions for better life of people of Kazakhstan. The head of state, said Sobolev, drew special attention to the need to increase the social protection of the population, to pay maximum attention, if possible, to teachers, doctors, and narrow the gap in their living standards with that of the people engaged in the production sphere.

Sobolev said that the minimal wages in 1995 in Kazakhstan are likely to be 250 tenges (now—200 tenges, 54.61 tenges equal one US dollar), while it is planned to increase 1.5 times the average wages. The vice-premier said that he is not among those who back this idea of higher wages.

Sobolev said that in 1995 it is planned "to increase the output in several industries and lower the rates of the production decline, thus a small increase in the GDP is expected."

Tajikistan

Tehran Talks End Without Results

LD1701191795 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 0620 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A consultative meeting between Raymond Temirel, head of the United Nations's political department, representatives of the communist state of Tajikistan, the political opposition, and the mediator states—Russia and Iran—has ended in Tehran without the expected results having been achieved. Temirel has already left Tehran.

Uzbekistan Waiting for Russian Troop Withdrawal

MK1701144095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 2

[Report by Oleg Panfilov under the "Tajikistan" rubric: "U.S. State Department Worried Over Situation Along Tajik-Afghan Border. If Russian Influence Weakens, It Will Be Replaced by Uzbek Influence"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The U.S. State Department in the person of Mr. Warren Christopher issued a somewhat belated statement on 10 January condemning recent incidents along the Tajik-Afghan border. In his statement, Secretary of State Christopher noted his country's anxiety at the Russian military air strikes at Tajik refugee camps in Afghanistan "which resulted in civilian deaths." Also condemned are the Tajik opposition's retaliatory measures entailing deaths of Russian border guards. [passages omitted]

News agencies simultaneously report the resumption of Uzbek-Tajik contacts shown in the fact that government talks were held in Tashkent 7 January. During the talks, according to a REUTER report, it was determined that Dushanbe is supposed to pay Tashkent $199 million in debt before the year 2000. Tashkent undertook to supply to Dushanbe natural gas in exchange for Tajik aluminum. The hardest of the remaining problems, however, is the one of further political and military relations between the two states. It has come to light from confidential sources that some among Tajikistan's leadership held secret talks with representatives of Uzbekistan authorities in the town of Bekabad.

According to unofficial military sources in Dushanbe, there is a growing feeling among officers in Russian subunits quartered in Tajikistan that their presence there is unnecessary. This is primarily connected with the situation in Chechnya. It is hardly worthwhile, in this connection, to discuss the problem of the Russian troops' presence in Tajikistan since leaders of the opposition are inclined to demand their withdrawal because the openness of the border may cause a more global conflict in Central Asia. Should the Russian army try to leave Tajikistan, however, it may—and it would most probably happen—be replaced by Uzbek military-political influence.

Russian General Sees Upsurge in Tajik Rebel Action

LD1701213895 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Russian 1000 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The situation on Tajik-Afghan border is under the control of the Russian Border Troops. Armed operations by opposition groups on the border will be dealt with by frontier guards decisively, using all types of weapons. Major-General Vladimir Novikov, the first deputy commander of the Russian Border Troops group in Tajikistan, reported this to journalists.

The Russian general stressed that according to the available data, the Tajik opposition in northern Afghanistan is preparing to destabilize the situation on the border again, especially during the spring period. Caravans are bringing military equipment up to Afghan frontier villages from the heart of the country.

On the current situation on the southern border, Novikov said that the opposition had not abandoned its plans to fire on frontier units and posts from the boundary territory, or from mining areas adjacent to the border.

General Novikov noted that representatives of the Border Troops command had held a number of meetings with authoritative elders in northern areas of Tajikistan [as heard]. These were made aware of the CIS frontier guards' concern about the [words indistinct] development of the situation. The military told the Afghans of the need to take steps to prevent provocations by Islamic Rebirth Movement units.

Priority Given to Russian, Uzbek, CIS Ties

MM1701115695 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 14 Jan 95 p 1

[ITAR-TASS report under the rubric "In the CIS": "Priorities Unchanged"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tajikistan's foreign policy priority is still to strengthen ties with Russia, Uzbekistan, and other CIS countries. That was stated by Talbak Nazarov, Tajikistan's new foreign minister, in his first interview. He noted that his department will continue the dialogue with the opposition.

Talbak Nazarov, age 56, is an academician of the national academy of sciences, a doctor of economics, and author of over 100 scientific works.

President's Concern Over Future of Peacekeeping Force

LD1701124395 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0625 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Emomali Rakhmanov, president of the communist regime of Tajikistan, appealed to UN Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali. He again asked the United Nations to give the CIS peacekeeping force in Tajikistan international status. The observers analyzing this request say that Rakhmanov's regular request to the United Nations is mainly the result of pressure by the Russian servicemen.

Observers say that as a result of the war in Chechnya, the Russian Government may refuse to further finance the so-called several thousand CIS peacekeeping force in Tajikistan. That is why the Russian generals and the Tajik puppets are concerned.

Disarmament Continues Following President's Edict

LD1701193795 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 0200 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with an edict issued by the president of the Republic of Tajikistan, the process of disarmament is going on in Tajikistan. More than 620 firearms and a large amount of ammunition were confiscated in the republic from the beginning of January.

It should be remembered that more than 20 various kinds of firearms were confiscated from the inhabitants of the republic only yesterday.

Uzbekistan

Officials Examine Religious Freedom in Andizhan

LD1701205995 Tashkent Radio Mashal in Uzbek 0800 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A group of religious officials from the Committee on Religious Affairs of the republic's Cabinet of Ministers and from the Spiritual Board of Transoxanian Muslims has been visiting Andizhan Region. They have been examining the way the law on freedom of conscience and religious organizations is being observed in religious institutions and madrassas [religious colleges] in the city of Andizhan and the Bulakbashinskiy and Khudzhabadskiy districts. A meeting was held at the regional administration on this particular subject.

Rasul Rahmonov, an adviser to the government Committee on Religious Affairs and Yusufhoji Shokirov, the deputy chairman of the Spiritual Board of Transoxanian Muslims, spoke at the meeting. In their speeches they dwelt on the necessity of improving relations between state and religious establishments and the consolidation of unity among Muslims. The deputy hakim of Andizhan Region, Nazirjon Saidov, participated in the meeting.

Armenia

Ghukasyan Rules Out Turkey in Peace Process

NC1701211495 Yerevan Radio Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1930 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Azerbaijan's position on the resolution of the Karabakh crisis has not undergone any serious change. This was stated to an AZG correspondent in Stepanakert by Nagorno-Karabakh Foreign Minister Arkadi Ghukasyan. In clinging to abstract schemes, Baku continues to ignore the realities that have emerged in the region, and I think that the officials of the neighboring republic have not matured enough for a constructive dialogue, he said.

In the opinion of the foreign minister, the republic's [Nagorno-Karabakh] political weight on the international platform has considerably increased.

Arkadi Ghukasyan said that France, Sweden, and the CIS and Eastern European countries are ready to provide armed forces to carry out peace operations. However, in the words of the foreign minister, these are merely good intentions at present. For now, preparatory work is going on in this direction.

Regarding Turkey, the Karabakh authorities' position towards that country remain unchanged. We rule out even the very possibility of any Turkish participation in the peace process and consider as unethical even the raising of such an issue, concluded Arkadi Ghukasyan.

Parliament Approves International Credit Agreements

NC1701211295 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1900 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Armenian Supreme Council held an extraordinary session on 17 January in keeping with President Levon Ter-Petrosyan's decree on the convocation of an extraordinary session of the Armenian Supreme Council.

The Supreme Council press service reported that Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council Artashes Tumanyan, who was chairing the session, submitted the agenda proposed by the Republic's president.

During the exchange of views on documents under examination, the speakers unequivocally emphasized the importance of the financial assistance being provided by the prestigious international organizations for the stabilization and development of the Republic's economy and favored the ratification of the credit agreements.

Next, the Supreme Council voted on the issues discussed. The 163 deputies present almost unanimously ratified the three international credit agreements. It decided to ensure the implementation of the Armenian state budget in the first quarter of 1995. It fully adopted the bills on income and property tax and a decision on the procedure of implementing these bills.

Next, the Supreme Council found it appropriate to hear the Armenian president's annual report for 1994 on the political and socio-economic situation in the Republic during its session tomorrow.

The parliament will continue its deliberations on 18 January.

Ethnic Groups Form 'Union of Nationalities'

NC1701211595 Yerevan Radio Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1615 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Yet another union, that of the nationalities, has been formally registered in Armenia. This new public organization brings together the representatives of the Russian, Ukrainian, Kurdish, Yezidi, Syriac, Greek, German, and Jewish communities.

Vladimir Charoyev, president of the union, told SNARK that the organization aims at assisting in the development of national cultures and languages, preserving religions and traditions, as well as solving the social problems of the national minorities.

The union intends to set up national cultural centers in Armenia for the peoples living here. Vladimir Charoyev hoped that a number of countries would help them in this work, such as Germany, Russia, Ukraine, Greece, Israel, and others.

According to him, the union adheres to no political party or current. It is getting ready to establish its branch in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The head of the Union of Nationalities [azgutyunneri miutyun] said that the Armenian State History Museum has endorsed the proposal to establish a department for the national minorities.

Georgia

Abkhaz Militants Reported Fighting in Chechnya

LD1701232295 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian 1000 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi (IPRINDA)—An agency correspondent has learned from well-informed sources that since the beginning of the armed conflict in Chechnya, between 300 and 1,000 Abkhaz militants have fought on the side of Dudayev's formation against the Russian troops. These Abkhaz militants, before Boris Yeltsin ordered borders closed, were conveyed to Chechnya in buses in small groups of 15 to 20 men, as well as in helicopters from Novyy Afon to the Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya and on to the assembly point in the area of Pervomayskoye. A certain Guram Gumba, a member of the presidium of the Caucasian Peoples'

Confederation, and an envoy of Abkhazia to the Unrepresented Nations' and Peoples' Organization, is thought to be Dzhokhar Dudayev's close friend.

Russia Dissociates Itself From Kitovani 'Outing'

MM1701121195 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Teymuraz Mamaladze: "Tengiz Kitovani on the March Again"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The figure of the pretender, in many respects typical of Russian history, is now appearing in the capitals of the near abroad states. Yesterday in Tbilisi a certain citizen named Fistun, brandishing the papers of the Russian president's personal representative (because he was waving them around it did not prove possible to ascertain the name of the bearer or the authenticity of the papers), urged refugees from Abkhazia to force the Inguri River and return to their lost homeland under his leadership.

Some 500 armed combatants under parliamentary Deputy Tengiz Kitovani, former Georgian defense minister, now cochairman of the Abkhazia National Liberation Front, were summoned to escort the refugees. Seizing several buses, the "frontline" fighters set off for the West Georgian city of Senaki, where, according to Kitovani, they would meet with Russian peacekeepers and plan the return home. "If the parliament gives the go-ahead, we will begin military operations to recover Abkhazia."

Eduard Shevardnadze assessed the incident as an antistate act and irresponsible provocation designed to bring a fresh wave of of destabilization to the republic and encourage separatism. IZVESTIYA was told by Vazha Lordipanidze, leader of his apparatus, that the leaders of the power structures have been tasked with disarming Kitovani's illegal armed formation, while the Georgian Prosecutor's Office has been instructed to institute criminal proceedings against the "authors" of the provocation.

The command of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus has issued a corresponding statement dissociating itself from support for this "outing to Abkhazia." Arbatskaya Ploshchad [Russian Defense Ministry address] has also voiced a categorical "no." But to be on the safe side Georgia's ambassador to Russia has been instructed to find out whether there is a citizen among Yeltsin's associates bearing a name that is truly symbolic for this kind of mission. The time now is such that a host of Fistunovs have sprung up.

As for T. Kitovani, last fall, having recognized his share of the blame for the "loss of Abkhazia," he promised to enter the republic "if Russia's peacekeeping operation does not bear fruit." Now that Russia itself is fighting to restore its territorial integrity, the former minister has evidently decided to carry out his intentions. There is every indication that people did not think about the consequences, either in August 1992 or in January 1995.

Sigua Says Government Knew About March on Abhkazia

LD1701193895 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian 1400 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi (IPRINDA)—Former Georgian Prime Minister, MP Tengiz Sigua who is one of the closest associates to [former defense minister] Tengiz Kitovani, on 17 January held a news conference in Tbilisi. Commenting on the events of 13 January in connection with the actions carried out by Tengiz Kitovani, Sigua noted that 1,400 unarmed people had participated in the action. In Sigua's words, despite the assertions by official Tbilisi, no clashes had occurred and the people had surrendered voluntarily to the law-enforcement bodies. Sigua said that Kitovani had intended to deploy his men in Senaki (West Georgia), get training, and only after the Georgian Government decided to intervene in Abkhazia using arms, he would join the government forces.

We had informed well in advance the Georgian Government and the Security Service about our plans, Sigua stressed. In his opinion, this action was aimed at exerting a political pressure on Ardzinba's government. According to Sigua, over 200 arrested supporters of Tengiz Kitovani had gone on hunger strike demanding their leader's release. In Sigua's opinion, all of those arrested are political prisoners. In Sigua's words, the assassination of the National- Democratic Party leader, Giorgi Chanturia, has only postponed the assassination of Tengiz Kitovani, and Shevardnadze has started a war against the national-liberation forces.

Calls Arrest of Kitovani 'Provocation'

LD1701205495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1620 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tbilisi, Jan 17 (INTERFAX)—Former Georgian Prime Minister and leader of the outlawed National Liberation Front Tengiz Sigua has described as provocation the recent arrest of former Defense Minister Tengiz Kitovani and about 350 Front supporters.

"The aim of this provocation is to try to expel genuine patriots from the country's political life", he told a Tbilisi news conference Tuesday [17 January].

Front members were detained by government troops while travelling in buses to Abkhazia to try, they say, to recover it by force as part of Georgia.

However, Sigua maintained this was a peace march and that people aboard the buses were mainly unarmed Georgian refugees from Abkhazia who tried to return home after the authorities had failed to resolve the repatriation issue.

He denied any knowledge of the origin of a large amount of firearms seized from Front members on January 13. "Perhaps some refugees carried weapons but not with the blessing of Front leaders", he said.

Sigua, who is also a member of parliament, said he would endeavor for an urgent session to be held to discuss the government's wrongful actions against Front members.

Call for Self-Determination in Caucasus

AU1401164995 Vienna NEUE KRONEN-ZEITUNG in German 14 Jan 95 pp 4-5

[Interview with President Eduard Shevardnadze by Kurt Seinitz in Tbilisi; date not given: "End Intervention in Caucasus!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Seinitz] The Caucasus has a difficult historical legacy and a history of violence. How can the vicious circle of violence be broken?

[Shevardnadze] The history of self-determination is generally complicated and contradictory. This is all the more true in places where ethnic, religious, territorial, and material interests have been mixed for centuries, and especially in the area known as the Caucasus to the rest of the world.

If there is a historical peculiarity here, a kind of "Caucasus feature," it is only the fact that the Caucasus, as one of the "plums" of the world, has become a "hostage," so to speak, of its geopolitical situation. In the Caucasus is the crossroads of east, west, north, and south; the crossroads of trading routes and, even more important, of the interests of power. It is this strange outpost, the strategic pillar in an unending and by no means peaceful quarrel among the big, surrounding states. This is the reason for the oppression and consequent resistance.

One can put an end to this only in one way: By giving the peoples in the Caucasus and their sovereign states, which have already developed, the opportunity to decide their fate themselves and by not provoking them through the political ambiguities of some special interests in this region.

[Seinitz] Do you see a danger that aggressive and irresponsible politicians might grab power in Russia?

[Shevardnadze] Such a danger may develop if the process of democratic development comes to a dead end. However, I want to believe in Russia's healthy forces, which assess the situation correctly and look for ways to consolidate.

[Seinitz] In Russia there are voices that predict a "new growing together" of the former USSR republics.

[Shevardnadze] A revival of the old state regime is impossible. However, there is another extreme: isolationism. Nowadays the particularities of the world's structure and the dynamism of international relations are such that the existence of every single state, even the most developed, has no prospects if the state is alone.

I believe in the theory of convergence to the extent that coming closer together and merging into a qualitatively new, better human community is unavoidable if mankind wants to survive. Permit me to give you an example that is closest to you: Even the traditionally neutral and flourishing Austria is now facing the question of integration. As far as I know, all the "pros" and "cons" of EU membership were discussed. Fears were mentioned in connection with potential economic dependence or the unavoidable participation of a neutral state in the European security structures. On the other hand, the possibilities of stimulating the economy and activating the labor market were also discussed.

As regards the CIS, I think that there are more positive than negative aspects. One would have to state quite precisely that the question of a unified economic area should in no case be linked to the question of the sovereign countries' political status.

[Seinitz] You were the foreign minister of the superpower Soviet Union and now you are the head of state of a country that is as large as Austria. What is the difference regarding the power and responsibility of these two offices?

[Shevardnadze] The main difference for me is that now I am in my homeland and try to serve my people. I do not think that the level of dignity is directly linked to size.

I think that these are things that are fundamentally different and cannot be compared. Political influence in the world doubtlessly depends on the possibilities of a state. However, in today's international arena, which has become narrow, mutual dependence has increased manifold. It is sufficient to have just one "powder keg" to set fire to the entire world!

If I may use the wise metaphor of your outstanding compatriot Robert Musil: The world no longer wants to resemble the "man without qualities."

Shevardnadze Decrees Personnel, Structural Changes

LD1701095995 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0800 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We would like to present to you several decrees from the head of state [Eduard Shevardnadze].

In connection with his transfer to another job, Valerian Advadze is to be released from the post of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Georgia to the Russian Federation.

In connection with his transfer to another job, Vazha Lortkipanidze is to be released from the post of chief of the apparatus of the Georgian head of state.

Petre Mamradze is to be appointed head of the apparatus of the Georgian head of state.

Changes are to be introduced in the structure of the apparatus of the Georgian head of state: the services of military, security, and law-enforcement advisers are to be united into a single service for defense, security, and law-enforcement bodies. Nugzar Sajaia is to be appointed head of the service for defense, security, and law-enforcement bodies.

Shevardnadze on Current Issues

LD1601143895 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0810 GMT 16 Jan 95

[Interview with Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze by Nato Oniani in Tbilisi on 16 January—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Nato Oniani] Good morning. We present a radio interview with the chairman of the Georgian parliament and head of state, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze.

In reviewing last week's economic developments, one of the main subjects you are going to discuss will probably be the budget, which parliament has finally confirmed. Apart from this, economic agreements were signed between Georgia and Ukraine during the visit to Tbilisi by the Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma.

[Shevardnadze] Good morning. Last week was special in many respects. On 9-10 January the Ukrainian president, Mr. Kuchma, paid an official visit to Georgia. The visit outlined the main directions along which our good-neighborly, friendly, and mutually beneficial relations should develop. Very interesting discussions took place concerning both the conceptual understanding of contemporary problems and the mapping out of prospects for relations between the two countries.

Very important economic agreements were signed which are to restore industrial links on new market economy principles. These documents include agreements between the governments of the Republic of Georgia and Ukraine concerning free trade, industrial cooperation, assisting and protecting investment, and the settling of accounts between the national banks. There was also an agreement establishing a list of goods which the two governments are to deliver to each other in 1995, quotas, and much more. As you can see, these are issues which have an impact on our everyday life. [passage omitted]

It can be said that the value-added tax, excise duty, profit tax, tax on property, and people's income tax are the levers regulating a civilized economy. By collecting these taxes, the Tax Inspectorate has managed to accumulate significant sums of money. Many people did not expect this to happen, but the reality is that these taxes have contributed up to 25 trillion coupons to the budget in the fourth quarter of 1994. It is planned that more taxes will be introduced in 1995. Of course, this will happen along with the expansion of the industrial base. In particular, it is economically justified and timely to introduce a tax on land, which, according to forecasts, should bring 32 trillion coupons, half of which will go to local budgets. Again, it will be used for the benefit of people in rayons and towns, especially, for their social protection.

The distribution of tax between budgets remains a problem. This is a crucial question. The current regulation gives no incentive to the local bodies of government to expand a base which attracts value-added tax and excise duty. The fact of the matter is that only 10 percent of the value-added tax ends up in local budgets, while the excise duty goes entirely to the republican budget. At the same time, the fact that the profit tax goes entirely to the local budgets cannot be justified either. That is why it is necessary to increase the payments of value-added tax and introduce a payment of excise duty into the local budgets. At the same time, part of the profit tax should go to the republican budget.

These and other budgetary problems will be addressed by the head of state's decree which is now being prepared by the economic unit of the Cabinet of Ministers. It will then be examined by the Cabinet of Ministers, and I will sign it in the next few days. [passage omitted]

As promised, in the next few months we will start distributing privatization vouchers among citizens. This will be an important economic, social, and political event which will determine the establishment and strengthening of a large layer of private owners. Certain things have already started, and, as I have said more than once in the past, this course is irreversible. [passage omitted]

[Oniani] Politicians are giving differing assessments of events in Russia; I mean the Chechen crisis, of course. Some politicians seem to have changed their position recently. You have spoken about Chechen events more than once in the past. But tension has risen further, so what would you say now about what is happening there?

[Shevardnadze] I must say that many politicians in the world are making a realistic assessment of what is happening in Russia. I have in mind, for example, the German chancellor, Mr. Kohl. The U.S. President, Mr. Clinton, also has a moderate and normal position, as have many others. At the same time, I should say that I am amazed by—I am not exaggerating—the shortsightedness of many modern politicians in Russia and elsewhere.

That violence and bloodshed is reprehensible and human rights abuses are unacceptable is clear even to a child, to first or second grade pupils. No experience or knowledge is necessary to recognize this. However, if aggressive separatism is celebrating, gaining the upper hand and winning through the use of arms and violence, then what should we do? Can we confine ourselves to discussing human rights alone? Do we not know what it all means? What should a state do in such circumstances?

There was a meeting at the level of European envoys several days ago which expressed concern over the violation of human rights. But what can a state do when the elimination of this link and the action of armed formations means in effect its disintegration? [passage omitted]

I have experienced everything, and I have digested everything. I was telling the whole world from burning Sukhumi that this would rebound on you like a boomerang. I have quoted myself many times, and I do not like repeating myself at all, but this is the truth. That is how it happened.

And now, I am telling all those politicians who have a strange position, to put it mildly, that if you do not look further ahead and if you do not take account of tomorrow's prospects, then the consideration of other states' vital interests at the level of theoretical dimensions alone and only in general will also rebound on you, gentlemen, like a boomerang. You should not abstract yourselves from reality.

I would like to ask everybody in the world to listen to the words of a person who knows Russia very well: the world today needs a single Russia, a single and stable Russia. Look a little further ahead, and you will see yourself in a mirror reflecting the sun-rays of the 21st century. It may so happen that your reflection in this mirror will not look ideal. That is why I appeal to everyone not to base their views on today's events alone.

And, finally, there is a lot of talk in Russia and elsewhere about who has armed Dudayev, who benefited from it, and how it all happened. And I am asking you this pressing question: Who gave weapons not only to Dudayev—this, of course, has to be established—but also, who armed Abkhaz separatism to the teeth? Who are these people? I believe that Russian society should know this as well. That is what I think about this issue.

[Oniani] A leader of the National-Liberation Front, [former Georgian Defense Minister] Tengiz Kitovani, and other members of this organization who, according to them, were on their way to liberate Abkhazia were detained last week. Tengiz Kitovani said after his arrest that the authorities which had lost Abkhazia had then prevented his people from taking it back. You gave your political assessment of this incident the same day. There were also other opinions about it: Why had the activity of this organization not been prevented before? Perhaps, what happened was in the interests of the authorities?

And another question, please. The incident on 13 January is often compared to events in Chechnya. Do you also see a link between these two things?

[Shevardnadze] [passage omitted] I have to say in this connection that what Kitovani initiated was a new adventure, pure adventure. What were his aims? I think that he knew full well that entering Abkhazia using these forces and means could be ruled out. Then there were lies that the Russian leadership was helping him and a so called representative of the Russian president, who is now under arrest—[pauses] This man must be a swindler, not a real representative.

What was their real aim? The real aim was to plunder Samegrelo, as if what Samegrelo had already suffered was not enough; to set up gangs of bandits and robbers—some groups who are still hiding in the woods were waiting for Kitovani to arrive; to set up bases in Senaki, Poti and Zugdidi. If necessary—and I am sure that is what they would have done—they would have cut off our vital supply routes and prevented the transit of goods from Poti. And then everything would have started again. It has been said—it was [Head of the Security Service] Igor Giorgadze who said it—that it would have been the beginning of another civil war.

The disarming of Kitovani's illegal armed formations has also been the first serious blow inflicted on mafia gangs. Everybody knows how this mafia clan was established at the time of the war. The petrol mafia and other groups controlling brandy and sparkling wine trade as well as the Tatishvili group were all connected with this clan and these mafiosi. And when the decree on stepping up the struggle against racketeering and the mafiosi was published, it was not just an appeal but it was a program and an order to act. It all started then.

The investigation will establish everything. But I would like to take this opportunity to tell the mafiosi and racketeers that they should understand and see that an unrelenting struggle against this terrible phenomenon has started.

I do not want to overtake events and speak of a link between this and developments in Chechnya. However, it is clear that someone was trying to capitalize on instability and set up a new pocket of instability in Georgia.

Regarding the question of preventing this, everything proceeded in due course. This case was referred to the court. The Procurator's Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and other organs referred it to the court, and everything was done legally. After the court declared this formation illegal, and after they began arming themselves and trespassing the law, action was then taken. Before that, Kitovani and like-minded people had been warned repeatedly that it was an adventure which would not succeed and that they should not embark on this road. [passage omitted]

I would like to tell our listeners that nobody will ever be able to steer Georgia along the road of adventurism and chaos. [passage omitted]

Estonia

Prime Minister: 'No New Shipping Route' With Sweden

LD1701234795 Tallinn Estonian Television Network in Estonian 1900 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] There will be no new shipping route opening between Sweden and Estonia under this government, said Prime Minister Andres Tarand at his news conference today. This, however, does not mean that the government will in principle oppose the opening of new shipping routes. The government discussed the protest from Nordstroem and Thulin, the Swedish partner in the Estline shipping company, regarding the changes in the regulations for opening new shipping routes. The prime minister noted that it is indeed not good for a monopoly to run a route, but under an agreement concluded by a previous government, the present government has to comply with this. The agreement was concluded with the one- time Transport Department and allowed the joint firm, made up of the Estonian Shipping Line and Nordstroem and Thulin, to operate a shipping route between Estonia and Sweden as a monopoly for 10 years. The government has now told the Justice Ministry to carry out a legal examination of this agreement. The Justice Ministry is also to investigate how to break free of the agreement without damage to the taxpayer's purse, said Tarand.

Under the new rules for registering shipping routes, special permission endorsed by the Ministry is no longer required for opening shipping routes between Estonia and foreign ports. In order to open a shipping route, a shipping company has to reach an agreement with a port in Estonia and coordinate with the border and customs services.

Foreign Minister Begins French Visit

LD1701232095 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1800 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign Minister Juri Luik began his working visit to France today. On the first day Luik read a paper at the International Relations Institute in Paris, on the subject of Estonia and European prospects. Tomorrow [18 January], Luik will have a meeting with Alain Lamassoure, the French minister delegate for European affairs, and with Foreign Minister Alain Juppe.

Today a protocol between the Governments of the Estonian and French Republics was signed in Paris, under which France will provide nonreturnable financial aid for a specific purpose, for the modernization of the passenger terminal at Tallinn airport. As authorized by the Estonian Government, the protocol was signed by Estonian Ambassador to France Andres Tomasberg. The protocol came into force the moment it was signed. Behind the aid is the French (?treasury). The donation amounts to 3.85 million francs, which accounts for 87 percent of the total cost of the project.

Defense Officials Clarify Remarks on Chechnya

LD1701224395 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1800 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Regarding an Associated Press [AP] item of today, we have asked the men who gave the interviews to the AP to comment on their statements. Our interviewer is Koit Luus:

[Luus] The AP agency reported today, in a survey provided by Michael Tarm, that Estonia is analyzing very thoroughly the war in Chechnya so as to learn how to withstand attacks from overpowering forces. Michael Tarm, in his story, quotes Defense Minister Enn Tupp. I quote: When the time comes, we will fight like Chechnya does—end of quote. Here is Enn Tupp's comment:

[Begin Tupp recording] This is not true. I have indeed said to journalists that on the basis of the information we have access to, we indeed analyze things because I remember that even before we had a ministry and I was on the State Defense Commission, we for example even analyzed the Gulf War. But as far as this is concerned, one way or another, I have not said what I have been claimed to have said, because we are building an Estonian state defense according to the possibilities we have at our disposal at the moment, and our aim is that with our state defense, we should form a part of the united European security system. [end recording]

[Luus] Michael Tarm also quotes the Defense Forces Commander Aleksandr Einseln. I quote: If I did not have this job, I would go to Chechnya and fight on their side myself. Here is a comment from Aleksandr Einseln:

[Begin Einseln recording] This is somewhat exaggerated; it seems a benevolent exaggeration, but an exaggeration nonetheless, and would leave a completely incorrect impression. I will tell you what I said from the Riigikogu [parliament] records. I spoke on 9 January, last Monday, in answer to a question from MP Kuno Raude. His question was: Mr. General, how would you see the situation if a situation similar to that in Chechnya should develop here? My response was that, first, as you have mentioned the people of Chechnya, I would like to voice my respect for this people's desire for freedom; and I must say that if I was not here, I would help them somehow today—end of quote. This is also how I relayed it to the newspapers, but somehow, with good intentions perhaps, they wanted to improve on it or produce a better image, and it did not come out right. [end recording]

Tarand Says Cabinet Cannot Recognize Chechnya

LD1701131895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1100 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Jan 16 (INTERFAX)—The Estonian Prime Minister Andres Tarand told parliament Monday [16 January] that his cabinet cannot recognize Chechnya for pragmatic and legal reasons.

During question time he said that Chechnya can be recognized only when it uses its right to self-determination, offers citizenship and exercises control over its territory and borders. In his opinion Chechnya will have to defend itself in armed struggle till the international public opinion capable of influencing governments matures to recognize Chechnya's right to self-determination.

Even if Estonia recognizes Chechnya, the initiative can hardly lead to special progress on the part of the other countries, Tarand believes. A preliminary agreement of leading countries along diplomatic channels can make a breakthrough. "But so far to my knowledge such talks are not being held", he said.

Tarand stressed that the 1991 Estonian-Russian treaty on the principles of bilateral relations does not allow to recognize Chechnya because Estonia recognized Russia's integrity within its current borders. He added that there are no moral arguments against Chechnya insisting on its recognition.

Parliament—No Troops for Peacekeeping Missions in FSU

LD1701195895 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1400 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Riigikogu today held the first reading of a bill on the use of the Defense Forces for fulfilling international duties of the Estonian state. This bill allows the Estonian peacekeepers to serve in UN peacekeeping forces, for example in Croatia. Rein Helme, the chairman of the state defense commission, said the bill was aiming to regulate the area which is still defined only by documents on Estonian membership in international organizations.

Helme told BNS that although the bill had passed the first reading, it still had to be improved. He added that the formalization of the service contracts and regulation of social guarantees of the peacekeepers needed special attention. As a social guarantee, the bill stipulates that the peacekeepers would be receiving increased salary while on operations or joint exercises abroad. The increased salary would be set by the government.

The bill stipulates that the units of the Estonian Defense Forces are not allowed to take part in international operations or joint operations together with armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the territories of the CIS states or the Baltic states.

Debated Citizenship Bill Brings Strong Reactions

LD1701225995 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1800 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Leaders of the three Russian-speaking parties have once again called to Riigikogu [parliament] members to postpone the adoption of the new citizenship law until after the elections [on 5 March]. Their statement says that an issue as important to both society and the state as the adoption of a citizenship law must be decided by the new parliament, to be elected on 5 March.

As is known, the Riigikogu suspended the third reading of the draft citizenship law today for a second time, with the reading to resume on Thursday [19 January]. One of the leaders of the Better Estonia/Estonian Citizen electoral pact, Juri Estam, however, began a hunger strike on Toompea [seat of parliament] today. According to what he said, his hunger strike is caused precisely by the draft citizenship law. In the draft tabled by Mart Nutt, Estam objects first and foremost to the concessions made to non-citizen colonists who arrived in Estonia before 1990. This is what Estam told ETA.

Privatization of Uranium Supplier Discussed

LD1701215695 Tallinn Estonian Television Network in Estonian 1900 GMT 16 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Safe storage of radioactive waste has lately been a worrying issue in Estonian society. The depository at Saku is substandard and studies in Paldiski are continuing. Similar issues arise with the production of the Silmet joint stock company in Sillamae. Economics Minister Toivo Jurgenson said at the Riigikogu information hour today that the absence of a proper waste depository near the Finnish Gulf and the town of Sillamae has been a problem for 50 years.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] The Silmet joint stock company is one of the main employers in Sillamae providing nearly 1,500 jobs. However, this is a very specific enterprise: Silmet has supplied the Russian nuclear industry with uranium for nearly 50 years. At present, the main output is rare metals niobium and tantalum, several earth metals, and powder mixtures of strategic importance. So the output of Silmet is being used by specific industries: by the military industry and atomic energy industry.

A working group consisting of experts from the Privatization Agency, the Economics Ministry, and the Finance Ministry is holding negotiations over the privatization of Silmet.

[Jurgenson] Part of the working group's work is to conduct investigations into the background of potential future owners and to get reasonable assurances that tender offers contain a positive program and provide solutions regarding suppliers, markets, etc. As for foreign aid, specialists of different states, predominantly from the Nordic countries, are currently studying issues of environmental safety.

[Correspondent] According to Toivo Jurgenson, an earlier deal which privatized Silmet's (?railway works) department had been illegal and had been declared void by now. [end recording]

Latvia

Council of Europe Quest Raises Human Rights Issue

MM1701144495 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jan 95 First Edition p 7

[Report by Aleksandr Shinkin: "We Will Talk About Human Rights Later. First We Will Admit Latvia to the Council of Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Miguel Martinez, president of the Council of Europe parliamentary assembly, visited Latvia this week. The aim of his visit was to familiarize himself with the situation in that Baltic state prior to its admission into the Council of Europe. However, Miguel Martinez' visit is more a matter of official etiquette than an actual study of the situation in the region. Furthermore, to judge from the visitor's own words he went for the two-day visit to Riga with his opinions already formed. He is convinced that the result of the assembly session's vote on Latvia's admission into the Council of Europe will be positive. Because it has already done everything necessary to be admitted.

The position of the president of the Council of Europe parliamentary assembly is entirely understandable: In the past the Council of Europe gave a commitment that the Baltic countries will eventually become members of it. Estonia and Lithuania have already been admitted. Only one small thing is missing—taking Latvia in.

Meanwhile, it is possible to ignore the highly sensitive situation over the violation of human rights in the country. But if someone does insist strongly on that, it can be explained to them that as soon as a country becomes a member of the Council of Europe each individual's rights in it will be protected by additional international guarantees. And, the argument runs, the presence of CSCE officials in Latvia and other Baltic countries clearly shows that the international community takes this question seriously.

But you have to understand that these arguments are designed for European political platforms. Miguel Martinez himself evidently appreciates that. And whereas he tells the Latvian premier that the country is firmly established as a democratic state, at a meeting with representatives of the ethnic minorities he will say: "I find it absolutely unacceptable that hundreds of thousands of people who were citizens under a totalitarian system are deprived of their citizenship when it is replaced by a democratic regime."

This is not the only paradox. Literally before the eyes of the president of the Council of Europe's parliamentary assembly the Riga Duma added one more distinction between citizens and noncitizens to the more than 60 already existing. It decided to introduce a municipal services allowance for needy citizens. Noncitizens, however, the majority of whom are not of indigenous nationality, are permitted that allowance as an exception and by special decision of the local authorities. For which read: Never. To which Miguel Martinez stated once more that there is nothing like that in any other country, everywhere else the only factors that are considered when social allowances are granted, he said, are a person's residence and employment in the state in question.

But what can be done here? The visitor to Latvia is the bearer of a great mission: to accelerate the process of the country's integration with Western institutions because only this can guarantee it stability and security. Indeed, no one objects to that. My only wish is that the "democratic country's" movement toward a free and democratic Europe should not ride roughshod over the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, insulting and impugning their honor and dignity and sowing grief and suffering.

European Convention Approved on Human Rights

LD1701234395 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 2100 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At its Tuesday [17 January] session the Latvian Cabinet of Ministers approved the European Convention on Human Rights and its additional protocols, which are due to be signed when Latvia joins the Council of Europe. [indistinct passage omitted]

Birkavs: Years Before Republic Can Join NATO

WS1801115695 Tallinn BNS in English 1813 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Jan 17, BNS—Taking into account the speed of Latvia's economic and political development, the country could join NATO no sooner than in five years, Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs told reporters on return from his U.S. trip.

Latvia should first become an associate member of the European Union and sign up to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade because these are the main preconditions for joining NATO and the EU.

In the future, Latvia should pay more attention to the development of the National Armed Forces, their ability to collaborate with NATO formations and compliance with European standards.

During his trip, Birkavs met with Republican senators who have drawn up a National Security Act providing for NATO expansion. Under the draft, four Eastern European countries, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic, will be accepted to the alliance starting with Jan. 10, 1999. The enrollment of the Baltic states is set for later years after the first four East European Nations are accepted.

The Latvian delegation suggested that one Baltic country be enrolled whenever a Visegrad group member is accepted. Birkavs said he hoped that Congress will consider the proposal.

Commenting on Russia's allegations of Baltic mercenaries in Chechnya, Birkavs said that the U.S. Government "smiled at them" and understood that it was not the official stance of the Baltic Governments.

As reported, Birkavs and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher signed a bilateral agreement on promotion and protection of mutual investments. Christopher described the step as an important step toward the strengthening of bilateral relations, said Birkavs.

Official: Legal Flaws May 'Provoke' OSCE Crisis

WS1801115795 Tallinn BNS in English 1813 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Jan 17, BNS—Legal flaws in documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] could provoke its long-term crisis, Latvian delegation head, MP Alexander Kirsteins told reporters Tuesday [17 January].

Kirsteins described the OSCE Jan. 13 resolution on the Chechen situation as legally incorrect. The statement calls to "stop violence and restore the political dialog in line with principles of the Helsinki documents, especially regarding Russian territorial integrity in the frame of its Constitution."

The resolution disregards the fact that Chechnya declared independence from Russia in 1991, while the existent Russian Constitution was adopted in 1993, Kirsteins said.

Another prerequisite for potential crisis is the organization failing to provide any mechanism for the creation of new countries. Documents, laying down the organization's principles, speak of general human rights and self-determination rights of nations but they fail to say how the rights are implemented.

The mentioned resolution was drafted by a work party, including proposals by the 15 European Union countries, the Baltic states and the Czech Republic.

The document failing to recognize that Chechnya has any right for self-determination, the Baltic states declined to support it.

On the other hand, Kirsteins praised the resolution for containing an intention to send a OSCE mission to Chechnya.

"Warfare is unlikely to escalate" after the arrival of the mission what will enable the sides to start settlement talks, said Kirsteins.

Kirsteins sees the main reason for the fact that no country has so far recognized the Chechen independence in the presence of Russian nuclear weapons in its territory.

In addition, other autnomous regions of Russia would follow the Chechen example, if its independence gains international recognition, said Kirsteins.

Russian Army Pensioners Remain Despite Treaty

LD1301221695 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1700 GMT 13 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A list has been received from the Russian Federation according to which, on 15 March 1994, there were more than 22,000 military pensioners living in Latvia. Examination has revealed that nearly 2,000 of these personnel included on this list retired after 28 January 1992, which means that in accordance with the Latvian-Russian treaty they must leave Latvia. This information was gained from the Internal Affairs Ministry, where a press conference was held today. It was held to clarify the issues relating to the stipulations adopted at the end of last year regulating the sojourn of Russian military pensioners in Latvia. Internal Affairs Minister Janis Adamsons explained that the (?stipulations relate to) the earlier legislative acts on the Russian-Latvian treaty on the troop withdrawal.

Moscow TV Bureau Promises 'Objective' Information

WS1701161695 Riga DIENA in Latvian 19 Dec 94 p 1

[Report by Baiba Melnace: "Independent Moscow Television Opens Offices in Riga and Washington"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Riga, 18 Dec — On Christmas Eve, the Moscow Independent Television [MIT] Baltic Bureau will be opened in Riga. Director of the Bureau Dmitriy Novikov, former Latvian TV reporter, assessed it as a possible source of objective information about the Baltic states in Moscow mass media.

Independent Television is a private television company, which engages a considerable number of popular journalists, such as Tatjana Mitkova, Yevgeniy Kiselov, and Irina Zaiceva.

As DIENA has already reported, the political standpoint of the above mentioned TV station can be judged by the fact, that the Russian State Duma has decided to check its activities, because Duma disapproves of the way it depicted the recent events in Chechnya. According to the station, it has an audience of 70 million.

It has already been a year, since the station receives material on Latvia, due to an agreement concluded between the station and Latvian Television. In the future, after the Baltic Bureau is opened in Riga on 22 December, the MIT will present three to four items weekly concerning the Baltic states.

The Baltic Bureau is the third MIT office abroad: such a bureau already functions in Berlin, and parallel to Riga, a bureau of this kind is being established in Washington.

At present, negotiations between technical directors of the Latvian TV and the MIT are being conducted, and most probably it will be possible to watch the MIT in Latvia in the near future.

The opening of the Baltic Bureau will be attended by the leaders of the company. They have recieved invitation to visit President Guntis Ulmanis.

Finance Ministry Releases Data on 1994 Foreign Debt

LD1701132195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1100 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Jan 17 (FIA)—According to preliminary reports, last year Latvia's foreign debt increased by almost 55 million lats ($101 million) and reached 188.5 million ($346.5) by January 1, 1995. This was disclosed to the Financial Information Agency by a spokesman for the Finance Ministry.

He said that the ministry does not have full information about all payments made in 1994 therefore the exact size of the foreign debt is not known. At the same time he said that 15 million of the sum goes to loans offered against government guarantees.

Ministry experts think that in any case Latvia will keep the government debt within the limits set by the 1994 budget according to which the size of the foreign debt should not have exceeded 251 million lats ($461 million) and loans against government guarantees exceed 21.5 million

According to the ministry, the loans on which Latvia signed agreements reached 289 million lats by the beginning of 1995.

The official rate of the lat set by the Bank of Latvia on January 16 was 0.544/$1.

Lithuania

President Denies Lithuania's Involvement in Chechnya

LD1701195495 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Reports about the alleged detention of a Lithuanian spy in Chechnya and the circulating rumors about a battalion with links to the Lithuanian special services allegedly fighting in Chechnya disseminated by some Russian officials and the mass media were vigorously denied by Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas.

We deny that anything of the kind has happened nor that anything of this kind can ever happen, the president told national radio in his regular Tuesday [17 January] interview. This simply is a lie, by which certain aims are pursued, the president stressed. Brazauskas said that Lithuania did not render support to either of the fighting sides.

I understand the situation in which the Russian authorities got themselves and I understand the tragedy of the Chechen people, however, the problem must be solved only by peaceful means and this must be done as soon as possible, Brazauskas pointed out.

Polish Envoy Reassures on Troops Deployment

LD1701202995 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Russian 1300 GMT 17 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Reports that Poland is concentrating its troops on the border with Lithuania were denied by Jan Widacki, the Polish ambassador to Lithuania. Of late there have been no new decisions concerning redeployment of Polish troops; however, the process of redeployment has been going on since 1992 and will continue for some time, the Polish ambassador to Lithuania said, speaking on Lithuanian Television. According to him, earlier, two-thirds of Polish troops were deployed in the western part of the country, and now an even distribution of Polish troops along the entire Polish border is being carried out.

Mr. Widacki offered a comment concerning the statement made by Vytautas Landsbergis, leader of the right-wing parliamentary opposition, who claimed that the Polish Government intends to deploy its military unit close to the Lithuanian border after moving it from the western part of the country. [passage omitted]

Mr. Widacki assured that neither the long-term program of the Polish army nor the redeployment of the Polish state border police units has anything to do with Russo-Lithuanian relations. This also should not be linked with the problems of military transit. A third state should not be drawn into the relations between Lithuania and Russia, the Polish ambassador said.

The Lithuanian minister of foreign affairs criticized the leader of the opposition, saying that he has given free rein to his fantasies and suggested that in similar cases he should appeal for information to the official state structures. [passage omitted]

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